I would add the extended episode of the 80,000 Hours podcast with David Chalmers. To my knowledge, some of the views he expresses there—e.g. that phenomenal consciousness is morally valuable even if not hedonically valenced—have not been explicitly discussed in either the EA or the philosophical literature.

Many utilitarian EAs have independently gravitated towards the view that the intrinsic value of pleasure and pain can be known by introspection or "direct acquaintance". Surprisingly, as far as I know no statement of this view exists in the EA literature, though some may be found in the philosophical literature (including publications by philosophers sympathetic to EA):

• Sharon Hewitt, The feeling of value: moral realism grounded in phenomenal consciousness
• Neil Sinhababu The epistemic argument for hedonism
• Adam Lerner, Fine-tuning evolutionary debunking arguments (unpublished)

Also Rethink Priorities:

• https://www.rethinkpriorities.org/publications#invertebrates
• https://www.rethinkpriorities.org/publications#moralweight