This is a great post and captured something that I feel. Thank you for writing it Michelle!!
This is a great post and captured something that I feel. Thank you for writing it Michelle!!
Executive summary: The author argues that friendship should be treated as a "sacred value" that is outside the scope of moral optimization, even though friendships can have positive or negative consequences.
Key points:
Â
Â
This comment was auto-generated by the EA Forum Team. Feel free to point out issues with this summary by replying to the comment, and contact us if you have feedback.
In 2022/3 there were a number of stressful events in and affecting the EA community, starting with the FTX crash. That led to people thinking about how to make a community one that you want to be a part of, and one in which people feel happy and safe - including, sometimes, wanting some people to leave or change how they interact with the community.Â
How to make sure a community thrives seems difficult. For other types of entities, there are clearly defined interventions. A company has a clear mandate to fire people who act against its interests and itâs clear that that mandate should be carried out by managers at that company. Communities are in a pretty different situation.Â
There are some community cases which seem reasonably clear - for example, people organising community events should take some care to exclude people who are likely to cause harm at those events. But there are also questions around whether communities should try to take more generalisable action against particular individuals, in the sense of trying to encourage everyone to stop associating with them.Â
Some of the discussions Iâve seen around negative events in the community have at least implicitly pushed for coordinated action. Sometimes thatâs been in a backward looking way, like wishing SBF had been excluded from the EA community long ago. Sometimes itâs been in a forward looking way: âAre certain types of finance just inherently shady? Should we avoid associating with anyone working in those?â.
Iâve been feeling kind of angsty about engaging in conversations around this, and have so far had trouble pinning down why. I often think more clearly by writing, which is why I wrote this. I also thought others might have experienced similar internal tension, and if so maybe hearing someone elseâs reflection on it could be useful.Â
After thinking about it some, I realised that I think the discomfort is coming from the fact that whatâs sometimes going on in questions like the above is implicitly âat what point does morality get to tell you to break off a friendship?â.[1] I think I intuitively hate that question. It seems important to me that who I spend non-work time with to be âout of moralityâs reachâ â I think it gets into the domain of what you might call 'sacred values'.[2]
 Â
It often feels kind of hard to know what the scope of effective altruism should be, because it feels like nothing is ever enough. But for most people itâs not sustainable to be always optimising every part of life for helping others more.Â
A friend of mine resolves that tension by using the idea of âsacred valuesâ. Deciding that something is a âsacred valueâ for you means treating that part of your life as something youâre clearly permitted to have, regardless of whether foregoing it would allow you to help others more.[3]Â
I donât think âsacred valuesâ should be taken too literally. Theyâre more of a useful cognitive manoeuvre for helping us deal with the weight of morality and how many different ways there are of helping others. Having sacred values might be a way of allowing yourself to dive into doing good effectively in a sustainable rather than overwhelming way. Periodically, in cool moments, you pick which areas to optimise in and which to keep for yourself. Then day to day you donât have to stress over every possible way of helping others more.[4]
Sacred values differ between people. For one person, having children might be a sacred value - they simply plan to have children, regardless of whether they could help others more if they didnât. Another person might feel fine doing a careful calculation of how costly to the world them having children is likely to be, and make the decision about having kids based on the outcome.Â
The kinds of things you might take into account when deciding which things you should treat as your sacred values are:Â
Thinking of some things as âsacred valuesâ has been useful for me in taking the edge off effective altruism seeming to always imply I should be doing more good than I am. One case that has been particularly significant is my diet. I spent quite a few years trying and failing to become vegetarian, and getting very stressed about it. That got much better when one of my vegan friends donated to Animal Charity Evaluators on my behalf with the admonition ânow stop worrying about that and do work insteadâ. It turns out I find eating kind of fraught, and so itâs very helpful for me to mostly put what I eat outside the domain of what Iâm morally trying to optimise.Â
On the other hand, people are malleable. What feels unacceptable or way too difficult for you this year may not in a decadeâs time. I donât think considering something as a âsacred valueâ for you needs to imply it will always be one. Over the long run we might aim to reduce the number of sacred values we have. Maybe someday eating will feel less fraught, and Iâll try to become a vegetarian again.
Saying that something is a sacred value for you might seem to imply that for that domain, morality wonât be in any way relevant. That doesnât seem quite right to me - I think itâs more about not needing to optimise. For example, I treat âbringing up my son to thriveâ as a sacred value to me. That means even though it might be better for the world overall for me to try to make sure he grows up to be as altruistic and effective as possible, I donât aim for that. On the other hand, that doesnât mean I donât morally care at all about how he grows up. Iâm bringing him up to be happy and kind. I care about whether he seems to care about other people, and try to help them. But Iâm thinking about my time spent with him as in a different domain than the one in which Iâm striving to maximise impact.Â
Like the other things mentioned above, there are lots of ways your friendships can be better or worse for the world. For example:Â
The benefits or harms you might get from a friendship are often going to be predictable rather than surprising. In some cases youâll be able to tell before you befriend someone whether they have the kinds of values that will likely rub off positively or negatively on you. In other cases you might notice as you spend time together that you keep getting into arguments and it doesnât seem to be benefiting either of you.Â
So like travel / diet etc, friendships do seem to be the kind of thing that morality has things to say about. If you were doing all you could to increase positive consequences and decrease negative ones, you could choose which friendships to take up / nourish / drop based on which were going to have better rather than worse consequences.
In trying to figure out why I was feeling fraught about questions surrounding âin light of events like the FTX crash, should we consider which people we shouldnât associate with?â, Iâve been realising how important it feels for me to treat friendship as a sacred value.Â
In thinking through why that is, I think itâs relevant how large a part friendship plays in my wellbeing. I expected to spend fairly little time with friends when I had a family, but in fact Iâve instead realised that I very much care about continuing to see my friends despite having a kid. In particular, it matters to me to have close, long run friendships. That makes the idea of allowing consequentialist morality to comment on my friendships feel threatening, as it would if it commented on how to bring up my son.
I think itâs possible that in some ways itâs a bit less costly for me than typical to have this as a sacred value. The reason is that I find it easier than some people do to separate out my different relationships with people. For example, itâs historically been possible (though still decidedly challenging) to be working closely with someone and for our working relationship to be going pretty badly, but for us to continue being close friends who care about each other and enjoy spending non-work time together.Â
You might think that if I werenât allowing morality to comment on my friendships, you should expect me to have friends with values totally dissimilar to mine, who encouraged me in bad habits etc. Thatâs not actually the case, and I donât expect it to become more true over time. âNot intentionally optimising my friendships based on valuesâ is pretty different from âmy friendships have no correlation with my valuesâ. In fact, I donât feel drawn to hanging out with people who seem mean. I find it interesting talking to people who have useful insights for my work. And I often kind of like having friendships that draw me towards good habits.Â
On the other hand, some things affecting my friendships have nothing to do with my values. I form and keep some friendships based on shared hobbies, or having similar dispositions that arenât related to my values. Other dispositions that draw me to (or repel me from) people are related to my values, but not in ways I particularly endorse. For example, I feel intuitively particularly badly towards people who are callous towards people in their care or who are their subordinates. The extent to which I feel that isnât in line with my endorsed view of âhow people should actâ in terms of how much time people should spend fixing that flaw, or how bad it is compared to other ways one might act badly. Whereas I feel totally unfazed by someone choosing to have a job they donât think will help others, even though it feels important to me to do so.Â
A caveat to all this is that I think that having friendship as a sacred value should be basically about who I personally spend time with and support through difficulties. I do think I should pay careful attention to which people are going to be bad for others in my life. I wouldnât want to cause people to spend time with others they donât want to (for example by inviting them to the same gathering). That ends up not being a big issue for me, because I prefer spending time with fewer people at a time.
The concrete implication of this for my action is that I basically shouldnât be asking myself âis it moral to continue being friends with this person?â, just like I shouldnât ask myself âis this a good way to ensure my son becomes an EA?â. Thatâs so, even though both are valid and important questions.Â
I expect this policy to have some personal costs. For instance, maintaining some friendships might make people think Iâm too trusting. I also expect it could have some broader costs. Itâs plausible that it might be useful for the community to systematically exclude people, not just in the sense of not working at particular companies or coming to professional events, but also in the sense of being ostracised by individual members of the community. I expect not to contribute much towards that because my decisions about people to spend leisure time with wonât be optimised for impact.Â
These costs seem worth it to me. Iâve previously been too slow to notice some of my sacred values. I think thatâs not just been sad for me but has also sometimes gotten in the way of my helping others as much as I can.[5]Â If Iâm representative in that, it may be helpful for the community to be one where people get to figure out their own limits and whatâs sustainable for them in the long term. ââFor me, that includes treating friendship very differently from how I treat how I spend my work time, or allocate my donations.Â
If this post resonated with you, you might enjoy the book Iâm reading at the moment:Â The Other Significant Others: Reimagining Life with Friendship at the CenterÂ
Â
To be clear, no-one has explicitly suggested to me breaking off a friendship for this reason. Itâs just a vibe I sometimes get from online dialogue. I wondered whether other people might be getting it too.
Warning for philosophers: Iâm going to be frustratingly sloppy with discussing âmoralityâ. This has been mostly me thinking through psychologically my relationship to my âdutiesâ. Iâm basically a consequentialist, so when I talk about morality affecting my actions, Iâm thinking about it in terms of increasing wellbeing in the long run as much as possible. My guess is that this will be differently applicable to different ethics, but doesnât depend on being consequentialist.
The feeling I have here is similar to Bernard Williamsâ idea of âa thought too farâ (though the implications I draw are reasonably different). The idea is that youâd treat the question of âought I to continue allowing this sacred value to be part of my lifeâ as a thought too far.
Another way of saying this is that Iâm not thinking of these as being fundamental parts of normative ontology. Iâm not talking about taking on deontological agent-relative permissions. Instead itâs similar to split level consequentialism.
Iâm not taking a stance on whether having sacred values increases a personâs impact over time. I think itâs plausible that sometimes itâs a way to prevent micro-optimisations which are actually counter productive because of wasted time/attention, and sometimes itâs clearly going to reduce the impact someone has.
In my view, there's a level of badness for being excluded from my friendship, and a level of badness for being excluded from my communities, and I think the 2nd one should be much stricter.Â
If I have a work buddy who is prone to making sexist jokes and off-colour comments, I would like them less, but I wouldn't find cause to avoid hanging out 1 on 1 or avoid them in the corridors. But I would keep them away from my dancing community, because it sets a bad tone and makes the place less welcoming for everyone. Everybody you let into a community has an effect on the character of that community, I seeÂ
I think it's completely fair for an intentional community or movement to have reasonable standards about who to include. I think EA has suffered from having incredibly low standards in the past, to the point where someone straight up admitted to being an authoritarian manipulative narcissist and was still welcomed in with open arms. Nobody has a democratic right to be in this movement!
'Someone straight up admitted to being an authoritarian manipulative narcissist and was still welcomed in with open arms".
Just to satisfy my curiosity about gossip,what are you referring to here?