These heuristics were informed by interviews with nine experts in Global Catastrophic Risk (GCR) policy and by a survey with seven responses. The experts all have some sort of interest in EA, so this should not be seen as a representative sample of policy expert opinion.

The interviews were part of my work on global food system resilience, but the heuristics mostly apply to GCR policy in general.

Summary

• Policy change is key to increasing GCR resilience: in many cases, governments are the only entities with the resources to tackle to problem. But [According to EA-adjacent policy experts] EAs generally overemphasize research compared to policy advocacy.
• It's worth taking time to consider the best target country. Each presents unique opportunities and challenges.
• Framing is important. Policies that increase resilience to GCRs may be more palatable when pitched in terms of climate change, economic growth, national security and so on.
• Timing matters. Advocates need to be ready to jump when a window of opportunity arises. Funders should be willing to support advocates long-term so that they can build relationships & wait for the windows.

Heuristics

Feeding everyone in a catastrophe is a huge task that only governments can achieve. Policy experts typically felt that EA orgs generally overestimate the importance of academic research in this field relative to policy advocacy.

• It would be naive to assume that research, in isolation, will influence government decision-making. Policy proposals must be backed by (some) evidence, but policymakers are not driven by academic findings.
• Research can improve the quality of “what we advocate for”, but has little impact on the chances of achieving policy change

There are different levels of government commitment. However, they do not necessarily have to be enacted in sequence:

• “Getting a file in a drawer” can be relatively easy, but there is no guarantee that catastrophe response plans will be used when the moment comes
• Getting cooling catastrophes - or any GCR - included in governments’ risk profiles or in law is probably a prerequisite for government funding (with possible exceptions such as grants for technological innovation), but inclusion in law means little on its own.
• Getting a government grant/contract would be a huge milestone. This could be for preparedness planning or for research into adaptations and resilient foods.
• It may be possible to get an existing government committee to examine the risk, or to prompt the formation of something like the UK’s AI “taskforce”. However, this would almost certainly for "out there" risks that are not in the public consciousness.

Different countries present different challenges and opportunities for improving global food system resilience. Success would be welcomed in any country: to date, we have never seen government grant funding for cooling catastrophe resilience, and it would be great to see this change.

• The US has the most resources, and leads the world in R&D capacity. Lots of political appointments in government departments, which means that policy windows are narrow and relationships have to be formed quickly. Lax spending laws mean that the lobbying environment is very crowded. The passing of the GCRMA in 2022 may have provided a new pathway for advancing GCR policy.
• The UK has more spending restrictions and a less crowded lobbying environment. The restrictions complicate logistics, but make it cheaper to advance policy for those in position. More of the work is done by bureaucrats, so engaging with civil servants is relatively more important. The UK has much less spending power than the US, but punches above its weight in soft power, as evidenced by the Bletchley Declaration on AI. One expert suggested that the most likely UK policy breakthrough would be the formation of a committee or task force.
• Australia is expected to be very resilient in a cooling catastrophe. It is a major food exporter and may be able to expand food production and export in a catastrophe.
• Argentina currently has the largest per-capita calorie surplus and is well-placed to continue or expand production in a catastrophe, feeding up to 300 million people. There have been some signs of interest from civil servants and technical experts, but no funding is forthcoming. Advocates are hopeful that by conducting modeling work and field trials with the blessing of the Argentinian government, they would benefit from government data and increase the probability of the government eventually acting on their findings.
• Smaller countries like Norway and Switzerland have been identified as potential targets for advocacy based on their perceived openness to national resilience planning.
• Multilateral advocacy was generally not favored by the experts we spoke to. There was concern that after a global catastrophe, domestic law takes priority over international agreements. However, we did not speak to any specialists in the UN, EU etc. We were told that “some effort should be happening at the UN level”, and that this could be a good way to engage Latin American countries.

Cooling catastrophe policy - like other GCR policy - can be advanced through a number of arms of government. It can be framed as a national security issue, a disaster-management issue, a technological issue, an agricultural issue, a scientific issue, and so on.

Cooling catastrophes are fringe, but prospects are improving.

• Increasing concern about climate change may push food resilience up the agenda
• Extreme weather events may cause regional or global food shocks that increase governments’ interest in resilience to catastrophes
• Biosecurity is another pathway to global food shortage. If biosecurity becomes a bigger concern, global food security (and especially infrastructure resilience) may get more attention

• However, it remains difficult to communicate the importance of low-probability, high-consequence events

   

Experts were surprisingly optimistic that additional advocacy efforts could lead to a significant policy breakthrough in their country

• 6 out of 7 survey respondents assigned at least 10% to the probability that a 10 FTE advocacy effort by an EA org in their country of expertise would lead to a breakthrough. 3 out of 7 gave a probability of more than 50%.
• One optimistic respondent highlighted that [~$1 million] is a lot of resources, and much has already been achieved with less.
• One pessimistic respondent (“~5%” probability) cited the unfamiliarity of politicians/advisors with the danger of cooling catastrophes.

Presentation is critical. Cooling catastrophes are not a mainstream political concern, and our experts suggested that “willingness of policymakers/politicians to engage with the issue” is the biggest single bottleneck to advocacy work in this area. The experts proposed various recommendations for presenting catastrophic food resilience in a way that is attractive to policy-makers

• Package food resilience measures alongside more mainstream concerns. Climate change, food/energy independence & technological innovation are examples of “sexy” causes that can be used to sweeten the pill.
• Get the timing right. The political agenda is constantly changing, and savvy lobbyists can predict when prospects are particularly good.
• There is a danger that eccentric-seeming EAs/scientists could turn policymakers off.
• Appearances are less important when working with civil servants

A small advocacy presence can go a long way. Policy experts highlighted instances when small teams were able to have large impacts by pouncing on opportunities when they arose. Advocates can ensure that food resilience stays on the agenda even when staff turnover in government is high.

More money and more people would increase the chances of policy success. Larger teams can scan more widely for opportunities, build more relationships, draw upon more collective expertise. There was disagreement among experts on whether it would be better to support food security specialists or GCR generalists in policy advocacy. One expert emphasized that a well-connected person would have much more impact. Another (in Australia) claimed that a lack of personnel is causing missed opportunities by limiting the capacity for professional connections. We assume that the returns of funding policy personnel would diminish with scale.

Continuity is important. Relationships develop over time, and lobbyists build credibility gradually. Short-term grant funding undermines this by making policy work insecure.

1. ^{^}