Artir Kel (aka José Luis Ricón Fernández de la Puente) at Nintil wrote an essay broadly sympathetic to AI risk scenarios but doubtful of a particular step in the power-seeking stories Cotra, Gwern, and others have told. In particular, he has a hard time believing that a scaled-up version of present systems (e.g. Gato) would learn facts about itself (e.g. that it is an AI in a training process, what its trainers motivations would be, etc) and incorporate those facts into its planning (Cotra calls this "situational awareness"). Some AI safety researchers I've spoken to personally agree with Kel's skepticism on this point.
Since incorporating this sort of self-knowledge into one's plans is necessary for breaking out of training, initiating deception, etc, this seems like a pretty important disagreement. In fact, Kel claims that if he came around on this point, he would agree almost entirely with Cotra's analysis.
Can she describe in more detail what situational awareness means? Could it be demonstrated with current/nearterm models? Why does she think that Kel (and others) think it's so unlikely?
Is marginal work on AI forecasting usefwl? With so much brainpower being spent on moving a single number up or down, I'd expect it to hit diminishing returns pretty fast. To what extent is forecasting a massive brain drain and people should just get to work on the object-level problems if they're sufficiently convinced? How sensitive to AI forecasting estimates are your priorities over object-level projects (as in, how many more years out would your estimate of X have to be)?
Update: I added some arguments against forecasting here, but they are very general, and I suspect they will be overwhelmed by evidence related to specific cases.
How would she summarise the views of various folks with <2030 median timelines (eg: Daniel Kokotajlo, the Conjecture folks), and what are her cruxes for disagreeing with them?
Maybe even that isn't thinking big enough. At some point with enough funding it could be possible to buy up and retire most existing AGI capabilities projects. At least in the West. Maybe the world would then largely follow suit (as has happened with things like e.g. global conformity on bioethics). Although on a smaller scale, there has been the precedent of curtailing the development of electric vehicles, which perhaps set things back a decade there. And EAs have discussed related things like buying up coal mines to limit climate change.
What level of spending would be needed? $1T? Would it be possible for the EA community to accumulate this much wealth in the next 5-10 years, without relying on profits from AI capabilities?
How much of an effect would it have? Could it buy us a few more years? Or would new orgs immediately fill the gaps? Would it be possible to pay off existing AI capabilities researchers in a way that they agree to a legally binding contract not to work on similar projects (at least for a set length of time)?
Why is forecasting TAI with bio anchors useful? Many argue that the compute power of the human brain won’t be needed for TAI, since AI researchers are not designing systems that mimic them.
[Question]
What should I ask Ajeya Cotra — senior researcher at Open Philanthropy, and expert on AI timelines and safety challenges?
Next week for The 80,000 Hours Podcast I'm interviewing Ajeya Cotra, senior researcher at Open Philanthropy, AI timelines expert, and author of Without specific countermeasures, the easiest path to transformative AI likely leads to AI takeover.
Crossposted to Less Wrong
‘Like most of life’s dangers, the dangers of artificial intelligence are not easily identified from the armchair.’
J Dmitri Gallow
Epistemic status
I’m not an expert in this field, and herein I make some sweeping generalisations educated guesses about the overall...
Let’s imagine it’s November 2031. We’re both still here, AI is much more capable than it is today, but governments are governing, civilisation is still (mostly) civilised, and there has been no catastrophic loss of control. It just kind of didn’t happen.
What happens to the AI safety field then?
I expect people who currently believe catastrophe could happen within two or three years will start saying five or ten years. Then 15. Then ‘who cares if we’re a few decades of...
Thanks to Bruce Friedrich, Seth Ariel Green, Tobias Leenaert, Jan Willem Bolderdijk, Martine van Haperen, Herman Rohrbach, Chris Popa and Elizabeth Alvarez for comments. Claude helped structure the text. Ideas and mistakes are my own. I currently work with ProVeg International. The prize I propose would be defined and judged by an independent committee, and its money would fund scaling the winning solution(s), not ProVeg or the winner.
TL/DR
* EA could d...
Artir Kel (aka José Luis Ricón Fernández de la Puente) at Nintil wrote an essay broadly sympathetic to AI risk scenarios but doubtful of a particular step in the power-seeking stories Cotra, Gwern, and others have told. In particular, he has a hard time believing that a scaled-up version of present systems (e.g. Gato) would learn facts about itself (e.g. that it is an AI in a training process, what its trainers motivations would be, etc) and incorporate those facts into its planning (Cotra calls this "situational awareness"). Some AI safety researchers I've spoken to personally agree with Kel's skepticism on this point.
Since incorporating this sort of self-knowledge into one's plans is necessary for breaking out of training, initiating deception, etc, this seems like a pretty important disagreement. In fact, Kel claims that if he came around on this point, he would agree almost entirely with Cotra's analysis.
Can she describe in more detail what situational awareness means? Could it be demonstrated with current/nearterm models? Why does she think that Kel (and others) think it's so unlikely?
I wonder too!