Just a quick update on predicted timelines. Obviously, there’s no guarantee that Metaculus is 100% reliable + you should look at other sources as well, but I find this concerning.

Weak AGI is now predicted in a little over two years:

https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3479/date-weakly-general-ai-is-publicly-known/

AGI predicted in about 10: https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5121/date-of-artificial-general-intelligence/

Also, these are predicted dates until these systems publicly known, not the date until they exist. Things are getting crazy.

Even though Eliezer claims that there was no fire alarm for AGI, perhaps this is the fire alarm?

27

0
0

Reactions

0
0
Comments12


Sorted by Click to highlight new comments since:

Might as well make an alternate prediction here: 

There will be no AGI in the next 10 years. There will be an AI bubble over the next couple of years as new applications for deep learning proliferate, creating a massive hype cycle similar to the dot-com boom. 

This bubble will die down or burst when people realize the limitations of deep learning in domains that lack gargantuan datasets. It will fail to take hold in domains where errors cause serious damage (see the unexpected difficulty of self-driving cars). Like with the burst of the dot-com bubble, people will continue to use AI a lot for the applications that it is actually good at. 

If AGI does occur, it will be decades away at least, and require further conceptual breakthroughs and/or several orders of magnitude higher computing power. 

I think, in hindsight, the Fire Alarm first started ringing in a DeepMind building in 2017. Or perhaps an OpenAI building in 2020. It's certainly going off all over Microsoft now. It's also going off in many other places. To some of us it is already deafening. A huge, ominous, distraction from our daily lives. I really want to do something to shut the damn thing off.

[anonymous]4
0
0

Can someone please explain why we're still forecasting the weak AGI timeline? I thought "sparks" of AGI as Microsoft claimed GPT-4 achieved should already be more than the level of intelligence implied by "weak".

The answer is that the question in question is not actually forecasting weak AGI, it's forecasting these specific resolution criteria:

For these purposes we will thus define "AI system" as a single unified software system that can satisfy the following criteria, all easily completable by a typical college-educated human.

  • Able to reliably pass a Turing test of the type that would win the Loebner Silver Prize.
  • Able to score 90% or more on a robust version of the Winograd Schema Challenge, e.g. the "Winogrande" challenge or comparable data set for which human performance is at 90+%
  • Be able to score 75th percentile (as compared to the corresponding year's human students; this was a score of 600 in 2016) on all the full mathematics section of a circa-2015-2020 standard SAT exam, using just images of the exam pages and having less than ten SAT exams as part of the training data. (Training on other corpuses of math problems is fair game as long as they are arguably distinct from SAT exams.)
  • Be able to learn the classic Atari game "Montezuma's revenge" (based on just visual inputs and standard controls) and explore all 24 rooms based on the equivalent of less than 100 hours of real-time play (see closely-related question.)

This isn't personal, but I downvoted because I think Metaculus forecasts about this aren't more reliable than chance, and people shouldn't defer to them.

aren't more reliable than chance

Curious what you mean by this. One version of chance is "uniform prediction of AGI over future years" which obviously seems worse than Metaculus, but perhaps you meant a more specific baseline?

Personally, I think forecasts like these are rough averages of what informed individuals would think about these questions. Yes, you shouldn't defer to them, but it's also useful to recognize how that community's predictions have changed over time.

Hi Gabriel,

I am not sure how much to trust Metaculus' in general, but I do not think it is obvious that their AI predictions should be ignored. For what is worth, Epoch attributed a weight of 0.23 to Metaculus in the judgement-based forecasts of their AI Timelines review. Holden, Ajeya and AI Impacts got smaller weights, whereas Samotsvety got a higher one:

However, one comment I made here may illustrate what Guy presumably is referring to:

The mean Brier scores of Metaculus' predictions (and Metaculus' community predictions) are (from here):

  • For all the questions:
    • At resolve time (N = 1,710), 0.087 (0.092).
    • For 1 month prior to resolve time (N = 1,463), 0.106 (0.112).
    • For 6 months (N = 777), 0.109 (0.127).
    • For 1 year (N = 334), 0.111 (0.145).
    • For 3 years (N = 57), 0.104 (0.133).
    • For 5 years (N = 8), 0.182 (0.278).
  • For the questions of the category artificial intelligence:
    • At resolve time (N = 46), 0.128 (0.198).
    • For 1 month prior to resolve time (N = 40), 0.142 (0.205).
    • For 6 months (N = 21), 0.119 (0.240).
    • For 1 year (N = 13), 0.107 (0.254).
    • For 3 years (N = 1), 0.007 (0.292).

Note:

  • For the questions of the category artificial intelligence:
    • Metaculus' community predictions made earlier than 6 months prior to resolve time perform as badly or worse than always predicting 0.5, as their mean Brier score is similar or higher than 0.25. [Maybe this is what Guy is pointing to.]
    • Metaculus' predictions perform significantly better than Metaculus' community predictions.
  • Questions for which the Brier score can be assessed for a longer time prior to resolve, i.e. the ones with longer lifespans, tend to have lower base rates (I found a correlation of -0.129 among all questions). This means it is easier to achieve a lower Brier score:
    • Predicting 0.5 for a question whose base rate is 0.5 will lead to a Brier score of 0.25 (= 0.5*(0.5 - 1)^2 + (0.5 - 0)*(0.5 - 0)^2).
    • Predicting 0.1 for a question whose base rate is 0.1 will lead to a Brier score of 0.09 (= 0.1*(0.1 - 1)^2 + (1 - 0.1)*(0.1 - 0)^2).

Agree that they shouldn't be ignored. By "you shouldn't defer to them," I just meant that it's useful to also form one's own inside view models alongside prediction markets (perhaps comparing to them afterwards).

What I mean is "these forecasts give no more information than flipping a coin to decide whether AGI would come in time period A vs. time period B".

I have my own, rough, inside views about if and when AGI will come and what it would be able to do, and I don't find it helpful to quantify them into a specific probability distribution. And there's no "default distribution" here that I can think of either.

Gotcha, I think I still disagree with you for most decision-relevant time periods (e.g. I think they're likely better than chance on estimating AGI within 10 years vs 20 years)

Remember that AGI is a pretty vague term by itself, and some people are forecasting on the specific definition under the Metaculus questions. This matters because those definitions don't require anything inherently transformative like us being able to automate all labour, or scientific research. Rather they involve a bunch of technical benchmarks that aren't that important on their own, which are being presumed to correlate with the transformative stuff we actually care about.

See also the recent Lex Fridman Twitter poll [H/T Max Ra]:

Curated and popular this week
 ·  · 13m read
 · 
Notes  The following text explores, in a speculative manner, the evolutionary question: Did high-intensity affective states, specifically Pain, emerge early in evolutionary history, or did they develop gradually over time? Note: We are not neuroscientists; our work draws on our evolutionary biology background and our efforts to develop welfare metrics that accurately reflect reality and effectively reduce suffering. We hope these ideas may interest researchers in neuroscience, comparative cognition, and animal welfare science. This discussion is part of a broader manuscript in progress, focusing on interspecific comparisons of affective capacities—a critical question for advancing animal welfare science and estimating the Welfare Footprint of animal-sourced products.     Key points  Ultimate question: Do primitive sentient organisms experience extreme pain intensities, or fine-grained pain intensity discrimination, or both? Scientific framing: Pain functions as a biological signalling system that guides behavior by encoding motivational importance. The evolution of Pain signalling —its intensity range and resolution (i.e., the granularity with which differences in Pain intensity can be perceived)— can be viewed as an optimization problem, where neural architectures must balance computational efficiency, survival-driven signal prioritization, and adaptive flexibility. Mathematical clarification: Resolution is a fundamental requirement for encoding and processing information. Pain varies not only in overall intensity but also in granularity—how finely intensity levels can be distinguished.  Hypothetical Evolutionary Pathways: by analysing affective intensity (low, high) and resolution (low, high) as independent dimensions, we describe four illustrative evolutionary scenarios that provide a structured framework to examine whether primitive sentient organisms can experience Pain of high intensity, nuanced affective intensities, both, or neither.     Introdu
 ·  · 2m read
 · 
A while back (as I've just been reminded by a discussion on another thread), David Thorstad wrote a bunch of posts critiquing the idea that small reductions in extinction risk have very high value, because the expected number of people who will exist in the future is very high: https://reflectivealtruism.com/category/my-papers/mistakes-in-moral-mathematics/. The arguments are quite complicated, but the basic points are that the expected number of people in the future is much lower than longtermists estimate because: -Longtermists tend to neglect the fact that even if your intervention blocks one extinction risk, there are others it might fail to block; surviving for billions  (or more) of years likely  requires driving extinction risk very low for a long period of time, and if we are not likely to survive that long, even conditional on longtermist interventions against one extinction risk succeeding, the value of preventing extinction (conditional on more happy people being valuable) is much lower.  -Longtermists tend to assume that in the future population will be roughly as large as the available resources can support. But ever since the industrial revolution, as countries get richer, their fertility rate falls and falls until it is below replacement. So we can't just assume future population sizes will be near the limits of what the available resources will support. Thorstad goes on to argue that this weakens the case for longtermism generally, not just the value of extinction risk reductions, since the case for longtermism is that future expected population  is many times the current population, or at least could be given plausible levels of longtermist extinction risk reduction effort. He also notes that if he can find multiple common mistakes in longtermist estimates of expected future population, we should expect that those estimates might be off in other ways. (At this point I would note that they could also be missing factors that bias their estimates of
 ·  · 7m read
 · 
The company released a model it classified as risky — without meeting requirements it previously promised This is the full text of a post first published on Obsolete, a Substack that I write about the intersection of capitalism, geopolitics, and artificial intelligence. I’m a freelance journalist and the author of a forthcoming book called Obsolete: Power, Profit, and the Race to Build Machine Superintelligence. Consider subscribing to stay up to date with my work. After publication, this article was updated to include an additional response from Anthropic and to clarify that while the company's version history webpage doesn't explicitly highlight changes to the original ASL-4 commitment, discussion of these changes can be found in a redline PDF linked on that page. Anthropic just released Claude 4 Opus, its most capable AI model to date. But in doing so, the company may have abandoned one of its earliest promises. In September 2023, Anthropic published its Responsible Scaling Policy (RSP), a first-of-its-kind safety framework that promises to gate increasingly capable AI systems behind increasingly robust safeguards. Other leading AI companies followed suit, releasing their own versions of RSPs. The US lacks binding regulations on frontier AI systems, and these plans remain voluntary. The core idea behind the RSP and similar frameworks is to assess AI models for dangerous capabilities, like being able to self-replicate in the wild or help novices make bioweapons. The results of these evaluations determine the risk level of the model. If the model is found to be too risky, the company commits to not releasing it until sufficient mitigation measures are in place. Earlier today, TIME published then temporarily removed an article revealing that the yet-to-be announced Claude 4 Opus is the first Anthropic model to trigger the company's AI Safety Level 3 (ASL-3) protections, after safety evaluators found it may be able to assist novices in building bioweapons. (The