This is a crosspost for The Case for Insect Consciousness by Bob Fischer, which was originally published on Asterisk in January 2025.
[Subtitle.] The evidence that insects feel pain is mounting, however we approach the issue.
For years, I was on the fence about the possibility of insects feeling pain — sometimes, I defended the hypothesis;[1] more often, I argued against it.[2]
Then, in 2021, I started working on the puzzle of how to compare pain intensity across species. If a human and a pig are suffering as much as each one can, are they suffering the same amount? Or is the human’s pain worse? When my colleagues and I looked at several species, investigating both the probability of pain and its relative intensity,[3] we found something unexpected: on both scores, insects aren’t that different from many other animals.
Around the same time, I started working with an entomologist with a background in neuroscience. She helped me appreciate the weaknesses of the arguments against insect pain. (For instance, people make a big deal of stories about praying mantises mating while being eaten; they ignore how often male mantises fight fiercely to avoid being devoured.) The more I studied the science of sentience, the less confident I became about any theory that would let us rule insect sentience out.
I’m a philosopher, and philosophers pride themselves on following arguments wherever they lead. But we all have our limits, and I worry, quite sincerely, that I’ve been too willing to give insects the benefit of the doubt. I’ve been troubled by what we do to farmed animals for my entire adult life, whereas it’s hard to feel much for flies. Still, I find the argument for insect pain persuasive enough to devote a lot of my time to insect welfare research. In brief, the apparent evidence for the capacity of insects to feel pain is uncomfortably strong.[4] We could dismiss it if we had a consensus-commanding theory of sentience that explained why the apparent evidence is ir
This isn't about your giving per se, but have your views on the moral valence of financial trading changed in any notable ways since you spoke about this on the 80K podcast?
(I have no reason to think your views have changed, but was reading a socialist/anti-finance critique of EA yesterday and thought of your podcast.)
The episode page lacks a transcript, but does include this summary: "There are arguments both that quant trading is socially useful, and that it is socially harmful. Having investigated these, Alex thinks that it is highly likely to be beneficial for the world."
In that section (starts around 43:00), you talk about market-making, selling goods "across time" in the way other businesses sell them across space, and generally helping sellers "communicate" by adjusting prices in sensible ways. At the same time, you acknowledge that market-making might be less useful than in the past and that more finance people on the margin might not provide much extra social value (since markets are so fast/advanced/liquid at this point).
Thanks!
ETFs do sound like a big win. I suppose someone could look at them as "finance solving a problem that finance created" (if the "problem" is e.g. expensive mutual funds). But even the mutual funds may be better than the "state of nature" (people buying individual stocks based on personal preference?). And expensive funds being outpaced by cheaper, better products sounds like finance working the way any competitive market should.