(Cross-post from /r/EffectiveAltruism, with minor revisions.)
On the home page of 80,000 Hours, they present a key advice article outlining their primary recommendations for EA careers. According to them, this article represents the culmination of years of research and debate, and is one of the most detailed, advanced intros to EAs yet.
However, while their article does go into some background ideas about the foundations of EA, one idea now stands above all else: a single, narrow focus on recruiting people to AI safety.
To be sure, the article mentions other careers. For example, the article brings up mitigation of climate change and nuclear war as potential alternatives before instantly dismissing them because they aren’t neglected. The article also briefly mentions the other two classical EA cause areas, global poverty and animal welfare. However, the article rejects these causes one sentence later for not focusing on the long-term. This ignores the fact that value spreading and ripple effects can affect the distant future. Quote:
Some other issues we’ve focused on in the past include ending factory farming and improving health in poor countries. These areas seem especially promising if you don’t think people can or should focus on the long-term effects of their actions. (emphasis mine)
In the end, the article recommends only AI risk and biorisk as plausible EA cause areas. But even for biorisk it says,
We rate biorisk as a less pressing issue than AI safety, mainly because we think biorisks are less likely to be existential, and AI seems more likely to play a key role in shaping the long-term future in other ways.
This is a stark contrast to the effective altruism of the past, and the community as a whole that focuses on a diversity of cause areas. Now, according to 80,000 Hours, EA should focus on AI alone.
This confuses me. EA is supposed to be about evidence and practicality. Personally, I’m pretty skeptical of some of the claims that AI safety researchers have made for the priority of their work. To be clear, I do think it’s a respectable career, but is it really what we should recommend to everyone? Consider that
- It’s not clear that advanced artificial intelligence is going to arrive any time within the next several decades. And if AI were far away it would substantially reduce EA leverage. I’m not personally that impressed by the recent deep learning revolution, which I see as essentially a bunch of brittle tools and tricks that don’t generalize well. See Gary Marcus’s critique.
- Most researchers seem to be moving away from a fast takeoff view of AI safety, and are now opting for a softer takeoff view where the effects of AI are highly distributed. If soft takeoff is true, it's much harder to see how a lot of safety work is useful. Yet, despite this shift, it seems that top EA orgs have become paradoxically more confident that artificial intelligence is cause X!
- No one really has a clear idea about what type of AI safety is useful, and one of the top AI safety organizations, MIRI, has now gone private so now we can’t even inspect whether they are doing useful work.
- Productive AI safety research work is inaccessible to over 99.9% of the population, making this advice almost useless to nearly everyone reading the article.
- Top AI safety researchers are now saying that they expect AI to be safe by default, without further intervention from EA. See here and here.
AI safety as a field should still exist, and we should still give it funding. But is it responsible for top EA organizations to make it the single cause area that trumps all others?
Thanks for asking.
One factor that seems important is that even a small probability of "very short timelines and a sharp discontinuity" is probably a terrifying prospect for most people. Presumably, people tend to avoid saying terrifying things. Saying terrifying things can be costly, both socially and reputationally (and there's also the possible side effect of, well, making people terrified).
I hope to write a more thorough answer to this soon (I'll update this comment accordingly by 2019-11-20).
[EDIT (2019-11-18): adding the content below]
(I should note that I haven't yet discussed some of the following with anyone else. Also, so far I had very little one-on-one interaction with established AI safety researchers, so consider the following to be mere intuitions and wild speculations.)
Suppose that some AI safety researcher thinks that 'short timelines and a sharp discontinuity' is likely. Here are some potential reasons that might cause them to not discuss their estimate publicly:
Extending the point above ("people tend to avoid saying terrifying things"):
Voicing such estimates publicly might make the field of AI safety more fringe.
Some researchers might be concerned that discussing such estimates publicly would make them appear as fear mongering crooks who are just trying to get funding or better job security.
Oren Etzioni, a professor of computer science at the University of Washington and the CEO of the Allen Institute for Artificial Intelligence (not to be confused with the Alan Turing Institute) wrote an article for the MIT Technology Review in 2016 (which was summarized by an AI Impacts post on November 2019). In that article, which is titled "No, the Experts Don’t Think Superintelligent AI is a Threat to Humanity", Etzioni cited the following comment that is attributed to an anonymous AAAI Fellow:
Note: at the end of that article there's an update from November 2016 that includes the following:
See also this post by Jessica Taylor from July 2019, titled "The AI Timelines Scam" (a link post for it was posted on the EA Forum), which seems to argue for the (very reasonable) hypothesis that financial incentives have caused some people to voice short timelines estimates (it's unclear to me what fraction of that post is about AI safety orgs/people, as opposed to AI orgs/people in general).
Some researchers might be concerned that in order to explain why they have short timelines they would need to publicly point at some approaches that they think might lead to short timelines, which might draw more attention to those approaches which might cause shorter timelines in a net-negative manner.
If voicing such estimates would make some key people in industry/governments update towards shorter timelines, it might contribute to 'race dynamics'.
If a researcher with such an estimate does not see any of their peers publicly sharing such estimates, they might reason that sharing their estimate publicly is subject to the unilateralist’s curse. If the researcher has limited time or a limited network, they might opt to "play it safe", i.e. decide to not share their estimate publicly (instead of properly resolving the unilateralist’s curse by privately discussing the topic with others).