Reflections on a decade of trying to have an impact
Next month (September 2024) is my 10th anniversary of formally engaging with EA. This date marks 10 years since I first reached out to the Foundational Research Institute about volunteering, at least as far as I can tell from my emails.
Prior to that, I probably had read a fair amount of Peter Singer, Brian Tomasik, and David Pearce, who might all have been considered connected to EA, but I hadn’t actually actively tried engaging with the community. I’d been engaged with the effective animal advocacy community for several years prior, and I think I’d volunteered for The Humane League some, and had seen some of The Humane League Labs’ content online. I’m not sure if The Humane League counted as being “EA” at the time (this was a year before OpenPhil made its first animal welfare grants).
This post is me roughly trying to guess at my impact since then, and reflections on how I’ve changed as a person, both on my own and in response to EA. It’s got a lot of broad reflections about how my feelings about EA have changed. It isn’t particularly rigorously or transparently reasoned — it’s more of a reflection exercise for myself than anything else. I’m mainly trying to look at what I’ve worked on with a really critical eye. I make a lot of claims here that I don't provide evidence for.
I’m sharing this because I think the major update I’ve had from doing this is that while I’ve generally done many of the “working-in-EA” things that are often presented as high impact, I personally feel much more tangibly the impact of my donations, and right now, if I think what’s made me feel best about being in EA, it’s actions more in the earning-to-give direction than the direct work direction.
My high-level view of my impact over this period is something like:
I became pretty convinced that factory farming was a moral tragedy as a little kid, I believe due to exposure to either PETA content or PETA Kids content. My brother was also vegetarian, which was a compelling enough reason for me to also become vegetarian. I volunteered for a lot of animal welfare organizations, especially in college. I also did a lot of direct action-type advocacy for animals in college. I was already a fairly hardcore utilitarian at that point, and had mainlined Peter Singer, David Pearce, Timothy Sprigge, and a bunch of other wacky utilitarians. I spent a significant amount of my time in college staying up until the early morning talking about wild animal suffering and other animal issues with my closest friend while playing the video game Super Monkey Ball. This did not help any animals but was incredibly important to how I think about animal issues now.
At some point around 2011 or 2012, I saw a frog that was hit by a bike and dying, and was really distraught over it. I’m not sure why, but this was oddly transformative for me, and I just internalized animal suffering from it really directly in a way I hadn’t before. I also have a fairly strong memory from when I was 20 or 21 of spending an afternoon in the rain putting worms back from the sidewalk into the grass, and feeling bad about them dying naturally. I formed fairly strong views about animals in nature living awful lives, and beliefs about my obligations to help them.
In 2014, I was targeted by a Google Ad for The Foundational Research Institute, I believe on a topic related to wild animal welfare. I think this was my first exposure to EA formally, though I’d read studies on The Humane League Labs website, had read Animal Liberation, Famine, Influence, and Morality, and some other books that informed EA ideas.
I did some volunteering for FRI, read a lot of Brian Tomasik’s website, and also did some experiments at a cat shelter on reducing the impact of outdoor cats on animals. In 2016, I started working at Mercy For Animals, running corporate animal welfare campaigns. I also formally started Utility Farm, a nonprofit that would later merge with Wild-Animal Suffering Research into Wild Animal Initiative. I’ve done a bunch of other things in the EA world since.
This is my best effort to estimate how my credence in various beliefs have changed since 2014, based on notes and exercises from that period of my life.
Belief | 2014 | 2024 | Change |
Most suffering/welfare is and will be experienced by wild animals | 90% | 90% | +0% |
I have a deep ethical obligation to reduce as much animal suffering as possible | 95% | 60% | -35% |
People generally have a deep ethical obligation to change their diet to help animals | 85% | 20% | -65% |
We can make meaningful progress on abolishing factory farming or improving farmed animal welfare by 2050 | 75% | 10% | -65% |
We can make meaningful progress on abolishing factory farming or improving farmed animal welfare by 2100 | 85% | 15% | -70% |
Most experiences are negative / suffering dominates in the wild | 85% | 80% | -5% |
I have an obligation to reduce suffering, but not to increase happiness | 75% | 65% | -10% |
I have strong moral obligations to help whoever I can as effectively as possible, independent of location, relationship, etc. | 75% | 80% | +5% |
I have strong moral obligations to help whoever I can as effectively as possible, independent of time | 30% | 40% | +10% |
I have a strong moral obligation to ensure future, positive lives occur | 5% | 10% | +5% |
I have a strong moral obligation to prevent future negative lives from occurring | 85% | 35% | -50% |
Large scale philanthropy by individuals often threatens democratic institutions, and this is often bad, independent of the benefits | 85% | 60% | -25% |
The best animal welfare interventions target farmed vertebrates | 95% | 10% | -85% |
Farmed vertebrate welfare should be an EA focus | 90% | 15% | -75% |
EA as a movement is/will be positive for the world in the long run | 90% | 30% | -60% |
Most people interested in EA should earn to give | 60% | 85% | +25% |
It was good for animal welfare that the EAs “won” the abolitionist/welfarist debates | 80% | 95% | +15% |
I have some long-held views that haven’t really changed:
My views have also changed in a bunch of ways:
I care a lot more about money
I care a lot more about status
My commitment to doing good feels deeper
I feel more morally compromised
Overall, when I look at my first 10 years engaging with EA, I feel mainly like things are just ambiguous to me. I feel a lot more positive about some donations I made than anything else — in particular large donations to brand new projects that probably helped accelerate them a lot. The animal work I’ve done feels promising but ambiguous. This post feels very melancholy, but ultimately, I still feel excited about trying to do impactful work in the world.
Thank you for writing this! Was really interesting to read. I'd love to see more posts of this nature. And it seems like you've done a lot for the world — thank you.
I have a couple questions, if you don't mind:
You write
I still generally suspect corporate campaigns are no longer particularly effective, especially those run by the largest groups (e.g. Mercy For Animals or The Humane League), and don’t think these meet the bar for being an EA giving area anymore, and haven’t in the US since around 2017, and outside the US since around 2021.
I would love to hear your reasoning (pessimism about fulfillment? WAW looking better?) and what sort of evidence has convinced you. I think this is really important, and I haven't seen an argument for this publicly anywhere. Ditto about your skepticism of the organizations leading this work.
We can make meaningful progress on abolishing factory farming or improving farmed animal welfare by 2050
Did you mean to change one of the years in the two statements of this form?
Most people interested in EA should earn to give
I'd love to hear more about this. How much value do you think e.g. the median EA doing direct work is creating? Or, put another way, how significant an annual donation would exceed the value of a talented EA doing direct work instead?
Thanks for the questions!
Corporate campaigns
Did you mean to change one of the years in the two statements of this form?
I'd love to hear more about this. How much value do you think e.g. the median EA doing direct work is creating? Or, put another way, how significant an annual donation would exceed the value of a talented EA doing direct work instead?
- On WAW specifically, my view is something like:
- Large scale interventions we can be confident in aren't that far away.
- The intervention space is so large and impacting animals' lives generally is so easy that the likelihood of finding really cost-effective things seems high.
- These interventions will often not involve nearly as much "changing hearts and minds" or public advocacy as other animal welfare work, so could easily be a lot more tractable.
I would love to hear you talk more about this :) What makes you hopeful that scalable interventions are coming, and can you say more about anything you're particularly excited about here? Also curious what "aren't that far away" caches out into in terms of your beliefs -- in 1 year? 3?
I wonder if your opinions are related to the following, which I'd also be excited to hear more about!
- I think that my research has generally caused the EA space to focus too much on farmed insects, and less on insecticides. I am somewhat inclined toward thinking that insecticide-caused suffering is both more tractable and larger in scale. I’m now working on a insecticide project though, so trying to correct this.
(Thanks for sharing this post Abraham, I enjoyed reading it :) )
Thanks for the questions!!
What makes you hopeful that scalable interventions are coming, and can you say more about anything you're particularly excited about here?
The ones that seem most likely in the near future are:
Things that make me think this is on the table:
In terms of timelines — I think this is more like 10-15 years. But part of the reason I think that's exciting is that I used to think it would be more like 2050+ before anything like this was on the table. I think I've also just generally decreased my confidence that the problems as are as difficult as I thought before (though I definitely think they are still tricky).
For insecticides, I think my view remains that we are something like 2-5 years of specific lab/field research away from plausibly having a great intervention, so it is sad that progress hasn't been made on it, and given that this also seemed like the case a few years ago, funding the research should have been a priority earlier.
Really interesting, thanks for sharing. I was particularly surprised about your changes of mind here:
We can make meaningful progress on abolishing factory farming or improving farmed animal welfare by 2050 75% 10% -65% We can make meaningful progress on abolishing factory farming or improving farmed animal welfare by 2100 85% 15% -70%
E.g. some spontaneous potential cruxes that might be interesting to hear your disagreement with, in case they capture your reasons for pessimism:
Nice, these are good questions, but probably don't capture all the cruxes in my view.
1. I think this seems moderately unlikely to me? I'm not sure what would drive down prices further than where they are now, as it seems like a large portion of the cost are the proteins themselves, and not production.
2. This also seems like it relies on crossing technological hurdles that are really hard.
3. I think this seems possible? But I'd put below 50% on it, and if it does happen, I'd expect something more like the climate movement, where lots of people think it is important but don't really take substantial steps to act on it.
4. I think that reaching 20% vegetarian seems possible in some countries, but I think I'm a lot more skeptical it'll go much higher.
I think it does seem plausible to me that there would be a meaningful reduction in the amount of meat consumed over this period in developed countries, but also expect that might come with more chicken/fish consumption that would offset animal welfare gains anyway.
I think another crux more important to my pessimism is that I don't feel very convinced that price/taste competitive meat alternatives will cause a significant increase in their adoption.
>50M metric tons of cellular meat will be sold at any price within a continuous 12-month span before the end of 2051. | 9% |
Finally, I'm also probably more optimistic about your last point, thinking that price/taste competitive meat alternatives will be huge. I think the Beyond and Impossible "moments" were huge milestones, and a few more "moments" like that will reduce resistance against higher welfare standards & higher prices for conventional meat.
Nice, these are great points.
On some specifics:
Thanks, that all makes sense and moderates my optimism a bit, and it feels like we roughly exhausted the depth of my thinking. Sigh... anyways, I'm really thankful and maybe also optimistic for the work that dedicated and strategically thinking people like you have been and will be doing for animals.
Thank you for sharing your reflections. As I read it I found various aspects that resonated with me, and I suspect that many other people on the EA Forum will feel the same. I'd love to see more of this type of writing (contemplative, reflective, critical/skeptical while being kind) on this forum.
Thanks for writing this, heaps of interesting points. Most surprising and saddening to me was that you think there is a 70% chance EA will be net-negative! Could you explain why you think this? Your various concerns about power centralisation and so forth make sense to me, but to my mind this isn't nearly enough to flip the sign, and EA still seems overwhelmingly good to me.
I was also struck by your melancholy tone - somehow I think I implicitly hoped that if I accomplished all the things you have I would feel more resoundingly happy with my impact! But maybe EAish people are unusually cognisant of missed opportunities and impact that could have been but wasn't.
I don't think it's all net-negative — I think there are lots of worlds where EA has lots of good and bad that kind of wash out, or where the overall sign is pretty ambiguous in the longrun.
Here are lots of ways I think are possible EA could end up causing a lot of possible harm. I don't really think any of these are that likely on their own — I just think it's generally easier to cause harm than produce good, so there are lots of ways EA can accidentally not achieve being overall positive, and I generally think it has an uphill road to climb to end up not being a neutral or ambiguous quirk in the ash heap of history.
Yeah, I think there are probably parts of EA that will look robustly good in the long run, and part of the reason I think that it's less likely EA as a whole will be less likely to be positive (and more likely to be neutral or negative) are that actions in other areas of EA could impact those areas negatively. Though this could cut both in favor of or against GHD work. I think just having a positive impact is quite hard, even more so when doing a bunch of uncorrelated things when some of them have major downside risks.
I think it is pretty unlikely that FTX harm outweighs good done by EA on its own, but it seems easy enough to imagine that conditional on EA's net benefit being barely above neutral (which for other reasons mentioned above seems pretty possible to me, along with EA increasingly working on GCRs which directly increases the likelihood EA work ends up being net-negative or neutral, even if in expectation that shift is positive value), that the scale of the stress / financial harm caused by EA via FTX, outweighs that remaining benefit. And then there is brand damage to effective giving, etc.
But yeah, I agree that my original statement above seems a lot less likely than FTX just contributing to an overall portfolio of harm or work that doesn't matter in the longrun from EA.
After some discussions with someone offline that were clarifying, I want to clarify my decrease in confidence in the statement, "Farmed vertebrate welfare should be an EA focus".
I think my view is slightly more complicated than this implies. I think that given that OpenPhil and non-EA donors are basically able to fund what seem like the entirety of the good opportunities in this space, I don't think these groups are that talent constrained, and it seems like the best bets (e.g. corporate campaigns) will continue to have decreasing cost-effectiveness, new animal-focused talent should probably be mostly going into earning-to-give for invertebrates/WAW, and that donations should mostly go to groups there or the EA AWF (which should in turn mostly fund invertebrates and WAW). I don't think farmed vertebrate welfare should be the default way that EAs recommend to help animals
Thanks, Abraham, I liked reading this! Good luck for an impactful decade to come
Great reflections, Abraham!
I care a lot more about money
Say you could either hire the best candidate for a role or the 2nd best plus receiving X $/year. What is the value of X which would make you indifferent between the 2 options? Feel free to provide different answers for different roles / sets of roles and organisatons/areas.
I think it would be pretty hard for me to make that trade off in a workplace context (I think I'm still a deep sucker for impact and in any real version of this is X would be whatever the organization is indifferent towards and I'd donate it). If you forced me to in some hypothetical I'd guess X is quite low for many junior roles (<$10k), but higher for more mid/senior roles (>$50k?). But I think something like the following are true:
I'm currently not doing what I suspect would be the most impactful jobs for me to do, because what seems reasonable to pay for them (based on market rates, etc) strikes be as being at least $30k-$40k below what I would consider.
Out of curiosity, what would you be doing?
(My guess: running an insect welfare org, or starting another EA charity.)
Yeah, I think that's basically what I was thinking (specifically, starting an insecticide charity, or similar project focused on implementing a WAW intervention)
Have you checked with potential donors if they'd be willing to pay you at a rate you find acceptable to run such a charity?
I'd be pretty excited about improving insecticides, but I'm not sure about donating much myself in the near term, since I already feel overinvested in invertebrates recently.
Also, adding to this, potential donors might be willing to pay more for you, given your experience, but maybe you've accounted for this in "market rates, etc". Presumably this would increase the probability of success of the org, from their POV.
And even bumping up the costs of the whole org 2x through higher salaries still leaves an insecticide charity at least 1/2 as cost-effective as something extraordinarily cost-effective (the same org where the same people work for less), which is still extraordinarily cost-effective!
If the counterfactual is that such a charity isn't started at all, that could be much worse than you running it at higher pay.
Yeah, I think this just seems pretty likely to me due to thinking that most animals are juveniles / die as juveniles, and the amount of time an animal has to be alive to accumulate good experiences to outweigh a painful death is probably higher than this. Things that have made me slightly less certain about this are me thinking it is more likely than I used to that adult animals in the wild live good lives, and me thinking that it is less likely than I used to that insects/some other invertebrates experience suffering, especially juvenile insects (though I probably still put a higher credence in this than many people).
I think it is pretty plausible I'm overconfident here though.
But, I also think this belief is mostly irrelevant to EAs / wild animal welfare advocates, unless you think there are special reasons improving welfare is easier on one side of the spectrum than the other, which I don't really have strongly held opinions on.
The juvenile animal argument is interesting, as from a total "QALY" perspective, if animals die very young then unless their deaths are extremely suffering-ful and drawn out, the total time for suffering isn't that large IMO.
Yep I completely agree that the belief is (or should be) mostly irrelevent to wild animal welfare advocates, and I think WAW might be more palatable to more people if it was emphasised less. "We have cheap and effective ways of helping wild animals live way better lives" is a better markteing tool than "Wild animals have bad live and are suffering soooo much so we have to do something" (aware I'm strawmanning for emphais a bit here). It only becomes relevant for arguments that look at whether the whole world is "net positive or negative", which I find a bit unhelpful as that discussion doesn't get us closer to making things better.
On that I appreciated these points
"On WAW specifically, my view is something like:
Yeah, I agree with everything you say here RE WAW, on both how to present it and the usefulness of the net-positive or negative debate.
I think importantly I failed to do this well, and if I had succeeded, the animal advocacy space would have been much more likely to prevent the take off of insect farming. Other people obviously had an effect here too, but I think not being strategic about this feels to me like the biggest failure I’ve had as an EA.
What do you wish you'd done differently and are there any lessons for AI governance which may be in a similar stage?
I'm pretty uncertain, but I think my best guess is that starting a group/getting someone to start a group working directly on it at the time would have been better than lobbying people to care about it. I suspect that broadly applies.
Hello !
Thanks a lot from sharing all this knowledge. It is pretty insightfull, even for people who don't follow EA news for years.
There are several claims that surprised me a little bit. I would be pleased to have more infos about these particular claims:
1-Low probability: People generally have a deep ethical obligation to change their diet to help animals: If it is pretty clear that it is not the most efficient way to help animals, it is not that clear that we do not have a moral duty to at least not eat animal products.To my mind, I think that we have to differenciate moral duties to efficacities issues.
Moreover, it is also close to impossible to convince people that animal welfare is a problem while eating animal products
2-Low probability: We can make meaningful progress on abolishing factory farming or improving farmed animal welfare by 2050: I would be pleased to know more about the facts that leed you into thinking that.
3-Low probability: I have a strong moral obligation to prevent future negative lives from occurring: Same than two.
4- High probability: It was good for animal welfare that the EAs “won” the abolitionist/welfarist debates: I would be interested about details of the historical fact (how EA "won" that debate") and also why it is a good news.
I know it's a lot of questions. Feel free to answer from all to none :) .
Like others I also feel like you had more impact that you aknowledge to yourself :).
Thanks again for the quality of the reasoning.
Sorry to just see this!
Equal Hands is an experiment in democratizing effective giving. Donors simulate pooling their resources together, and voting how to distribute them across cause areas. All votes count equally, independent of someone's ability to give.
You can learn more about it here, and sign up to learn more or join here. If you sign up before December 16th, you can participate in our current round. As of December 7th, 2024 at 11:00pm Eastern time, 12 donors have pledged $2,915, meaning the marginal $25 donor will move ~$226 in expectation to their preferred cause areas.
In Equal Hands’ first 2 months, 22 donors participated and collectively gave $7,495.01 democratically to impactful charity. Including pledges for its third month, that number will likely increase to at least 24, and $10,410.01
Across the first two months, the gifts made by cause area and pseudo-counterfactual effect (e.g. if people had given their own money in line with their voting, rather than following the democratic outcome) has been:
Interestingly, the primary impact has been money being reallocated from animal welfare to global catastrophic risks. From the very little data that we have, this primarily appears to be because animal welfare-motivated donors are much more likely to pledge large amounts to democratic giving, while GCR-motivated donors are more likely to sign up (or are a larger population in general), but are more likely to give smaller amounts.
The total administrative time for me to operate Equal Hands has been around 45 minutes per month. I think it will remain below 1 hour per month with up to 100 donors, which is somewhat below what I expected when I started this project.
We’d love to see more people join! I think this project works best by having a larger number of donors, especially people interested in giving above the minimum of $25. If you want to learn more or sign up, you can do so here!
Following up with some thoughts I originally had in response to saulius' List of ways in which cost-effectiveness estimates can be misleading. Not sure if there has been other write ups of this effect.
If we incentivize charities' to act as cost-effectively as possible, and if they operate in coordination with other groups working on the same issue, it seems like we might expect in many cases what's best for an individual charities' cost-effectiveness to be bad for the overall cost-effectiveness of the space. This issue is compounded if multiple EA / highly cost-effective charities are operating in the same space.
The issue is something like, charities have relative strengths and weaknesses, and by coordinating to take advantage of those, individual charities might lose out on cost-effectiveness, but overall make their collective work more effective.
I think this occasionally actively happens with animal welfare campaigns, where single donors are giving to several charities doing the same thing.
An example using chicken welfare campaigns in the animal welfare space:
Charity A has 100 good volunteers in City 1, where Company X is headquartered. To run a successful campaign against them would cost Charity A $1000, and Company A uses 10M chickens. Alternatively, Charity A could run a campaign against Company Y in a different city where they have fewer volunteers for $1500 (more expensive because fewer volunteers).
Charity B has 5 good volunteers in City 1, but thinks they could secure a commitment from Company Y in City 2, where they have more volunteers, for $1000. Company B uses 1M chickens. Or, by spending more money, Charity B could secure a commitment from Company X for $1500.
Charities A and B are coordinating, and agree that Companies X and Y committing will put pressure on a major target (Company Z), and want to figure out how to effectively campaign.
They consider three strategies:
Strategy 1: They both campaign against both targets, at half the cost it would be for them to campaign on their own, and a charity evaluator views the campaign as split evenly between them, since they put in equal effort. The cost-effectiveness of each charity is: (5M + 0.5M Chickens / $500 + $750) = 4,400 chickens / dollar, and $2500 total has been spent.
Strategy 2: Charity A targets Company X, and Charity B targets Company Y. Charity A's cost-effectiveness is 10,000 chickens / dollar, and Charity B's is 1,000 chickens / dollar, with $2,000 total spent.
Strategy 3: Charity A targets Company Y, Charity B targets Company X. Charity A: 667 chickens / dollar, Charity B: 6696 chickens / dollar. $3,000 total spent across all charities.
These charities want to be as effective as possible — clearly, the charities should choose Strategy 2, because the least money will be spent overall (and both charities will spend less for the same outcome).
But if a charity evaluator is fairly influential, and looking at each charity individually, Charity B might push hard for less ideal Strategies 1 or 3, because those make its cost-effectiveness look much better. Strategy 2 is clearly the right choice for Charity B to make, but if they do, an evaluation of their cost-effectiveness will look much worse.
I guess a simple way of putting this is - if multiple charities are working on the same issue, and have different strengths relevant at different times, it seems likely that often they ought to make decisions that might look bad for their own cost-effectiveness ratings, but were the best thing to do / right decision to make.
I can think of a few examples where charities made less effective decisions explicitly due to reasoning about their own cost-effectiveness, and not thinking about coordination, but I'm not sure how prevalent this actually is as an issue. It mainly makes me a little worried about apples-to-apples comparisons of the cost-effectiveness of charities who do the same thing, and are known to coordinate with each other.
Really interesting, thanks for sharing. I was particularly surprised about your changes of mind here:
E.g. some spontaneous potential cruxes that might be interesting to hear your disagreement with, in case they capture your reasons for pessimism: