Great comment, I think that's right.

I know that "give your other values an extremely high weight compared with impact" is an accurate description of how I behave in practice. I'm kind of tempted to bite that same bullet when it comes to my extrapolated volition -- but again, this would definitely be biting a bullet that doesn't taste very good (do I really endorse caring about the log of my impact?). I should think more about this, thanks!

This isn't a well thought-out argument, but something is bugging me in your claim. The real impact for your work may have some distribution, but I think the expected impact given career choices can be distributed very differently. Maybe, for example, the higher you aim, the more uncertainty you have, so your expectation doesn't grow as fast.

I find it hard to believe that in real life you face choices that are reflected much better by your graph than Eric's.

Fittingly, this comment is in the tail of comments I've written on the forum:

I'm confused about how to square this with specific counterexamples. Say theoretical alignment work: P(important safety progress) probably scales with time invested, but not 100x by doubling your work hours. Any explanations here?

Idk if this is because uncertainty/ probabilistic stuff muddles the log picture. E.g. we really don't know where the hits are, so many things are 'decent shots'. Maybe after we know the outcomes, the outlier good things would be quite bad on the personal-liking front. But that doesn't sound exactly correct either

Another complication: we want to select for people who are good fits for our problems, e.g. math kids, philosophy research kids, etc. To some degree, we're selecting for people with personal-fun functions that match the shape of the problems we're trying to solve (where what we'd want them to do is pretty aligned with their fun)

I think your point applies with cause selection, "intervention strategy", or decisions like "moving to Berkeley". Confused more generally

I want to point out two things that I think work in Eric's favor in a more sophisticated model like the one you described. 

First, I like the model that impact follows an approximately log distribution. But I would draw a different conclusion from this. 

It seems to me that there is some set of current projects, S (this includes the project of "expand S"). They have impact given by some variable that I agree is closer to log normal than normal. Now one could posit two models: one idealized model in which people know (and agree on) magnitue of impacts and a second, more realistic model, where impact is extremely uncertain, with standard deviation on the same order as the potential impact. In the idealized model, you would maximize impact by working on the most impactful project, and get comparatively much less impact by working on a random project you happen to enjoy. But in the realistic world with very large uncertainty, you would maximize expected value by working on a project on the fuzzy Pareto frontier of "potentially very impactful projects", but within this set you would prioritize projects that you have the largest competitive advantage in (which I think is also log distributed to a large extent). Presumably "how much you enjoy a subject" is correlated to "how much log advantage you have over the average person", which makes me suspicious of the severe impact/enjoyment trade-off in your second graph. 

I think a strong argument against this point would be to claim that the log difference between individual affinities is much less than the log difference between impacts. I intuitively think this is likely, but the much greater knowledge people have of their comparative strengths over the (vastly uncertain) guesses about impact will counteract this. Here I would enjoy an analysis of a model of impact vs. personal competitive advantage that takes both of these things into account. 

Another point, which I think is somewhat orthogonal to the discussion of "how enjoyable is the highest-impact job", and which I think is indirectly related to Eric's point, is nonlinearity of effort. 

Namely, there is a certain amount of nonlinearity in how "amount of time dedicated to cause X" correlates with "contribution to X". There is some superlinearity at low levels (where at first most of your work goes into gaining domain knowledge and experience), and some sublinearity at high levels (where you run the risk of burnout as well as saturation potential if you chose a narrow topic). Because of the sublinearity at high levels, I think it makes sense for most people to have at least two "things" they do. 

If you buy this I think it makes a lot of sense to make your second "cause" some version of "have fun" (or related things like "pursue personal growth for its own sake"). There are three reasons I believe this. First, this is a neglected cause: unless you're famous or rich, no one else will work on it, which means that no one else will even try to pick the low-hanging fruit. Second, it's a cause where you are an expert and, from your position, payoff is easy to measure and unambiguous. And third, if you are genuinely using a large part of your energy to have a high-impact career, being someone who has fun (and on a meta level, being a community that actively encourages people to have fun) will encourage others to be more likely to follow your career path. 

I should caveat the third point: there are bad/dangerous arguments that follow similar lines, that result in people convincing themselves that they are being impactful by being hedonistic, or pursuing their favorite pet project. People are rationalizers and love coming up with stories that say "making myself happy is also the right thing to do". But while this is something to be careful of, I don't think it makes arguments of this type incorrect.

I guess I have two reactions. First, which of the categories are you putting me in? My guess is you want to label me as a mop, but "contribute as little as they reasonably can in exchange" seems an inaccurate description of someone who's strongly considering devoting their career to an EA cause; also I really enjoy talking about the weird "new things" that come up (like idk actually trade between universes during the long reflection).

My second thought is that while your story about social gradients is a plausible one, I have a more straightforward story about who EA should accept which I like more. My story is: EA should accept/reward people in proportion to (or rather, in a monotone increasing fashion of) how much good they do.* For a group that tries to do the most good, this pretty straightforwardly incentivizes doing good! Sure, there are secondary cultural effects to consider-- but I do think they should be thought of as secondary to doing good.

*You can also reward trying to do good to the best of each's ability. I think there's a lot of merit to this approach, but might create some not-great incentives of the form "always looking like you're trying" (regardless of whether you really are trying effectively).

As usual, it would be great to see downvotes accompanied by reasons for downvoting, especially in the case of NegativeNuno's comments, since it's an account literally created to provide frank criticism with a clear disclaimer in its bio.

I would be interested in what people think qualifies as "great personal sacrifice." Some would say it would mean things like becoming a priest, volunteering for the military during a war, going to prison for something you believe in, etc. The things that many EAs do, such as giving 10% or 50%, being vegetarian or vegan, choosing a lower pay career, relocating to a less preferred city or country, choosing a somewhat less satisfying/prestigious career, or working or volunteering a total of 60 or 70 hours a week (while maintaining good sleep, nutrition, exercise and stress levels), might be described as "significant sacrifice." But maybe if an EA were doing extreme versions of many of these things, it could be considered great personal sacrifice?

Thanks for asking! The first thing I want to say is that I got lucky in the following respect. The set of possible outcomes isn't the interior of the ellipse I drew; rather, it is a bunch of points that are drawn at random from a distribution, and when you plot that cloud of points, it looks like an ellipse. The way I got lucky is: one of the draws from this distribution happened to be in the top-right corner. That draw is working at ARC theory, which has just about the most intellectually interesting work in the world (for my interests) and is also just about the most impactful place for me to work (given my skills and my models of what sort of work is impactful). I interned there for 4-5 months and I'll be starting there full-time soon!

Now for my report card, as for how well I checked in (in the ways listed in the post):

• Writing the above post was useful in an interesting way: I formed some amount of identity around "I care about things besides impact" in a way that somewhat decreased value drift. (I endorse this, I think.) This manifested as me thinking a lot over the last year about whether I'm happy. Sometimes the answer was "not really"! But I noticed this and took steps toward fixing it. In particular, I noticed when I was in Berkeley last summer that I had a need for a social group that doesn't talk about maximizing impact all the time. This was super relevant to my criteria for choosing a living situation when I came back to Berkeley in October. I ended up choosing a "chill" group house, and I think that was the right choice.
• I had the goal of keeping a monthly diary about my values. I updated it four times -- in June, July, October, and March -- and I think that captured most of the value. (I'm not sure that this was a particularly valuable intervention.)
• Regarding the four specific non-EA things I cared about that I listed above:
  • Family and non-EA friends: I continue to be close with my family and remain similarly close with the non-EA friends I had at the time.
  • Puzzles and puzzle hunts: I continue caring about this. Empirically I haven't done many puzzle hunts over the last year, but that was more for a lack of good opportunities. But I recently joined a new puzzle hunt team, so I might have more opportunities ahead!
  • Spending time in nature: yup, I continue to care about this. I went to Alaska for a few weeks last month and it was great.
  • Random statistical analyses: honestly, much less? Which I'm a bit sad about.
    • One interested that I had not listed because I had mixed feelings about how much I endorsed the interest was politics. I indeed care less about politics now (though still do a decent amount).
• I also picked up an interest -- I'm part of the Bayesian Choir! I've also been playing some small amount of tennis, for the first time since high school.
• I didn't do any of the CFAR techniques, like focusing or internal double crux.

I'd say that this looks pretty good.

I do think that there are a couple of yellow flags, though:

• I currently believe that the Berkeley EA community is unhealthy (I'm not sure whether to add the caveat "for me" or whether I think it's unhealthy, period). The main reason for this, I think, is that there's a status hierarchy. The way I sometimes put this is: if you asked me which of my friends in college are highest status, I would've been like "...what does that even mean, that question doesn't make sense". But unfortunately I think if you asked about people's status in this community, I'd often have thoughts. I have a theory that this comes out of having a large group of people with really similar values and goals. To elaborate on this: in college, everyone was pursuing their own thing and had their own values, which means that different people had very different standards for what it meant for someone to be cool. (There would have been way more status if, say, everyone were trying to be a member of some society; my impression is that this caused status dynamics in parts of my college that I didn't interact with.) In the Berkeley EA community, most people have pretty similar goals (such as furthering AI safety or having interesting conversations). If people agree on what's important then naturally they'll agree more on who's good at the important things (who's good at AI safety research, or who's good at having interesting conversations -- and by the way, there's way more agreement in the Berkeley EA community about what constitutes an interesting conversation than there is in college).
  • This theory would predict that political party organizations (the Democratic and Republican parties) have a strong social status hierarchy, since they mostly share the same goals (get the party into a position of power). If I learn that actually these organizations mostly don't have strong social status hierarchies, I'll retract my diagnosis.
• I weakly think that something about the Berkeley EA community makes it harder for me to have original thoughts. Maybe it's that there's so much stuff going on that I don't spend very much time alone with my thoughts. Or maybe it's that there's more of a "party line" about the right takes, in a way that discourages free-thinking. Or maybe it's that people in this community really like talking about some things but not other things, and this implicitly discourages thinking about the "other things".

I haven't figured out how to navigate this. These may be genuine trade-offs -- a case where I can't both work at ARC and be immune from these downsides -- or maybe I'll learn to deal with the downsides over time. I do think that the benefits of my decision to work at ARC are worth the costs for me, though.

Yup -- that would be the limiting case of an ellipse tilted the other way!

The idea for the ellipse is that what EA values is correlated (but not perfectly) with my utility function, so (under certain modeling assumptions) the space of most likely career outcomes is an ellipse, see e.g. here.

You might also be interested in this post https://slatestarcodex.com/2018/09/25/the-tails-coming-apart-as-metaphor-for-life/ 

Given a correlation, the envelope of the distribution should form some sort of ellipse, narrower as the correlation goes stronger, and more circular as it gets weaker

Note that the y-axis is extrapolated volition, i.e. what I endorse/strive for. Extrapolated volition can definitely change -- but I think by definition we prefer ours not to?