A preliminary estimate, and a request for better ones.
Summary
I believe the standard literature estimates for the number of DALYs attributable to a case of stunting are too low, largely because they don’t account for the long term effects. This means that childhood nutritional interventions that reduce the prevalence of stunting may be substantially more cost-effective than previously believed.
Epistemic status
Exploratory and back-o...
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Subtitle: It’s a major warning shot, and might be the last one we get
All opinions are my personal view, and don’t represent my employer or fellow investigators.
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Dear forum,
I was wondering if the repugnant conclusion could be responded by an argument of the following form:
Considering planet earth and a given happiness distribution of its citizens with total happiness h, there is simply not enough space or resources or whatsoever to let an arbitrary large number of people n live with an average amount of happiness epsilon, such that n * epsilon > h. At even larger scales, the observable universe is finite and thus for the same reason as above n does not need to exist.
What do you think of such an argument?
I am not sure, whether the nature of the repugnant conclusion is really affected by such an argument. Can you help me to understand?
The repugnant conclusion is presented as an objection to certain views in population axiology. The claim is that a possible world containing sufficiently many morally relevant beings just above neutrality is intrinsically better than a possible world with arbitrarily many beings arbitrarily happy. The claim is not that these worlds could become actual, so empirical considerations of the sort you describe aren't relevant for assessing the force of the objection.
Put differently, theories like total utilitarianism imply that the "repugnant" world would be better if it existed, and the objection is that this implication is implausible. The implausibility would remain even if it was shown that the "repugnant" world cannot exist.
Thank you very much, you put it words, what I could not. Your answer gave me not only the assurance that my doubts were justified, but also some confidence to ask more questions of that kind.Thank you.
Related - The Upper Limit of Value
And thank you as well for the short, but helpful answer. The relevance of the thought of mine for philosophy gives also confidence to that thinking.
Btw we have a some friends in common of which I am aware: EdoArad -> (Shay ben moshe) -> Amit -> Arne
^^
Cool! Through data science I guess?
Yup, through effectivethesis precisely