It might be helpful to distinguish between two different strategies:
Advocating to prevent expansion:For this, I would presume you need political decision-makers to obstruct the project. I'm skeptical that sufficient political power can be mobilized from animal advocates alone. I think you need causes that mobillizes more people, such as environmental, job displacement, food sovereignty/quality, anti foreign business, etc.
Advocating for stronger animal welfare regulations:This feels more achievable if the regulations don't impose large costs, but it may be harder to draw in meaningful support from other causes. Even so, getting new regulations is hard. IIRC, the biggest animal welfare regulations in the US were won via ballot measures, where voters' views could directly accept/reject policy, not by influencing politicians to legislate. It might be relevant to consider how protections were won in other countries.
These are just speculations, perhaps this is a false dichotomy.
Thanks for sharing this example, Asampana. Do you have a rough idea of what it would take to prevent this expansion, i.e., at what level does the relevant decision-making power lie? And are there existing political movements or currents that are conducive to success?
I once heard a talk by @Daniela Waldhorn that raised the thought experiment of "what if animal advocates had established a movement against factory farming when it was still in its infancy?" There may be something to the case that a large number of people could be mobilized to support such bans and that opposition to them is surmountable when the industry is still young. But it still seems likely that JBS would seek to expand elsewhere instead.
We should prioritize slowing the spread of industrial animal agriculture in future high-production regions over investing in advocacy in currently high-production regions that remain neglected in terms of farmed animal advocacy.
I am generally more optimistic about advocacy that seeks to improve welfare conditions than advocacy that tries prevent the expansion of intensive production. Welfare campaigns have smaller asks, which I suspect makes them more tractable. I also worry that obstructed intensification in one place will largely be offset by intensification or production expansion elsewhere.
I would vote differently if the topic were framed in terms of focusing more on places that have growing industries instead of in terms of preventing the spread of intensification. I strongly welcome evidence or speculation that preventing spread is tractable.
The neglectedness and intensity of animal suffering would, in a triaging scenario, see me prioritizing it over many global health interventions. I am open to the idea that many animals do actually live lives worth living. That said, I suspect I would rather forego living than spend an existence as an industrially farmed broiler chicken or fish. These are the animals I would spend money on at the margin, with research into the welfare of more liminal animals like crustaceans and insects (probably not large increases for wild for now, since tractability may remain a constraint).
I am sensitive to the idea that animal welfare work may not be able to productively absorb $100 million. At the same time, I would like to see more experimentation with campaigns and approaches in the animal advocacy movement.
Thanks for these updates, and for the work that you do at GWWC.
I'm wondering, would you know the share and total amounts of funding going to the different cause area categories you outlined if you also include Open Philanthropy, Longview, Manifund, etc? (I recognize many cause areas may also receive large amounts of funding from non EA affiliated sources). No worries if not.
Thank you for writing this article! As a complete newcomer to pandemic preparedness at large, I found this extremely useful and a great example of work that surfaces and questions often unstated assumptions.
Although I don't have enough expertise to provide much meaningful feedback, I did want to bring up some thoughts I had regarding your arguments in Reason 2. Your 44 hospitalizations threshold in the numerical examples strikes me as reasonable, but it does also seem to me that the metagenomic sequencing of COVID-19 was related ― if not a critical precondition ― to China confirming its finding of a novel pathogen (source). I recognize that the early detection interventions you are calling into question here may be more of the form of mass/representative sampling programs, but it seems plausible to me that merely having the means to isolate and sequence a pathogen near the site of the outbreak in question could substantially affect time to confirmation.
My prior is that China is likely quite capable in that regard, but other countries may have fewer capabilities. All this to say that investing in more conventional metagenomic sequencing capacity in "sequencing deserts" could still be very cost effective. But note that this is all conjectural; I don't know anything about the distribution of sequencing capacity, nor even what it takes to identify, isolate and sequence a pathogen.
Thanks for your questions, Moritz! I hadn't seen that post.
I don't think I could tell you with confidence that such interventions would be promising. There are a lot of steps in the causal chain that I'm unsure about.
Looking at the supplementary material of this study, it seems like a lot of the second-hand cages from the EU's ban may have been sold to countries that already almost only use cage-free systems (cross-referencing with OWID data numbers ). So perhaps many of second-hand cages are simply replacing old ones, rather than causing more chickens to end up in them (of course they could be used for new chickens farms ― don't know).
Note that the OWID numbers are more recent, so it's possible some of these countries increased their cage share as a result of those sales.
Still, it's possible that more are now being sold to e.g. Nigeria, and that this is placing new chickens in cages. So the question is: how much does the lower cost of second hand cages induce more adoption? I would think some bit, but I find it hard to say.
How concentrated is the supply of second-hand cages? Would bans in a few exporting countries/companies restrict the supply a lot?
What systems are they transitioning from, and what are the improvements in benefits?
It also feels like this would maybe be more of delaying tactic, as producers may upgrade once they are wealthier or new cages are cheaper.
Also, from the spreadsheet you shared with me, it seems like a lot of the projected growth in chicken consumption is in Nigeria. The more the consumption growth is concentrated in one or a few countries, the more it may make sense to focus on their policies.
Sorry, I know this isn't really an answer to your questions ― it's hard to think about!
Thanks for writing this! It's a great report. Some quick thoughts:
Even if the removal of subsidies caused a decrease in the number of local farms, you might worry that it increases the competitiveness of foreign animal products that may have worse welfare standards (of course, removing subsidies would be a notable policy win, and spur removals in other countries).
I agree that understanding the kinds of systems used and their prevalence seems key. However, I think it's possible that we could define a lower bound of the number of animals in more intensive systems and pencil out whether an intervention seems worth it (there could still be better interventions at other parts of the intensification gradient). Getting better data sounds like it could be expensive is one concern I have.
On another note, I wonder if a better way to slow the expansion of intensive livestock production in new regions might be to restrict access to critical equipment and inputs. Low/middle income countries might not have the industries to produce cages, crates, slaughter equipment, antibiotics, etc, at scale, and so may import. Influencing policymakers in countries that supply these inputs may be more tractable. For instance, it seems the World Bank has been influenced by high-income countries to limit finance for fossil fuel projects.
Voters in high-income countries want action on moral issues, but often struggle to personally swallow the costs. Imposing the policies on other countries can therefore be an easy policy win for politicians. It wouldn't surprise me if bans on exports of battery cages, gestation crates, antibiotics for use in livestock and such were reasonably tractable (note: not sure antibiotic bans would be good for welfare). Of course all this comes with the complexity of what it may do to wellbeing of humans in affected countries.
It might be helpful to distinguish between two different strategies:
These are just speculations, perhaps this is a false dichotomy.
Thanks for sharing this example, Asampana. Do you have a rough idea of what it would take to prevent this expansion, i.e., at what level does the relevant decision-making power lie? And are there existing political movements or currents that are conducive to success?
I once heard a talk by @Daniela Waldhorn that raised the thought experiment of "what if animal advocates had established a movement against factory farming when it was still in its infancy?" There may be something to the case that a large number of people could be mobilized to support such bans and that opposition to them is surmountable when the industry is still young. But it still seems likely that JBS would seek to expand elsewhere instead.
40%➔ 60% disagreeI am generally more optimistic about advocacy that seeks to improve welfare conditions than advocacy that tries prevent the expansion of intensive production. Welfare campaigns have smaller asks, which I suspect makes them more tractable. I also worry that obstructed intensification in one place will largely be offset by intensification or production expansion elsewhere.
I would vote differently if the topic were framed in terms of focusing more on places that have growing industries instead of in terms of preventing the spread of intensification. I strongly welcome evidence or speculation that preventing spread is tractable.
Thank you for writing this! I'm hoping to get around to reading it in the new year.
Do you know if it is available in more e-reader friendly formats, like epub or mobi?
No worries Luke! Thank you for your post and for these links.
The neglectedness and intensity of animal suffering would, in a triaging scenario, see me prioritizing it over many global health interventions. I am open to the idea that many animals do actually live lives worth living. That said, I suspect I would rather forego living than spend an existence as an industrially farmed broiler chicken or fish. These are the animals I would spend money on at the margin, with research into the welfare of more liminal animals like crustaceans and insects (probably not large increases for wild for now, since tractability may remain a constraint).
I am sensitive to the idea that animal welfare work may not be able to productively absorb $100 million. At the same time, I would like to see more experimentation with campaigns and approaches in the animal advocacy movement.
Thanks for these updates, and for the work that you do at GWWC.
I'm wondering, would you know the share and total amounts of funding going to the different cause area categories you outlined if you also include Open Philanthropy, Longview, Manifund, etc? (I recognize many cause areas may also receive large amounts of funding from non EA affiliated sources). No worries if not.
Thank you for writing this article! As a complete newcomer to pandemic preparedness at large, I found this extremely useful and a great example of work that surfaces and questions often unstated assumptions.
Although I don't have enough expertise to provide much meaningful feedback, I did want to bring up some thoughts I had regarding your arguments in Reason 2. Your 44 hospitalizations threshold in the numerical examples strikes me as reasonable, but it does also seem to me that the metagenomic sequencing of COVID-19 was related ― if not a critical precondition ― to China confirming its finding of a novel pathogen (source). I recognize that the early detection interventions you are calling into question here may be more of the form of mass/representative sampling programs, but it seems plausible to me that merely having the means to isolate and sequence a pathogen near the site of the outbreak in question could substantially affect time to confirmation.
My prior is that China is likely quite capable in that regard, but other countries may have fewer capabilities. All this to say that investing in more conventional metagenomic sequencing capacity in "sequencing deserts" could still be very cost effective. But note that this is all conjectural; I don't know anything about the distribution of sequencing capacity, nor even what it takes to identify, isolate and sequence a pathogen.
Thanks again for this brilliant piece!
Thanks for your questions, Moritz! I hadn't seen that post.
I don't think I could tell you with confidence that such interventions would be promising. There are a lot of steps in the causal chain that I'm unsure about.
It also feels like this would maybe be more of delaying tactic, as producers may upgrade once they are wealthier or new cages are cheaper.
Also, from the spreadsheet you shared with me, it seems like a lot of the projected growth in chicken consumption is in Nigeria. The more the consumption growth is concentrated in one or a few countries, the more it may make sense to focus on their policies.
Sorry, I know this isn't really an answer to your questions ― it's hard to think about!
Thanks for writing this! It's a great report. Some quick thoughts:
On another note, I wonder if a better way to slow the expansion of intensive livestock production in new regions might be to restrict access to critical equipment and inputs. Low/middle income countries might not have the industries to produce cages, crates, slaughter equipment, antibiotics, etc, at scale, and so may import. Influencing policymakers in countries that supply these inputs may be more tractable. For instance, it seems the World Bank has been influenced by high-income countries to limit finance for fossil fuel projects.
Voters in high-income countries want action on moral issues, but often struggle to personally swallow the costs. Imposing the policies on other countries can therefore be an easy policy win for politicians. It wouldn't surprise me if bans on exports of battery cages, gestation crates, antibiotics for use in livestock and such were reasonably tractable (note: not sure antibiotic bans would be good for welfare). Of course all this comes with the complexity of what it may do to wellbeing of humans in affected countries.