(I have completely no expertise in AI, but this is what I always felt personally confused about)
How are we going to know/measure/judge whether our efforts to prevent AI risks are actually helping? Or how much they are helping?
(I have completely no expertise in AI, but this is what I always felt personally confused about)
How are we going to know/measure/judge whether our efforts to prevent AI risks are actually helping? Or how much they are helping?
Firstly, thank you for this! For such a big priority (within the EA community), I feel like there's a lot of confusion about AI.
I help organize UChicago EA & have asked members to send me questions, so I'll update this comment as they come in:
Do we need to decide on a moral principle(s) first? How would it be possible to develop beneficial AI without first 'solving' ethics/morality?
Good question! The answer is no: 'solving' ethics/morality first is one thing that we probably eventually need to do, but we could first solve a narrower, simpler form of AI alignment, and use those aligned systems to help us solve ethics/morality and the other trickier problems (like the control problem for more general, capable systems). This is more or less what is discussed in ambitious vs narrow value learning. Narrow value learning is one narrower, simpler form of AI alignment. There are others, discussed here under the heading "Alternative solutions".
How worried are people actually about suffering in neural networks/artificial minds?
(My impression is that this is a fun thing to talk about, but won't be that useful for a long time)
Here's a great post about this, which I would summarise as "not worried yet, but it's really hard to tell when we should worry".
Hi Sam. I'm curious to what extent people in the field think risk communication could be beneficial for reducing AI risk. In other words, are there any aspects of AI risk that could be mitigated by large numbers of people having accurate knowledge about them? Or is AI risk communication largely irrelevant to the problem? Or is it more likely to increase rather than decrease AI risk (perhaps by means of some type of infohazard)?
Here's a couple that came to mind just now.
How smart do you need to be to contribute meaningfully t AI safety? Near top in class in high-school? Near top in class at ivy-league? Potential famous prof at ivy league? Potential fields medalist?
Also, how hard should we expect alignment to be? Are we trying to throw resources at a problem we expect to be able to at least partially solve in most worlds (which is e.g. the superficial impression I get from biorisk) or are we attempting a hail mary, because it might just work and it's important enough to be worth a try (not saying that would be bad)?
Big labs in the West that kind of target AGI are OpenAI and DeepMind. Others target AGI less explicitly, but inlcude e.g. Google Brain. Are there equivalents elsewhere? China? Do we know whether these exits? Am I missing labs that target AGI in the West?
Finally, this one's kind of obvious, but how large is the risk? What's the probability of catastrophe? I'm aware of many estimates, but this is still definitely something I'm confused about.
I think on all these questions except (3), there's substantial disagreement among AI safety researchers, though I don't have a good feeling for the distributions of views either.
Thank you for posting this question and encouraging people to talk openly about this topic!
Here are some of the AI-related questions that I've thought about from time to time:
On the margin, should donors prioritize AI safety above other existential risks and broad longtermist interventions?
To the extent that this question overlaps with Mauricio's question 1.2 (i.e. A bunch of people seem to argue for "AI stuff is important" but believe / act as if "AI stuff is overwhelmingly important"--what are arguments for the latter view?), then you might find his answer helpful.
other x-risks and longtermist areas seem rather unexplored and neglected, like s-risks
Only a partial answer, but worth noting that I think the most plausible source of s-risk is messing up on AI stuff
Is "intelligence" ... really enough to make an AI system more powerful than humans (individuals, groups, or all of humanity combined)?
Some discussion of this question here: https://www.alignmentforum.org/posts/eGihD5jnD6LFzgDZA/agi-safety-from-first-principles-control
Here are some big and common questions I've received from early-stage AI Safety focused people, with at least some knowledge of EA.
They probably don't spend most of their time thinking about AIS, but it is their cause area of focus. Unsure if that meets the criteria you're looking for, exactly.
I think that as a software developer I can't really help with this problem, but I'm not sure and would I'd like input from people in the field
A timely post: https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/DDDyTvuZxoKStm92M/ai-safety-needs-great-engineers
(The focus is software engineering not development, but should still be informative.)
I want to get a sense for what kinds of things EAs — who don't spend most of their time thinking about AI stuff — find most confusing/uncertain/weird/suspect/etc. about it.
By "AI stuff", I mean anything to do with how AI relates to EA.
For example, this includes:
but doesn't include:
Example topics: AI alignment/safety, AI governance, AI as cause area, AI progress, the AI alignment/safety/governance communities, ...
I encourage you to have a low bar for writing an answer! Short, off-the-cuff thoughts very welcome.
I've since gotten a bit more context, but I remember feeling super confused about these things when first wondering how much to focus on this stuff:
(If people are curious, the resources I found most helpful on these were: this, this, and this for 1.1, the former things + longtermism arguments + The Precipice on non-AI existential risks for 1.2, 1.1 stuff & stuff in this syllabus for 1.3 and 3, ch. 2 of Superintelligence for 1.4, this for 1.6, the earlier stuff (1.1 and 3) for 4, and various more scattered things for 1.5 and 2.)