I was curious why given Will's own moral uncertainty (in this interview he mentioned having only 3% credence in utilitarianism) he wasn't concerned about SBF's high confidence in utilitarianism, but didn't hear the topic addressed. Maybe @William_MacAskill could comment on it here?
One guess is that apparently many young people in EA are "gung ho" on utilitarianism (mentioned by Spencer in this episode), so perhaps Will just thought that SBF isn't unusual in that regard? One lesson could be that such youthful over-enthusiasm is more dangerous than it seems, and EA should do more to warn people about the dangers of too much moral certainty and overconfidence in general.
In summarising Why They Do It, Will says that usually, that most fraudsters aren't just "bad apples" or doing "cost-benefit analysis" on their risk of being punished. Rather, they fail to "conceptualise what they're doing as fraud". And that may well be true on average, but we know quite a lot about the details of this case, which I believe point us in a different direction.
In this case, the other defendants have said they knew what they're doing was wrong, that they were misappropriating customers' assets, and investing them. That weighs somewhat against the misconceptualisation hypothesis, albeit without ruling it out as a contributing factor.
On the other hand, we have some support for the bad apples idea. SBF has said:
So I agree with Spencer, that SBF was at least deficient in affective experience, whether or not he was psychopathic.
Regarding cost-benefit analysis, I would tend to agree with Will that it's unlikely that SBF and company made a detailed calculation of the costs and benefits of their actions (and clearly they calculated incorrectly if they did), although the perceived costs and benefits could also be a contributing factor.
So based on the specific knowledge of the case, I think that the bad apples hypothesis makes more sense than the cost-benefit hypothesis and misconceptualisation hypotheses.
There is also a fourth category worth considering - whether SBF's views on side constraints were a likely factor - and I think overwhelmingly yes. Sure, as Will points out, SBF may have commented approvingly about a recent article on side constraints. But more recently, he referred to ethics as "this dumb game we woke Westerners play where we say all say the right shibboleths and so everyone likes us." Furthermore, if we're doing Facebook archaeology, we should also consider his earlier writing. In May 2012, SBF wrote about the idea of stealing to give:
I'm sure people will interpret this passage in different ways. But it's clear that, at least at this point in time, he was a pretty extreme act utilitarian.
Taking this and other information on balance, it seems clear in retrospect that a major factor is that SBF didn't take side constraints that seriously.
Of course, most of this information wasn't available or wasn't salient in 2022, so I'm not claiming that we should have necessarily worried based on it. Nor am I implying that improved governance is not a part of the solution. Those are further questions.
Great comment.
I agree with your analysis but I think Will also sets up a false dichotomy. One's inability to conceptualize or realize that one's actions are wrong is itself a sign of being a bad apple. To simplify a bit, on the one end of the spectrum of the "high integrity to really bad continuum", you have morally scrupulous people who constantly wonder whether their actions are wrong. On the other end of the continuum, you have pathological narcissists whose self-image/internal monologue is so out of whack with reality that they cannot even conceive of themselves doing anything wrong. That doesn't make them great people. If anything, it makes them more scary.
Generally, the internal monologue of the most dangerous types of terrible people (think Hitler, Stalin, Mao, etc.) doesn't go like "I'm so evil and just love to hurt everyone, hahahaha". My best guess is, that in most cases, it goes more like "I'm the messiah, I'm so great and I'm the only one who can save the world. Everyone who disagrees with me is stupid and/or evil and I have every right to get rid of them." [1]
Of course, there are people whose internal monologues are more straightforwardly evil/selfish (though even here lots of self-delusion is probably going on) but they usually end up being serial killers or the like, not running countries.
Also, later when Will talks about bad applies, he mentions that “typical cases of fraud [come] from people who are very successful, actually very well admired”, which again suggests that "bad apples" are not very successful or not very well admired. Well, again, many terrible people were extremely successful and admired. Like, you know, Hitler, Stalin, Mao, etc.
Yep, I agree. In fact, the whole character vs. governance thing seems like another false dichotomy to me. You want to have good governance structures but the people in relevant positions of influence should also know a little bit about how to evaluate character.
In general, bad character is compatible with genuine moral convictions. Hitler, for example, was vegetarian for moral reasons and “used vivid and gruesome descriptions of animal suffering and slaughter at the dinner table to try to dissuade his colleagues from eating meat”. (Fraudster/bad apple vs. person with genuine convictions is another false dichotomy that people keep setting up.)
Quote: (and clearly they calculated incorrectly if they did)
I am less confident that, if an amoral person applied cost-benefit analysis properly here, it would lead to "no fraud" as opposed to "safer amounts of fraud." The risk of getting busted from less extreme or less risky fraud would seem considerably less.
Hypothetically, say SBF misused customer funds to buy stocks and bonds, and limited the amount he misused to 40 percent of customer assets. He'd need a catastrophic stock/bond market crash, plus almost all depositors wanting out, to be unable to honor withdrawals. I guess there is still the risk of a leak.
I don't think we disagree much if any here -- I think pointing out that cost-benefit analysis doesn't necessarily lead to the "no fraud" result underscores the critical importance of side constraints!
I think this significantly under-estimates the likelihood of "bank run"-type scenarios. It is not uncommon for financial institutions with backing for a substantial fraction of their deposits to still get run out due a simple loss of confidence snowballing.
Could you say more about that? I suggest that "substantial fraction" may mean something quite different in the context of a bank than here. In the scenario I described, the hypothetical exchange would need to see 80-90% of deposits demanded back in a world where the stocks/bonds had to be sold at a 25-50% loss. It could be higher if the exchange had come up with an opt-in lending program that provided adequate cover for not returning (say) 10-15% of the customers' funds on demand.
I'd also suggest that the "simple loss of confidence snowballing" in modern bank runs is often justified based on publicly-known (or discernable) information. I don't think it was a secret that SVB had bought a bunch of long-term Treasuries that sank in value as interest rates increased, and thus that it did not have the asset value to honor 100% of withdrawals. It wasn't a secret in ~2008 that banks' ability to honor 100% withdrawals was based on highly overstated values for mortgage-backed securities.
In contrast, as long as the secret stock/bond purchases remained unknown to outsiders, a massive demand for deposits back would have to occur in the absence of that kind of information. Unlike the traditional banking sector, other places to hold crypto carry risks as well -- even self-custody, which poses risks from hacking, hardware failure, forgetting information, etc. So people aren't going to withdraw unless, at a minimum, convinced that they had a safer place to hold their assets.
Finally, in conducting the cost/benefit analysis, the hypothetical SBF would consider that the potential failure mode only existed in scenarios where 80-90%+ of deposits had been demanded back. Conditional on that having happened, the exchange's value would likely be largely lost anyway. So the difference in those scenarios would be between ~0 and the negative effects of a smaller-scale fraud. If the hypothetical SBF thought the 80-90%+ scenario was pretty unlikely . . . .
(Again, all of this does not include the risk of the fraud leaking out or being discovered.)
Okay yes, I agree that a driver of bank runs is the knowledge that the bank usually can't cover all deposits, by design. So as long as you keep that fact secret you're much less likely to face a run.
I am now unsure how to reason about the likelihood of a run-like scenario in this case.
(This comment is basically just voicing agreement with points raised in Ryan’s and David’s comments above.)
One of the things that stood out to me about the episode was the argument[1] that working on good governance and working on reducing the influence of dangerous actors are mutually exclusive strategies, and that the former is much more tractable and important than the latter.
Most “good governance” research to date also seems to focus on system-level interventions,[2] while interventions aimed at reducing the impacts of individuals are very neglected, at least according to this review of nonprofit scandals:
Six years before the review quoted above, this article called for psychopathy screening for public leadership positions (which would have represented one potential approach to interventions at the “individual level,” to adopt the terminology of the review quoted above).[3]
This leads me to wonder: what are the most compelling reasons for the lack of research (so far) on interventions to reduce the impact of dangerous actors, and which (if any) of these reasons provide strong arguments against doing at least some research in this neglected area? I think there are lots of possible answers here,[4] but none of them seem strong enough to justify the relative lack of research on this area so far (relative to the scale of the problem).
Here’s a quote from the episode (courtesy of Wei Dai's transcript) demonstrating this claim:
I agree that all these aspects of governance are important, but disagree that working on these things would entirely protect an organization from the negative impacts of malevolent actors.
To be clear, I am glad people are working on system-level solutions to low integrity and otherwise harmful behaviors, but I think it would be helpful if it wasn’t the *only* class of interventions that had substantial amounts of resources directed towards them.
Interestingly, one of the real-life cases Boddy refers to in support of his argument is the Enron scandal, a case which was also covered in the book Will MacAskill was talking about, Why They Do It.
Here are some of the reasons I’ve already thought about (listed roughly in order from most to least convincing to me as a reason to be pessimistic about this approach to risk reduction): potential lack of tractability; lower levels of social and political acceptability/feasibility; lack of existing evidence as to what methods work, to what extent, and in which contexts; and perhaps a perception that the problem (of dangerous actors) is small in scale. I’d be interested to know which (if any) of these reasons are the most important, and if there are other considerations I’m overlooking. Overall, despite these reasons against working on it, I still think this area is worth investigating to a greater extent than it has been to date.
Interesting discussion. In the interview, MacAskill mentioned Madoff as an example of the idea that it’s not about "bad apples." [1] Giving Madoff as an example in this context doesn’t make sense to me. But maybe MacAskill was meaning to say that it's not about "bad apples that are identified as such before/at the time of their fraud"? That would be the only interpretation that makes sense to me, because Madoff sounds like he really was a "bad apple" based on the info in Why They Do It.
Here's what Soltes says about Madoff in Why They Do It (quoted from the audiobook, with emphasis added):
Here’s a quote from MacAskill (emphasis added):