CEA statement on Nick Bostrom's email

Just to clarify, I am a utilitarian, approximately, just not a hedonic utilitarian.

Why did you reply to MissionCriticalBit when it was I who made that claim? I almost didn't see it.
Also pointing out that the academics who study this stuff for a living don't believe in it is not fallacious, but rather a very useful piece of information.
Anyway, I wanted to give the HBDers another shot so I downloaded the survey (can we all agree that paywalls for publicly funded research is bullshit?) and I have two important things to note: genetic gaps is not equivalent to racial gaps, and the survey itself admits it is unrepresentative.
It was an internet survey:

The EQCA was an online survey administered from May 2013 to March 2014.

 and had a high nonresponse rate:

a total of 265 responses were received, which produced a response rate of 19.71%. 

with respondents who are different than the field as a whole:

In the current study, the EQCA sample leaned slightly to the left (54%, Table 2). The left tilt of the EQCA sample was small compared to the left tilt observed for psychologists overall, who overwhelmingly identify as left-liberal (90% or higher, Duarte et al., 2015). [...] In addition, the EQCA sample was predominantly male (83%), far exceeding the male share of APA membership, which is mostly female (57%, APA Center for Workforce Studies, 2015).

which heavily biases the results in favor of your position:

In contrast, compared to female and left (liberal) experts, male and right (conservative) experts were more likely to endorse the validity of IQ testing (correlations with gender, politics: r = .55, .41), the g factor theory of intelligence (r = .18, .34), and the impact of genes on US Black-White differences (r = .50, .48).

EDIT: To respond to missioncriticalbit below. My comment was about the sentence "HBD is not generally accepted in academia". The reason I can't show you a survey that shows you that is the same reason I can't show you a survey that zoologists don't believe in unicorns, they don't engage with it so there is no survey available (even the bad survey by anon rationalist is not about HBD). But I don't want to make an assertion without citing anything, so what is the best available option? How about an example of a professional biologists with no conflict of interests using publicly available data to create a well received paper that has been seen more than 12000 times that clearly rejects HBD.

Missioncriticalbit just makes assertions without citing anything. The reason I don't respond and refused to continue to read his reply is not because I am afraid, but because he hadn't cited anything, didn't engage with my writings and outright insulted me.

The reason I respond in an edit instead of a reply is because the HBDers have removed half a dozen of my latest comments from the frontpage while taking away a big chunk of my voting-power on this forum. I'm not inclined to give them another way to take away my voting-power, but I don't want to silence myself, so using the edit button is my workaround.

HBD is a hypothesis for how the world works, so the burden of proof is on HBD and giving a bad reason not to believe in HBD is not evidence for HBD.

This logic is only applicable to contrived scenarios where there is no prior knowledge at all – but you need some worldly knowledge to understand what both these hypotheses are about.
Crucially, there is the zero-sum nature of public debate. People deliberately publicizing reasons to not believe some politically laden hypothesis are not random sources of data found via unbiased search: they are expected to cherrypick damning weaknesses. They are also communicating standards of the intellectual tradition that stands by the opposing hypothesis. A rational layman starts with equal uncertainty about truth values of competing hypotheses, but learning that one side makes use of arguments that are blatantly unconvincing on grounds of mundane common sense can be taken as provisional evidence against their thesis even before increasing object-level certainty: poor epistemology is evidence against ability to discover truth, and low-quality cherrypicked arguments point to a comprehensively weak case. Again, consider beliefs generally known to be kooky, and what they bring to bear on the opposition. Their standard of rigor alone is discrediting to what they believe in.

Moreover, I've established that, upon checking, some of your links positively provide evidence in favor of HBD, rather than against – at least by the standard of evidence implicit in the phrasing of the list. Returning again to the Identical Ancestors Point, is presented as an Anti-HBD finding in the first place because it implies a very low prior for genetic divergence of populations, migrations somehow averaging it all out: Human migrations over the last thousand years have been such that literally everyone on Earth is a descendant of literally everyone that lived 7000 years ago whose offspring didn't die out. (Is this the wrong takeaway? What, then, did you mean to say by adding it?) Looking into the actual paper, we see: ...For example, a present-day Norwegian generally owes the majority of his or her ancestry to people living in northern Europe at the IA point, and a very small portion to people living throughout the rest of the world. Furthermore, because DNA is inherited in relatively large segments from ancestors, an individual will receive little or no actual genetic inheritance from the vast majority of the ancestors living at the IA point. Not only does this make the original argument invalid (even in a strong absolute sense – there can be zero common inheritance!) – it directly reinforces the HBD conjecture that long-term (i.e. pre-IAP) divergent local adaptation is relevant to current genetic (and trait) differences.

LW has an empiricist tradition, the term 'rationalist' is a misnomer.

I agree that this is improper and irritating terminology, because doctrinally, LW asserts its allegiance to empiricism, with all the talk about Bayes-updating on evidence and how rationalists must "win". But in practice this isn't so clear-cut: LW is fascinated with armchair thought experiments (that routinely count as evidence to update on), and all the attention devoted to infohazards, Pascal mugging, one-boxing, AI scenarios etc. suggests that they, as a living tradition, are not resilient to speculation the way pure empiricists – say, regular natural scientists – would be. So, not necessarily a misnomer.

the major ethical theories don't have any inconsistencies as far as I can tell

They are internally consistent, but I think the point of ethical theory is to clarify the intuitively knowable essence of moral action for purposes of nontrivial decisionmaking, not to assert what morality is and derive an arbitrary decision rule from there. Utilitarianism is often criticized for things like the repugnant conclusion, yet non-utilitarian ethical theories routinely produce more grating outputs, because they fail to capture the most significant part of intuitive ethics, which is mostly about harm reduction under conditions of resource scarcity. They are less consistent with ethics given to us in lived experience, so to speak.

even if you don't know which way the arrow of causality points, that's still an unnecessarily big risk. It's not particularly altruistic to make statements that have that big a chance of helping racists. You could also spend your time... not doing that.

No, the extent of the purported risk matters. You are just falling back on the unsupported prior about cost-benefit ratio because you have preemptively excluded all factors that may change the qualitative conclusion of "not doing that". To give a specific example: under the assumption that HBD is wrong, we must consider disparate outcomes to be a result of some discrimination and devote resources to alleviate it; but if HBD is actually right, this'd necessarily mean that our costly attempts to help low-performing groups are suboptimal or futile (as in, not effective), and that we will have unfairly attributed blame, harming other groups psychologically and materially. Then there are knock-on effects of harming science: for starters, fears of enabling racists can hold back genomic medicine (and population-specific treatment) by increasing hurdles to data collection and access. We do not have a priori knowledge as to which costs are negligible. On a more meta level, Scott Alexander's parable comes to mind.

there is still the entire field of linguistic racism.

IMO it's a weak argument because for all the racism, black Americans still report the highest self-esteem of all racial groups; and theories of stereotype threat are apparently unsupported by high-quality data; so it isn't clear what the odds are that some HBD research or whatever would harm people substantially. But even before that – there are laws against hate speech and discrimination, and they can be strengthened if needed; it seems very suboptimal to focus on not developing neutral knowledge only to deny hateful ideologies rhetorical ammo, instead of dealing with them directly. By the way, cannot racists point to censorshipas sufficient evidence of their correctness, if their intent is to spin available facts to their benefit? Actually, doesn't this enable them to – convincingly – claim that facts are much worse than they are, that the genomic gap in cognitive ability is bigger than the non-zero gap we'd have found (and, I believe, have partially found) with proper research (which is currently prohibited)? And in any case, you have to put racism-driven harms in the context of costs of pretending that HBD is certainly false – that is, under the assumption that we are "just not doing that" and have no clue whether it is or isn't true.

As an aside, I am personally puzzled by the strong conviction of many that HBD becoming common knowledge could lead to normalization of racial discrimination. This is a normative, not scientific question. Societies with Social Darwinist values do not need HBD to embrace and exacerbate the status quo of disparate power. Societies with ethnocentric values opportunistically oppose and exploit ethnic outgroups regardless of relative merit. Mainstream modern value system depends on the premise of human rights, not equality of capability. We do not hold that it is normal to oppress individuals who are known to be below average in some morally neutral trait (except maybe for an expansive definition of "oppress" and clinical issues having to do with lack of legal capacity), we have a strong revulsion to identity-based discrimination, and we understand the unreasonableness of treating individuals on the basis of average values.
Uncharitably, in the case of EA, this concern may have to do with the strain (common to EA and LW) of conspiratorial elitism and distrust in the democratic process, and with the unconscious belief that intelligence does define moral worth. That's ...not a very popular belief. I would deeply hate it if my cognitive betters acted like they have greater moral worth than myself, and therefore, to be fair, I cannot deny equal moral worth to people of lower ability. Most people correctly believe that they aren't brilliant, but they're not so dull as to not arrive at this logic. There are some contingent factors that complicate the picture, but not fundamentally.

the racist stereotyping does lead to black people being harmed both socially and economically. The myth of meritocracy is strong, and people who are seen as unable to 'pull themselves up by their  bootstraps' are looked down upon.

Without getting into the weeds of stereotype scholarship, the extent of claimed harms, and the irrational denial of the role of merit in achievement (reasoning in that wiki page doesn't even begin to address what would happen in a "proper" meritocratic society after a few generations, because it is premised on genes not contributing to achievement; this is a typical case of an unexamined anti-HBD prior leading to policy errors)... I'll just say that in my opinion both those issues, insofar as they harm anyone, have to do with beliefs about moral qualities. If "Protestant ethic" is alive and prescribes vilification of people of lower morally neutral ability, then that is a problem in its own right and beyond the scope of this conversation. Luckily, Protestant ethic also encourages treating people on a case by case basis.

What global utility?

Crucially, the search for interventions that actually close the IQ gap. As it stands, we have picked low-hanging fruit like lead exposure, malnutrition, iodine deficiency, parasites and such (in developed nations; I expect EA efforts in Africa to keep delivering on this front), and are left with pursuing dead ends of addressing iniquity like the "food deserts" nonsense, or doubling down on stuff like school spending, that has long ran into diminishing or zero returns and is only popular because to point out its inefficacy means to risk being labeled racist. As Nathan Cofnas argues,

...But the reason that these programs, which Kourany rightly says ought to exist, have never been created is not because of racism but because of the taboo on talking about genetic differences among policy makers. No mainstream politician can acknowledge that there are differences that might call for the creation of a program to “work with the strengths and work on the weaknesses of every [ethnic] group to help make them the very best they can be.” It is hereditarians who have advocated these programs and environmentalists who have resisted them.

Ironically, Cofnas got in trouble for this. If the suppression starts this far upstream from the object level, how can our priors be trusted?

there are other correlations that are both on firmer ground, have more global utility and aren't fulfilling the desires of racists

I sincerely doubt you can prove 1 or 2 (given that your critiques of relevant methodology weren't persuasive), and it looks like assigning any value to 3, on its own, is pure spite that is best left out of effective altruism. Making racists mad is not, in fact, a positive good, fun as it may be.

If you had read my comments

Have read some. I explicitly say I'm addressing the state of discourse here, more than just your comment. I respond to you in particular when I quote specific passages. Sorry if that was unclear.

did support the environmental explantation of the IQ gap

Again, this is not HBD Central, and it is sufficient to establish that there is legitimate uncertainty, so we cannot fall back on the comfortable prior that costs of repudiating HBD are negligible.

Very civil. It will not surprise you to learn that this does not motivate me to keep reading.

Well, I believe that misleading people, and even wasting people's time on true but irrelevant, misleadingly phrased, blatantly misinterpreting and patently false claims is a form of rudeness that's extra obnoxious, because it craftily avoids opprobrium one could earn with trivial show of disrespect. It's not fair to act indignant about an unflattering comparison after doing that. Even so, I've made peace with Brandolini's law, and kept addressing those claims on the object level, to substantiate my "very civil" summary and so that "EAs were to become a little more reserved on this topic, and at least stopped turning off potential recruits with irrefutable displays of irrationality." To be honest your reaction isn't wholly unexpected, but I did hope that I've been polite enough to merit some tolerance.

Yeah I'm out.

OK but please think of your stated desire is to persuade those who happen to believe in HBD to disbelieve it. Obviously you've failed in my case, but I maintain that flaming out like that is detrimental even as far as fence-sitters are concerned. I believe I've provided sufficient receipts for the purpose of showing how your list is inadequate.

It is really not hard to showboat on this topic, by citing from very clearly argued stuff like this or "authoritative" sources like that review or very technical recent papers or just by gesturing in the general direction of environmentalist rhetoric that is... the way I've described, and evident in, e.g., this condemnation of Cofnas, mired in (what I hope is obvious after my initial comment) logical fallacies and half-truths and raw indignation. Or one can just say that if this guy is challenged not by rational and empirical arguments but by being repeatedly called a pseudoscientist and getting a page full of personal attacks on him to the top of search results for his name (a page he responds to with an even pettier page), then he may get a lot of uncomfortable stuff right.

My point is not to showboat but to argue that people who pursue this anti-HBD rhetorical strategy, including you, are probably not succeeding, and are doing the community no favors.

I strongly think you're wrong

But can you be trusted to actually think that, given what you say about utility of public admission of opinions in question? For an external observer, it's a coin toss. And the same for the entirety of your reasoning. As an aside, I'd be terrified of a person who can willfully come to believe – or go through the motions of believing – what he or she believes to be morally prudent but epistemically wrong. Who knows what else can get embedded in one's mind in this manner.

I don't understand how this can happen on the EA Forum. Why would anyone believing in this and wanting to do good promote this?

Well, consider that, as it tends to happen in debates, people on the other side may be as perfectly sure about you being misguided and promoting harmful beliefs as you are about them; and that your proud obliviousness with regard to their rationale doesn't do your attempt at persuasion any more good than your unwillingness to debate the object level does.
Consider, further, that your entire model of this problem space really could be wrong and founded on entirely dishonest indoctrination, both about the scholarly object level and about social dynamics and relative effects of different beliefs.
Finally, consider that some people just have a very strong aversion to the idea that a third party can have the moral and intellectual authority to tell them which thoughts are infohazards. If nothing else, that could help you understand how this can happen.

If you want to do good, why would you ever, in our world, spread these views?

Personally – because I do, in fact, believe that you are profoundly wrong, that even historically these views did not contribute to much harm (despite much misinformation concocted by partisans: policies we know to be harmful are attributable to different systems of views); that, in general, any thesis about systematic relation in the pattern {views I don't like}=>{atrocities} is highly suspect and should be scrutinized (e.g. with theists who attribute Stalin's brutality to atheism, or derive all of morality from their particular religion); and that my views offer a reliable way to reduce the amount of suffering humans are subjected to, in many ways from optimizing allocation of funds to unlocking advances in medical and educational research to mitigating slander and gaslighting heaped upon hundreds of millions of innocent people.

Crucially, because I believe that, all that medium-term cost-benefit analysis aside, the process of maintaining views you assume are beneficial constitutes an X-risk (actually a family of different X-risks, in Bostrom's own classification), by comprehensively corrupting the institution of science and many other institutions. In other words: I think there is no plausible scenario where we achieve substantially more human flourishing in a hundred years – or ever – while deluding ourselves about the blank slate; that it's you who is infecting others with the "Basilisk" thought virus. And that, say, arguments about the terrible history of some tens of thousands of people whom Americans have tortured under the banner of eugenics – after abusing and murdering millions of people whilst being first ignorant, then in denial about natural selection – miss the point entirely, both the point of effective altruism and of rational debate.

If the impact of spreading these views is more tragedies happening, more suffering, and more people dying early, please consider these views an infohazard and don't even talk about them unless you're absolutely sure your views are not going to spread to people who'll become more intolerant- or more violent.

This is an impossible standard and you probably know it. Risks of a given strategy must be assessed in the context of the full universe of its alternatives; else the party that gets to cherrypick which risks are worth bringing up can insist on arbitrary measures. By the way, I could provide nontrivial evidence that your views have contributed to making a great number of people more intolerant and more violent, and have caused thousands of excess deaths over the last three years; but, unlike your wholly hypothetical fearmongering, it's likely to get me banned.

Indeed, I could ask in the same spirit: what makes people upvote you? If your logic of cherrypicking risks and demonizing comparative debate is sound, then why don't they just disregard GiveWell and donate all of their savings to the first local pet shelter that gets to pester them with heart-rending imagery of suffering puppies? Maybe they like puppies to suffer?! This is not just manipulation: rising above such manipulation is the whole conceit of this movement, yet you commit it freely and to popular applause.

To make me or anyone like me change my mind, strong and honest empirical and consequentialist arguments addressing these points are required. But that's exactly what you say is "much less relevant" than just demanding compliance. Well. I beg to differ.

For my part, I do not particularly hope to persuade you or anyone here, and guidelines say we should strive to limit ourselves to explaining the issue. Honestly it's just interesting at this point, can you contemplate the idea of being wrong, not just about "HBD" but about its consequences, or are you the definition of a mindkilled fanatic who can't take a detached view at his own sermon and see that it's heavy on affirmation, light on evidence?

Oops! Sorry, I only discovered the second link; but before writing my comment, I looked up the first myself.

I’m not a biologist and will probably defer to any biologist entering this thread and commenting on the twin studies.

Twins (mostly, as the linked study shows) do not have exactly the same DNA. But it doesn’t seem to be relevant. The relevant assumption is that there’s almost no difference between the DNAs of “identical” twins and a large difference between the DNAs of non-identical reared-together twins, which is true despite a couple of random mutations per 6 billion letters.

The next two linked articles are paywalled. Is there somewhere to read them?

The third is a review of a short book, available after a sign-up, and it says that “some studies on twins are good, some bad”, and the author feels, but “doesn’t actually know” that the reviewed one is good. The reviewed book performed a study on twins and noticed there isn’t much of a difference between the correlation of the similarity of many personality traits with whether people are identical twins, and concluded that, since you’d expect to see a difference if the traits have different degree of heritability, many personality traits are results of the environment.

How is this an evidence that twin studies are flawed and shouldn’t be used? If that’s a correct study, it’s just evidence that personality traits are mostly formed by environment (which is something I already believe and have believed for the most of my life), but, e.g., why would this be relevant for a discussion of whether or not some disease has a genetic component to it, when a twin study shows that there is?

It’s important to carefully compare the numbers; but obviously there are things that identical twins have in common more often then non-identical twins, because these things are heritable at to larger or lesser degree; like hair color or height.

Of course, any study makes some underrepresentation of humanity. But if your study is about the degree of heredity of something and not about twins, why would this matter? If there’s a difference between adopted identical and non-identical twins that’s better explained by genetics (e.g., non-identical twins would have a different height more often), why does it matter how well they represent twins in general? Unless you’re studying how likely people are to be adopted, I don’t understand the claim.

The last link is paywalled, but again, why would this affect the difference between identical twins and non-identical twins? Until a year ago, I kept secret that I’m bi and would’ve kept it secret from scientists; but I don’t think this kind of thing affects conclusions you’d make if identical twins answered identically to some question more often than non-identical twins (e.g., imagine a society where people with green eyes are persecuted and a lot of them use contact lenses. Some would still say the truth, in confidence, to scientists; and the number of identical twins telling the same answer would be greater than the amount of non-identical twins telling the same answer, and the scientists will correctly infer this to be evidence for the heritability of eye color, even though a lot of twins would lie about their eye color).

So while it’s possible to just compare full DNAs and account for lots of different factors (all sorts of various environmental conditions that might be different between the subjects of the study) to find out whether DNA correlates with eye color, it’s much easier to do a twin study, and a strong correlation there will be a strong evidence

I agree with basically everything you say here, but I also think it's a bit unfair to point this out in the context of Kaspar Brandner sharing a lot of links after you did the same thing first (sharing a lot of links). :)

In any case, I think

not discussing the issue >> discussing the issue >> discussing the issue with flawed claims. 

(And I think we're all in trouble as a society because, unfortunately, people disagree about what the flawed claims are and we get sucked into the discussion kind of against our will because flawed claims can feel triggering.) 

I don't fault you for not reading it all, but it is a good resource for looking up specific topics. (I have summarized a few of the points here.) And I don't think IQ is a flawed measure, since it is an important predictor for many measures of life success. Average national IQ is also fairly strongly correlated with measures of national welfare such as per Capita GDP.

To be clear, I'm not saying studying this question is more important than anything else, just that research on it should not be suppressed, whatever the truth may be. This point was perhaps best put in the conclusion of this great paper on the topic:

The strategy – advocated by some influential scholars – of stigmatizing, suppressing, or downplaying evidence in favor of hereditarianism about group differences has been tried and has not worked. Research on this topic has been done and the results are widely available. Major psychology journals continue to publish work that deals openly with group differences (though researchers still debate about the relative contribution of genes and environment, and the question has not been settled definitively). Any measures that would be effective in preventing further work, such as those advocated by Kourany (2016), would have to be so severe that they would only attract even more attention to the findings they aimed to suppress. Science will carry on, and these questions will be answered. We should prepare in advance for the possibility that the genes underlying intelligence differences will not be distributed identically among ethnic groups. Failure to do this will only create a vacuum for “cranks rather than scientists” to opine on the nature and consequences of group differences (Anomaly, 2017, p. 293). Reich (2018) warns that if scientists “willfully abstain from laying out a rational framework for discussing human differences, [they] will leave a vacuum that will be filled by pseudoscience” (p. 258).

This paper has argued that the usual utilitarian reasons given for restricting intelligence research are not convincing and, in fact, there are strong reasons, both utilitarian and non-utilitarian, to favor free inquiry. For philosophers specifically, there is an additional consideration. For decades, the contribution of philosophers to this debate has consisted mostly in providing alternative explanations for evidence seeming to support hereditarianism about race differences (see Sesardic, 2000, 2005), and advocating various kinds of restriction and censorship (see Cofnas, 2016). This may be because hereditarianism is controversial, and philosophers are strongly disincentivized from pursuing lines of argument that lead to truly controversial conclusions. Testifying to how serious this problem is, Jeff McMahan, Francesca Minerva, and Peter Singer recently founded the Journal of Controversial Ideas, which will allow scholars to publish pseudonymously. Singer (2017) commented that “it’s unfortunate that such a journal should ever be considered necessary to enable controversial ideas to be published, but perhaps we have got to the point where it is.” It is not clear what kind of controversial ideas Singer had in mind, and the journal has not yet released its first issue, but it is hard to find a more controversial idea than hereditarianism about race differences in intelligence.

There is a danger for the philosophical community in putting our credibility on the line over the claim that race differences are entirely environmental. If work on genetics and neuroscience within the next decade produces convincing evidence that differences in measured intelligence among groups have a significant genetic component, there will be no way to conceal this information. The hereditarian explanation will have to be accepted, and people will know that philosophers were on the wrong side of the issue both scientifically and morally: scientifically, because we are supposed to be careful, disinterested commentators on scientific controversies, not activists supporting only the politically popular side; morally, because we did not help lay the groundwork for responding in a moral way to these facts that we should have known might be coming.

Given my priors and respect for my leisure time I'm not going to read those giant threads. I won't downvote you since I haven't actually read it, but let me ask you a related question:

Do you think that out of the billions of possible correlations in the social sciences, the best use of our finite time on earth is to study this one? The incredibly flawed measure of 'low iq' is correlated with the arbitrary socially-contingent western category of 'black people' (almost certainly because of environmental factors). But there are millions of things correlated with the western category of 'black people' and there are millions of things correlated with 'iq'. Also, there are so many more variables to study that are less flawed and less arbitrary, why should we focus on the one correlation out of billions that racist people (who want to make the world worse for out fellow human beings) want to us to talk about?

IMO, I agree with the idea that EA shouldn't invest anything in studying this, though I took a different path.

1. I think IQ differences are real and they matter.

2. However, I think the conclusion that HBD and far-righters/neo-nazis wants us to reach is pretty incorrect, given massive issues with both evidence bases and motivated reasoning/privileging the hypothesis.