I think this question is pretty hard for me to answer because it's hard for me to imagine what the future would look like if we have AIs that are actually much more capable than today but the world mostly stays normal. I think it's much more plausible to me that I'm wrong because AIs don't become much capable, than because they do become much more capable and nothing external much changes.
- If I'm imagining that world, the most likely hypothesis that comes to mind is that we had some significant global governance to either slow down further AI development or to manage the risks imposed by the existing very powerful models (likely both).
- In such a world, whether I should work on AI safety or not depends a lot on the details of whether the global governance is in a good place and/or benefits from my help.
- Another possibility (that seems less likely to me but not impossible) is that we were wrong about the difficulty of aligning AI and we have some form of "alignment by default" world where the AIs are actually just much more cognitively capable than us but they're aligned to our intentions.
- In that world, what I should work on is in some sense not up to me (and certainly not up to my 2026-self!). I should instead be asking the new and better AIs what I should be doing, to the extent my efforts matter at all.
- A third possibility is that capabilities stalled at a level slightly higher than today's, but not generally dangerous (for example if AI conquered a few fields the way it conquered math and cybersecurity, but otherwise stopped). And we've seen a few years with minimal further progress. In particular, this is a world where we have convincing evidence that AI R&D is not automatable, robotics has stalled out, human persuasion and long-run autonomy seems to have stalled, etc.
- In such a world I think probably some people should still work on AI safety but mostly it's manageable. Maybe people should go back to theory and conceptual stuff, if it looks clear that prosaic AI won't get to true AGI/ASI. Probably I'd personally work on something else. I'm not sure.
- A fourth possibility is that AI capabilities are at an insanely high level and still growing, and alignment and governance still are far from solved, but we aren't yet doomed. In that world (which I think is the one you're most worried about/think is most central?) I basically think it's reasonable to think AI x-risk is just around the corner and we should still be working really hard on it.
- If we had, say, 3-5 more years of capabilities with AIs that are superhumanly good at science, long-term planning, real-world robotics (or side channels like persuasion and nanotech), but no major catastrophes, than I'm probably wrong about this for some key reason. #1 or #2 are the most obvious that comes to mind but maybe there's a secret third thing here that I didn't account for.
Good post. It's worth mentioning that this already happened. This is what the Singularity Institute, now called the Machine Intelligence Research Institute (MIRI), wrote in 2000. MIRI predicted that transhuman AI — what we'd now call artificial general intelligence — would be invented no later than 2020, and probably much earlier:
In 1999, Eliezer Yudkowsky, MIRI's founder, wrote that he believed dangerous nanotechnology would wipe out humanity unless we (or, specifically he) invented friendly AI first. (Now he says don't just slow down, stop. Back then he said we had to go fast.) Nowadays, we'd call friendly AI something like aligned AGI or safe AGI. Yudkowsky's name for his friendly AI project was "Ellison".
He wrote:
So, what happens when people get the timeline wrong by at least 6 years? You've seen one example of what has happened! Look at MIRI and at Eliezer Yudkowsky, and at the LessWrong community.
Another example I personally found interesting to look at is the eschatology of Jehovah's Witnesses. In the 1960s, the Jehovah's Witnesses leadership embraced an end of the world prophecy with a specific year attached: 1975.
This prophecy was widely taught and believed among Jehovah's Witnesses. People took this deadly seriously and did things like sell their house and devote themselves full-time to evangelism.
When 1976 rolled around and the world was not over, the church leadership backpedaled and did revisionist history on what it had actually said. Recruitment suffered greatly for at least a few years, although the church did not collapse and obviously still exists. One leader even said the prophecy's falsification was a good thing, since it separated the true faithful wheat from the wavering chaff.
Would it be so surprising if the most devoted Singularity believers kept kicking the can down the road over and over forever until they eventually died of old age 50 or 60 years from now? Not to me, at least. That seems perfectly human.
On the other hand, many people whose belief is not as strong will probably rethink things when the AI bubble pops.
Thanks Yarrow, this is fascinating historical context. I wasn’t aware of those early MIRI predictions.
I first learned about these predictions from a post on the philosopher David Thorstad's fantastic blog Reflective Altruism. Thorstad, in turn, cited this post on the EA Forum. Credit where credit is due!
There is some background that will unfortunately take a while to explain, but it seems worthwhile.
Eliezer Yudkowsky has a very odd approach where he completely changes his mind on big topics, but never really explains why, if he even acknowledges that it happened. His fear that nanotech would imminently end the world is one. Unless I'm missing something, he never explained why he changed his mind on this, besides a few short oblique comments.
You'd think it would be a big deal. He used to say that we need to rush to build AGI as fast as possible to stop the world from imminent destruction from nanotech. Now he says countries should agree to stop working on AGI and blow up the datacentres of any countries that don't comply. That's a huge shift! What happened? There's no real explanation that I can find...[1]
Another one is deep learning or deep neural networks. In 2008, Yudkowsky wrote a post that was critical of neural networks. Even into the mid-2010s, several years into the deep learning revolution that kicked off in 2012, MIRI was still primarily focused on hand-coded AI. I think it wasn't until after AlphaGo defeated Lee Sedol in 2016 that MIRI finally hired its first research intern to focus on machine learning. By no later than 2023, Yudkowsky was fully bought-in to deep learning. But what happened? When and why did he change his mind?
I've searched extensively and asked around. Nobody seems to have a clear answer on this. Even people from MIRI or Lightcone Infrastructure (the organization that runs LessWrong) don't seem to know. A member of the LessWrong community — presumably a friendly audience — wrote a critical review of the book Yudkowsky co-authored, focusing mainly on this point. Yudkowsky's talking points about AI safety are essentially the same as they were in 2008 when he was skeptical of neural networks. They have been cosmetically updated for the deep learning era. But he assumed in 2008 (and seemingly for some time after) that AGI would be hand-coded. Why should ideas about hand-coded AI still apply to deep learning? If they still apply, why do they? What's the reasoning? What's the argument? Yudkowsky never says.
The unfortunate situation is that LessWrong is essentially an Eliezer Yudkowsky fan club founded by Eliezer Yudkowsky. Yudkowsky's blog posts called The Sequences are a revered text. Even his Harry Potter fanfic is a revered text. Yudkowsky claims he is the smartest person in the world. Many of his fans seem to agree.
In a normal context, people would evenhandedly evaluate Yudkowsky's views and track record on topics like AI and nanotech. But he has many followers who see him as some kind of one-of-a-kind world-historical genius, some kind of nearly infallible mystical guru figure. He's treated with reverence and loyalty rather than critical thinking and accountability. Not by everyone, but by a lot of people.
I don't buy EA's self-congratulatory self-image, which you described:
There are many reasons I don't buy this self-image, some of which I've detailed here and here. You can look at the Yudkowsky fan club as one example (among many) of why that self-image doesn't add up.
Added Thursday, November 5th, 2026 at 11:57 PM Eastern: I did another cursory check on this, including the link that Matrice Jacobine shared below. I still can't find any explanation from Eliezer Yudkowsky about why he stopped believing that nanotech had a 70%+ chance of wiping out humanity by 2015. If anyone is aware of an explanation from Yudkowsky about why he changed his mind on this prediction, please let me know. ↩︎
You seem to have looked as hard for one as you looked for evals for general AI capabilities beyond the METR time horizons graph...
Hi Matrice. I have observed a pattern in your comments where you make bold claims, often quite rudely, with citations that don't turn out to verify the claims. When pressed, you have just doubled down on things that are plainly false — about which there is no meaningful controversy among knowledgeable people, about which there is full consensus among experts, such as the definitions of certain terms in machine learning — even as I have given citations that do verify my claims.
I wish you well, but I don't find it productive to engage with this pattern. Take care. I would ask that you please refrain from trying to engage with me in the future.
If the EA Forum had blocking, I would block you. In lieu of blocking, please respect my wishes to not interact with you going forward.