This post is part of a series of rough posts on nuclear risk research ideas. I strongly recommend that, before you read this post, you read the series’ summary & introduction post for context, caveats, and to see the list of other ideas. One caveat that’s especially worth flagging here is that I drafted this in late 2021 and haven’t updated it much since. I’m grateful to Will Aldred for help with this series.
One reason I'm publishing this now is to serve as one menu of research project ideas for upcoming summer research fellowships. I'm publishing a few of the posts to the frontpage to raise awareness that this series exists, but I'll keep the rest as personal blogposts to avoid spamming the frontpage.
| Importance | Tractability | Neglectedness | Outsourceability |
| Medium/High | Medium | Medium | Medium |
Will Aldred and I wrote a shallow exploration of some technological developments that might occur and might increase risks from nuclear weapons - especially existential risk or other risks to the long-term future. For each potential development, we provided some very quick, rough guesses about how much and in what ways the development would affect the odds and consequences of nuclear conflict (“Importance”), the likelihood of the development in the coming decade or decades (“Likelihood/Closeness”), and how much and in what ways thoughtful altruistic actors could influence whether and how the technology is developed and used (“Steerability”).
However, I pivoted away from nuclear risk research before we had time to properly research and draft the post. What we finished was just a very incomplete starting point that may contain errors.
So one version of this project would be copying and “finishing” a new and improved version of our not-properly-finished report. See the Summary and Introduction to get a clearer sense of what that might look like and why it might matter. If you’re interested in doing that version of this project, please reach out to me and we can discuss whether and how to proceed with that.
A more ambitious version of this project could in various ways go beyond what we were drafting. Ways of going beyond what we were drafting include:
A given project could do anywhere from just one to all ten of those ten things (though it seems probably best to limit one’s ambitions to just, say, 1-5 of those things, at least for an initial project).
I tentatively expect items 1, 4, and 6 would be the most valuable. But I also think the ideal project might include some amount of many of these items, since they might be best pursued in tandem.
And each of those items could be done with a focus on just one potential technological development, just a handful of potential developments, or a large number of potential developments. For example, a researcher do a deep dive into one of the developments to gather much more info, correct errors or misleading implications, write up their findings in a way tailored to whichever decision-makers are most relevant to the goal (e.g., EA community members making career decisions vs EA funders vs non-EA nuclear risk advocates vs US policymakers), and reach out to those decision-makers to discuss their findings. Or a researcher could spend 2-10 hours each on expanding and improving the info on most or all of the potential developments.
Specific actions that could be taken to tackle this project include:
This project would likely bump up against some information hazards (especially attention hazards), as is the case with much other discussion of technological developments that might occur and might increase risks. So I would encourage people to only pursue this project if, before publishing or widely sharing their outputs, they would explicitly ask multiple non-junior members of the existential risk research community:
That said, I’d guess that at least some substantial version of the outputs someone generates by doing this project could indeed ultimately be published/shared.
Feel free to reach out to me if you want me to review things, suggest people to review things, or discuss principles for handling information hazards.
This is one of many questions relevant to how much to prioritize nuclear risk relative to other issues, what risks and interventions to prioritize within the nuclear risk area, and how that should change in future.
I also think it’s an especially important question because I think (1) with current technologies and arsenals, even very large-scale nuclear conflict seems very unlikely to fairly directly cause existential catastrophe, but (2) various technologies could plausibly change that. As such, I expect that a significant fraction of the contribution of nuclear weapons to total existential risk comes from the chance of major risk-increasing technological developments, and I expect that many of the highest priority interventions for reducing nuclear risk may focus on steering particular technological developments. (That argument skips some steps and hence isn’t watertight; I can attempt to explain my more detailed views if people are interested. See also Shulman (2020).)
This project idea is very broad and could be taken in many directions, so I think many people could work out and execute some version of it that’s well-aligned with their skills and interests. The project could also range from very deep and extensive research to taking relatively “simple” and “obvious” actions to improve the post I already wrote, so I expect that for any of a wide range of skill- and seniority-levels there’d be some version of this project that would fit well.
I think one important skill or trait will be a willingness and ability to be mindful of information hazards and the unilateralist’s curse.
It might also be helpful to have an engineering background or otherwise be a technically minded person.
I think deeper research or distillation of research on many of the specific technological developments would suit the skills and interests of many people outside the EA community (henceforth "non-EAs"), and is in fact similar to what many non-EAs are already doing. It might be worth trying to convince/fund non-EAs to do that work with a focus on the potential developments that seem most promising or where uncertainty is largest.
But I think it would be important to have an EA community member vet and extend the outputs of such work, such as by considering additional possible downside risks or considering in more detail whether and how the potential technological development may reduce the odds or severity of especially worrisome nuclear conflict scenarios. And I think it would be important to have an EA to synthesize these various outputs into bottom-line views on what this suggests about how much to prioritize nuclear risk reduction and what to prioritize within that area. This could all happen after and separately from the non-EA research, or via an EA being part of the research team working on these outputs, or via EAs reviewing and giving feedback on the work.
It also seems very feasible to contract non-EAs to handle various various tasks related to convening a workshop or designing, administering, and analyzing results from a survey, either (a) after an EA provides some of the content for these things and a clear explanation of the intended outcomes or (b) with the EA staying involved throughout this process.
Information about what various actors believe can prevent issues like some actors charging ahead due to not being aware that other actors see a given goal as net-negative, or conversely holding back from pursuing a given goal due to unfounded worries that other actors might see that goal as net-negative.