Michael Nielsen has a beautiful new essay on moral imagination: the ability humans have to 'develop and transmit new notions of good action, indeed, even new kinds of good'.
As examples, he gives:
* Hammurabi's creation of a code of laws (in 1754 BCE) and his justification of his rule not in terms of divine or hereditary right, but by the delivery of justice to his citizens.
* St Gregory of Nyssa's...
Epistemic status: Speculation from two decently informed advocates armed with anecdata.
Note on process: After having some version of this conversation several times and saying, “we should probably write about this publicly,” we took the less heroic route: we recorded one of our conversations, fed the transcript into an LLM, and then substantially revised the structure, substance, and framing ourselves. We will not be sharing the transcript, as it is in...
A preliminary estimate, and a request for better ones.
Summary
I believe the standard literature estimates for the number of DALYs attributable to a case of stunting are too low, largely because they don’t account for the long term effects. This means that childhood nutritional interventions that reduce the prevalence of stunting may be substantially more cost-effective than previously believed.
Epistemic status
Exploratory and back-o...
Artir Kel (aka José Luis Ricón Fernández de la Puente) at Nintil wrote an essay broadly sympathetic to AI risk scenarios but doubtful of a particular step in the power-seeking stories Cotra, Gwern, and others have told. In particular, he has a hard time believing that a scaled-up version of present systems (e.g. Gato) would learn facts about itself (e.g. that it is an AI in a training process, what its trainers motivations would be, etc) and incorporate those facts into its planning (Cotra calls this "situational awareness"). Some AI safety researchers I've spoken to personally agree with Kel's skepticism on this point.
Since incorporating this sort of self-knowledge into one's plans is necessary for breaking out of training, initiating deception, etc, this seems like a pretty important disagreement. In fact, Kel claims that if he came around on this point, he would agree almost entirely with Cotra's analysis.
Can she describe in more detail what situational awareness means? Could it be demonstrated with current/nearterm models? Why does she think that Kel (and others) think it's so unlikely?
I wonder too!