There are many ways in which EA could have handled it better and I agree with your headline: "EA isn't immune to money, status and power".
At the same time, I really want to push back against the simplistic narrative that Wytham Abbey was obviously a silly and ineffective thing to buy[1]. Lots of people were skeptical that £14.9 million pounds could possibly be well spent buying a historic building when it could have saved like 4000 lives based on GiveWell figures. I think it should be quite clear today that this was way too dismissive.
EA correctly called AI as one of the largest issues of our time early and, by taking this gamble, has managed to achieve dramatic influence over the way this is playing out. This grant was a bet on purchasing a nice venue for retreats could allow EA ideas to become more influential. Given how influential EA ideas have become subsequently, it feels plausible that this kind of bet could have worked out. There's definitely a part of me that views this way of influencing the world as shallow, but, at the end of the day, the world is how it is, and you can have a lot of impact if you can bring the right people together.
Now, it may turn out that the influence of EA on AI is actually net-negative. I put a decent amount of weight on this possibility. At the same time, I mostly don't think the folks criticising the castle should get to claim this as a victory[2]. On the contrary, I consider the whole castle brouhaha to have been a distraction from more substantial issues in terms of integrity.
Many people didn't necessarily object to the castle in and of itself, but more as a PR risk. I think Will MacAskill does a great job of explaining why the "PR mindset" was likely a mistake: "Post-FTX, I think core EA adopted a “PR mentality” that (i) has been a failure on its own terms and (ii) is corrosive to EA’s soul".
It wasn't obvious at the time, but it seems pretty clear to me now that a lot of EA's post-FTX reputational issues were actually the result of EA-on-EA fire and then various folks or groups being unwilling to sufficiently back themselves (if you're not willing to back yourself, why would anyone else back you?) rather than anything that happened. Honestly, I think that a lot of the infighting that occurred after FTX was low integrity behaviour, in particular, people taking advantage of the moment to litigate their grievances. Now if this is true, and I think it is, it creates a bit of a bind. On one hand, criticising the motives of critics most typically ends up sliding into a group becoming more insular and closed-minded. On the other hand, giving bad faith critics free reign without ever calling out their bullshit can be disasterous too, as the near-collapse of EA demonstrated. After all, who wants to be part of a community if there's an active effort to tar the community's reputation, the community itself is full of drama and almost no-one is sticking up for people who are fighting their hardest to make the world a better place?
Just to be clear, there are extremely strong reasons be wary of pushing back against criticism. It's very common for this to start off reasonably and then escalate. At the same time, reversed stupidity is not intelligence. Just because the default is for communities to mess up their epistemics by being overly reactive against critics, doesn't mean that you can swing all the way to the opposite end and everything will be fine and gandy. For a long time, it worked rather well, but then the community obtained money and power and the wrong people flooded in and then when things blew up, they took the opportunity to litigate their petty grievances and the EA community that had previously been able to operate on an assumption of good faith was mostly caught flatfooted and let things play out by default, when we needed to be defending ourselves. (Lucky for us most of the people with the wrong motivations left shortly after).
You linked to your comment here as an example of EA doing poorly on conflicts of interest. Honestly, I think a) you're wrong and that Claire had an extremely reasonable explanation b) your criticism focused on prioritised non-mandatory process over the deeper principles at stake c) I honestly think you should apologise to her and admit you were wrong d) maybe there's enough uncertainty that an apology wouldn't be justified, but I still think it's at least somewhat arrogant for you to be acting as though you were clearly in the right here.
Just to be clear, I'm not trying to put you in the crowd of "wrong people" or "bad faith critics", you seem pretty good faith in this post and I can't remember if I've read any of your other comments or posts so I'm going off this post.
But from what I've read, I suspect that you want the community to focus a bit too much on process over real virtue or integrity. Just to be clear, I'm not trying to dismiss the importance of rules, you can follow almost all the rules, but then let one slide and create major legal trouble for yourself and your organisation. Additionally, there are certain norms that are important, not so much because of legal reasons, but because not following them would be a serious breach of trust[3].
My position is simply that I don't think we should take this so far that we let processes colonise our minds as to what true integrity looks like. If money, status and power draw the wrong people to the community then adding just a tiny bit of extra process around the margins isn't going to save you (but it may distract you).
Don't get me wrong, I think what you're doing here is great (honorable even)!
Accordingly, I am deliberately selecting Board members with a specific brief to be ethical watchdogs within the organisation. I have approached people I believe to be unusually high integrity, and unusually willing to challenge or confront me if necessary.
Second, I am asking some people to become personal ethics advisors to me, completely separate from the Board. This is because I think the bar for someone to approach a Board member with feedback is quite high. I think that external ethics advisors might be able to receive more feedback, including “epistemically rigorous gossip”, than charity directors. They might also be perceived as more impartial.
So where do I disagree:
a) "These are easier to mitigate, because we can choose to change our own behaviours more easily than we can gatekeep the community" — maybe we should avoid solutions closer to gatekeeping because they would be infeasible or they would backfire, but I certainly wouldn't make a decision here merely on the basis of one path being "easier". b) "If you prefer to appoint people you trust personally and who share EA values to positions of responsibility, they will be conflicted or appear to be conflicted more often than in bigger communities" — We should avoid these conflicts when we can; own it when we can't or when the cost would be too high. Again, we need to comply with all relevant laws, mistakes here can be very costly, but it's worth understanding that laws are designed for a low trust environment (ie. all of society). We can't let this completely colonise our mindset. Some people want us to shift much further towards low trust norms, I feel this is defeatist and so I oppose.
I haven't thought deeply about this yet, but I wonder whether thinking about whether an action would be a "breach of trust" with the public would be a healthier mindset than PR mindset but I haven't thought deeply about it. Arguably, the recommended PR response to many situations would be at least a minor breach of trust because you're optimising your interaction with the person to obtain an outcome rather than genuinely engaging with them.
Thanks for this, and in particular for writing a strongly argued disagreement, which takes courage.
I didn't particularly want to relitigate the Wytham Abbey debate but I guess I did mention it, so fair enough.
This may be me retrospectively changing my motives, but my objections to Wytham Abbey were (I think) threefold:
1. The building seemed incredibly poorly suited to the proposed use case. Wrong layout/rooms, subject to heavy restrictions as a historic building, substandard catering facilities. I would have been less bothered by them buying a fit-for-purpose conference centre (I think). I think this point of view is one reason why it was used so sporadically, and I vaguely remember people who went there said it was a crap place to hold retreats etc.
2. The conflict of interest in the grant decision.
3. The optics.
I think you argue quite coherently against the optics and this is the one I am least confident in and feel least bothered about today. I agree that EA has commendably defied the optics to do important things.
Your own footnote says it "may have been a bad investment if it were underutilised or if it didn't deliver significant value over hiring external venues". I think it was. It was used sporadically, was hugely controversial, became a meme of EA's excesses and failures, and EV sold it in 2025 for £6m, having bought it for £14.9m in 2022.
On the conflict of interest, I linked to that comment because I followed up with specific (and, in my view, reasonable) questions that went unaddressed. I raised this issue, Claire linked to a comment which did not address my concerns, I clarified my concerns and my follow-up questions weren't answered.
I still emphatically disagree with you on this. There is, in my view, no acceptable reason why that grant was assessed by someone who was so obviously conflicted, when it would have been so easy to mitigate this conflict by having almost literally anyone else at OP assess the grant. (Bear in mind that the widely quoted and accepted standard is an actual or perceived conflict of interest.)
I can also say that I have never heard of, nor seen any evidence of, large grantmakers* taking a Board seat and then having that same person assess the specific grants to that organisation, although that doesn't necessarily mean that this doesn't happen. For the record, even if the practice is widespread, I would still disagree with it on principle, but I would update in your direction.
You and I can obviously have differences of opinion, but you should consider carefully that there is widespread agreement in society, charitable regulation etc. that conflicts of interest are important and should be both acknowledged and mitigated, so the onus is on you to justify your opinion that these processes miss "real virtue or integrity", as there are very strong and widespread norms in the other direction.
I think you're right that managing this conflict wasn't legally required, as far as I can tell. My point is one that I think you gesture at in your footnote 3, about breaches of trust with the public: the norm exists for exactly this situation, because high trust inside a group doesn't substitute for the confidence of people outside it.
(I don't have any opinion on Claire's actual virtue or integrity and, if you do, this may lie behind your reaction. My opinion is that this specific grant was terrible governance, but that can be a mistake as easily as it can be malpractice.)
On your specific criticisms: a) No, she did not give a reasonable explanation for why she assessed a high value and highly controversial grant to an organisation on whose Board she sat, when easy mitigation was at hand. She also did not provide any account that I have seen regarding whether this conflict was acknowledged, disclosed or managed, as ordinary governance would seem to demand. b) No, it didn't, because the principles would have been served very well (probably equally as well) by someone else competent assessing the grant, without nearly so many concerns about conflicts of interest. c) I guess I have answered this with points a) and b). d) I can see that this might seem arrogant. My intention was to show that serious conflicts of interest existed, were apparently not mitigated and then were waved away without adequate explanation, and I think this comment thread demonstrates that.
Finally, I do agree that FTX imploding gave lots of ammunition to people who were wrong in expectation to say "I told you so". FTX being a fraud doesn't mean that everyone who objected to FTX-related things was right at the time, including me. Equally, the fact that Wytham Abbey failed doesn't prove it was a bad grant in expectation. But my first objection was about the building itself, which was knowable before the purchase, and that is how it played out in reality.
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*I am not sure how to footnote in these comments, but just to note, I said "large grantmakers" because this can be very difficult in small grantmakers, if you want to take Board seats. For example, I hold a Board seat at Lafiya as part of my grantmaking relationship to them. I joined the Board in December 2025, after our Fund's grant to them, and might have decided on a further grant to them after taking the seat (as it happens, I haven't done this, but I could have).
Taking that Board seat was an experiment, which I do not intend to repeat. I am also now asking for two second opinions on any future grants to Lafiya, to mitigate the conflict of interest. I just wouldn't want this to come out and for me to seem hypocritical.
Also, for the record, if Ultra Philanthropy (currently 1.8 FTE on payroll plus some contractors) can take steps to mitigate conflicts of interest over six-figure grants, it makes me even more insistent that a multibillion-dollar foundation with hundreds of staff can do the same, when making controversial eight-figure grant decisions.
I don't know very much about Wytham Abbey (and I've never been there).
But it seems like the complaints about a conflict of interest and "EA is wasting money on castles" actually ended up distracting from what seems to have been the more important lesson here, which is about domain knowledge: something can seem well-suited to a particular use case in the abstract, but may turn out to be poorly suited in the concrete. No-one had any interest in buying a building poorly suited to the use case and, if anything, this is the kind of mistake that a closer relationship between a funder and a grantee might actually be able reduce by involving the grantmaker at an earlier stage of the process. Now there are risks as well, as you point out, but these can be mitigated (I'd probably feel more nervous about the CEO of a large funder sitting on the board of an organisation they were funding, not saying I'd be completely against this, but they wouldn't have a direct boss to evaluate them. There'd still be the board, but an employee would have two potential lines of oversight rather than one).
"So the onus is on you to justify your opinion that these processes miss "real virtue or integrity" — I don't agree. I think we should take a more nuanced stance on how these norms evolved. Effectiveness is obviously a part of it, but it's only one component. Have you heard of the book Seeing as a State? States focus on legible metrics like COI because that is the mechanism that is available to them and because it reduces the chance they can be blamed if things go wrong. I'm not saying that these laws should be repealed nor am I saying that concerns about conflicts of interest are minor and can be waved away. I'm just saying that these shouldn't colonise our minds and I think you're giving them too much deference in terms of how we should handle situations where there isn't a legally mandate[1]. Nor am I saying that we should ignore social norms either—integrity is about right relationship with society and yourself. It's about orienting to both.
"When easy mitigation was at hand" — except if the purpose of her being there was to help ensure that the money was spend well...
Just to be clear, this isn't an endorsement of looking for loopholes in the law. I'm only talking about situations where the law doesn't apply and it isn't due to an obvious loophole.
I agree that domain knowledge was a real problem here.
I don't see, however, how this evidences the idea that earlier grantmaker involvement would mitigate this. The grantmaker was involved on both sides of the transaction, presumably from an early stage, so if anything it should update you in the other direction.
I don't think conflict of interest norms are mainly a product of states needing legibility, in the Seeing Like a State sense (although I haven't read that book). The principle that no one should be a judge in their own cause is centuries old. High-trust communities built on expertise, like academic peer review, adopted conflict rules for themselves rather than having them imposed.
I take your points, which I think are broadly true - people and organisations use weak proxy metrics a lot, sometimes for the wrong reasons, and we shouldn't adopt norms for their own sake.
At the same time, I think conflicts of interest are a norm we should take seriously, and for substantive reasons. Conflicts of interest genuinely get in the way of truth-seeking, by making people less objective and making it harder for them to decide what to do and say. They therefore disadvantage the ecosystem, organisations and individuals, including those individuals in conflicted positions.
Some examples:
Funder A comes to person X for a reference or assessment of a charity. Person X sits on the Board of that charity and knows something very bad that happened internally, but is bound by confidentiality. This puts person X in a tough situation.
Funder B has a Board seat at charity Z. Charity Z decides to apply to Funder B for a large grant and is very enthusiastic about it. Funder B actually thinks it's a bad grant. They are forced to decide between the best funding decision they can make, and disappointing the Board and staff of charity Z.
I accept your point (and made the same one myself) that conflicts are almost inevitable in small ecosystems, but my response to that is that we mitigate this by acknowledging, declaring and managing the conflict. So, for example, person X can give a reference after saying "as a trustee, I am clearly conflicted and not able to give my fullest reference, but you can have it anyway." Funder B can say "as I am conflicted, I will ask an independent colleague to assess this grant."
This also answers your point that the purpose of Claire being there may have been to help ensure the money was spent well. That's an argument for her sitting on the Board, but not for her being the person at OP who assessed the grant. She could have overseen the spending as a trustee while a colleague assessed the grant, without any noticeable loss to anyone involved.
Even if you weight these norms less than I do, the cost of mitigation in this case was close to zero - namely one colleague assessing the grant instead of her. I can't see that much was gained by skipping it, and I think this applies across almost all conflicts of interest - the cost of mitigation is small and the dangers of no mitigation much larger.
Thank you for writing this up, Jack. I think this is a very important topic. As a board member and organizational leader, I've thought a lot about these things, and I've been meaning to write more about this for a long time, but I've struggled with the nuances. I'll quickly try here.
There are robust measures like an independent board with the ability and standing to evaluate and even fire the CEO (not only based on written rules, but also on a holistic picture of their conduct). I often come back to "Nonprofit Boards are Weird", which I think sums up the responsibility quite well. One concrete thing that I've been missing, and that has been on my list of ideas, has been to find ways for board members to upskill better and learn from the ones who have dealt with challenging and delicate situations. When I was recently advising on a round of board member hirings, I noticed how hard it is to find a group of people who don't have conflicts of interest, who have a diverse set of points of view, and who have also experienced the kind of situations where they didn't just have to tick boxes and follow scripts.
I'm myself very grateful to have a board that took my evaluation seriously and interviewed founders, former colleagues, and staff to get a complete picture before confirming me and my role.
For me as a leader, an important aspect is having a community of peers - leaders who meet weekly and discuss concerns around integrity and who care deeply about this topic. I found these people through the Integral Altruism community, and through that, I also attended a retreat called Integrity Institutions this year. Part of our discussions there, with value-driven people who have gone into politics and organizations that are not mission-driven, has been that it is easy to be corrupted in different ways and get sucked into certain forms of status-seeking. This doesn't have to mean money or direct power-seeking, but more subtle forms of being motivated by the number of direct reports, the amount of funding you raise, or the kind of people you can hire in your organization, instead of thinking about impact first principles. It's easy not to notice how these factors influence you, so having time and a group of people who can help you reflect has been very important for me.
"Don’t trust common-sense morality fully - but trust your deviations from it even less." (Toby Ord at EAG Bay Area 23) seems like one thing that points in the direction that I find useful. Developing this common-sense morality could involve metacognition, learning from wisdom traditions, and being able to take different points of view and life experiences. I hope we can find more people who have dealt with the kinds of situations we sometimes struggle with and bring them in as advisors, board members, and leaders.
This is a piece worth a lot of reflection, and I really admire the steps you’re taking!
I worry also about culture and individual role modelling might not be enough to prevent the worse forms of status-seeking & greed. I don’t think that a norm of whistleblowing policies and independent boards would’ve stopped SBF—I mean, we know that Tara Mac Aulay quit Alameda way back in 2018 and warned others about it.
I think people with power in this space (funders, evaluators, incubators, implementers) need to be on the lookout for charlatans. We should narrow down which inputs a bad actor could manipulate to access our power: For a funder, this is in evaluation, due diligence, etc. For an implementer, this might be in your hiring process. Validate your assumptions and lock these things down. ‘Assume good faith’ is a great rule to have when your movement is small—‘Trust, but verify’ needs to replace it.
We also need to acknowledge—and I don’t believe this was done well after the FTX collapse—that bad actors do not have to have ill intent. I think it might be just as harmful to exaggerate the impact of your programme, or to fail to run M&E on it appropriately, whether you are deliberately concealing and defrauding donors, or just being conveniently neglectful. There’s a selection bias here with a long tail; for every outright fraudster losing billions, there can be hundreds of little exaggerations and not-being-completely-upfronts costing millions each.
When I feel the tug of these incentives myself, I’m often a little surprised that there aren’t a lot of checks and balances on these kinds of deceptions within EA. I hope that with some amount of the money that comes into the space, that we set much higher standards for ourselves and independently hold others to account.
Thanks Huw, I agree with lots of this, in particular that a lot of FTX mistakes were decent people making bad decisions, rather than malicious actors. I think the latter is more likely than the former, but both are possible.
I found Chana's ideas on epistemically rigorous gossip helpful to think about checks and balances, provided that someone has some semi-formal role to look into them and take action. This is why I asked Sjir to help - if there are rumours circling about Ultra, there needs to be someone who is empowered to look into them and report back. (Chana's post: https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/KE4Ga3zHQsczooQi7/correctly-calibrated-trust#:~:text=epistemically%20rigorous%20gossip)
It's interesting that you mention Tara because one of my reflections after FTX was "how is it possible that so many people knew this guy was an outright liar and yet no one stopped him?"
I think this came down to two things:
1. Lots of people chose to keep their concerns to themselves, because they were afraid of retribution, or thought someone else was dealing with it. I think robust whistleblowing protections mitigate this somewhat, by giving them protection and placing a report formally on the record. It would also help if people made an internal promise to themselves to act on concerns if they have them, rather than just moving on for the sake of a quiet life (although I recognise that this is hard).
2. As I understand it, some people with power did have a fuller picture of Sam's behaviour and decided not to do anything about it. This is partially solved by the whistleblowing element (it puts a complaint on the record and makes it harder to ignore), and partly by having people whose role it is to investigate and adjudicate these things.
Obviously one could still simply ignore or fire one's ethics advisors, but I feel like Sjir would resign and then write a forum post if I did that, and that would affect my ability to keep acting badly.
I do agree though that SBF was hard to stop, because oathbreakers are very hard to contain.
In sum, I hope that some combination of personal accountability/conscience and institutional checks and balances can help us navigate this one much better.
When I feel the tug of these incentives myself, I’m often a little surprised that there aren’t a lot of checks and balances on these kinds of deceptions within EA. I hope that with some amount of the money that comes into the space, that we set much higher standards for ourselves and independently hold others to account.
I agree, and I've seen big differences in how thoroughly organizations vet their boards, donors, employees, and other stakeholders. Higher standards of vetting would also have the upside of being able to hire more people from the outside, whereas nowadays trust is built within the community and references count a lot.
Thanks Jack, I think this is a really important topic and appreciate you writing about it. Some quick thoughts below - I'm sure I'll have more to say over time.
At an organisational level: I think that your suggestions around governance and policies are a good and obvious place to start. For example, at EAA, we already have conflict of interest and whistleblower policies, and an independent board, who I meet with very regularly. I'm not sure all of these policies are online, but I will aim to publish them on our new website, up in mid-November.
On a personal level: I have thought a lot about the narrative of "power corrupts" and thinking about how this might ever apply to me, and what warning signs I should look for in myself, or others around me that should be obvious warning signs. Some very quick examples: clear motivated reasoning, evasiveness when asked direct questions, not taking the concerns of people who are less "powerful" into consideration when they are a relevant stakeholder etc. I plan to build this into my ongoing reflections of my leadership. It's important to me to use my power and influence responsibly, and in ways that are aligned with my values.
I think external accountability is much stronger than personal accountability though, and am grateful to be working with my board of directors to ensure strong governance and accountability.
These indicators seem like good ones to me. I particularly dislike the "well they [less powerful people] just don't understand what we are doing" thing.
Really interesting piece, Jack. Thanks for sticking your neck out there and being willing to tackle the tough questions.
Having spent time thinking about EA governance (thanks for the link above), I think things have hugely improved, particularly at the larger orgs. The challenge in my view is the proliferation of small 1-3 person organisations with little or no trustee board and little follow-up from funders.
I firmly believe everybody needs a boss to deliver to their full potential. This is based on my own personal experience (I get more done when someone is chasing me for quality output) and conversations with friends within EA. The model that some funders have of granting money and then never following up is not good for effectiveness, even before you consider potential fraud.
Thank you for raising this issue, Jack, I share the concern regarding governance and the right accountability mechanisms, particularly as our community is expected to have a lot more money at its disposal. I liked how you not only diagnosed the problem but also shared your own actionable mitigation mechanisms. I have two questions on them and one suggestion:
There are many different interpretations of what a non-profit board should do, but at its very core it has the power to change the CEO. Given how founder-driven philanthropic advisories tend to be, do you think that Ultra’s board would realistically have that power of you? If not, what other mechanisms would it have to push back, especially when you disagree?
I like the concept of personal advisors and I’m curious how you expect it to work in practice:
How will they gather information about your decisions and actions? Is it self-reported, or is there a structure or cadence for proactively getting external feedback
Beyond your personal respect for the advisors, what mechanisms will they have to influence your actions if you disagree? Also, if you have more than one advisor and they disagree with each other, how is that resolved?
Suggestion: EA, as any group, is likely to have shared biases and blind spots. To reduce this risk, I’d suggest including non-EA people both on your board and among your ethics advisors.
I recognise these are ‘what-ifs’ and you might be still figuring out the answers yourself. I’m interested in the operational details because I would love to see similar steps taken across our community so that we can learn together how to bring more accountability to the community. Really glad to see you bringing this discussion forward!
Thanks for writing this Jack, feels like the right time to be having this conversation.
The thing that concerns me most isn’t donors with an obviously different agenda, but donors who share most of our values gradually pulling priorities towards theirs, because it’s much harder to spot.
Imagine someone who seems aligned with our mission gives $100m. If, down the line, they want to be part of a strategy conversation, we’re very unlikely to say no.
However “unrestricted” a donation is, large gifts rarely come without strings, so I think this needs an organisational defence, not just personal integrity. I’d add a fourth policy to your conflict of interest, whistleblowing and compensation policies: a published gift acceptance policy. It would say what conditions we’ll accept, what access a donor does and doesn’t get, and who decides. It’s much easier to write that now than mid-negotiation with a nine-figure donor. It also turns saying no from a personal act of courage into “that’s our policy”, which is far easier to do.
In general, gift acceptance policies are useful, if only to stop the charity accepting unwanted gifts (e.g. a crumbling building that costs a lot to maintain).
I am not sure if they solve the specific issue you have in mind here, though. An unrestricted gift of $100m would pass most policies I have seen. Or were you thinking to include some sort of "undue influence" clause?
I wonder if this protection relies more on a) leaders have the strength and integrity to reject a major donor's advice; but also b) a diverse funding landscape, where even a $100m donor has less clout because they are not a disproportionate part of the funding ecosystem (see here: https://open.substack.com/pub/fundinganthropalypse/p/two-coefficient-givings-beat-one?utm_source=share&utm_medium=android&r=4b7xoz)
EAs are unusually trustworthy, virtuous, high-integrity people, who are unusually unlikely to be (as you rightly note) "motivated by personal financial gain".
Despite 1, there will no doubt be some existing bad actors within EA, and the influx of money may attrat more.
More importantly, it is still beneficial to have sound governance even when the people involved are well-intentioned and virtuous. Partly for optics, and partly so that it is someone's job to spot and correct mistakes.
I definitely don't want to lose sight of 1, and how wonderful that is. But I agree that as EA grows in money and power, good internal governance will become more important.
One minor point of hope is that as more funding comes online, from more different sources, orgs may well feel more able to criticise any single funder (e.g. cG) when previously that would have been even more costly. I'm not sure how large that effect is. I also expect that as money becomes less scarce, founders and org-builders will increase more in status, as they will be (seen as) more of the limiting factors.
As a newcomer to EA I am not able to give much input, but as a psychologist I can tell a few things about money, power and status.
The most important is what you described: we are fallible. We care about social status because is inherent in our DNA as a means to survive within the tribe. And rather than deny it, the best we can do is admit it and embrace that side of humanity. Because then we will be able to control it, instead of being controlled by greed.
I truly believe you can pursue selfish and altruistic goals at the same time. The issue is what you do when both are in conflict, how can you reconcile those motivations.
Maybe, doing most good requires also caring about your selfish motivations instead of fighting against them along the way (so that part within ourselves will not sabotage us). Being honest with yourself in the first place, and practice pure honesty and transparency with those outside.
Pursuing money, status and power is not the problem. Pursuing them secretly using EA or other people as a means, is the big concern.
This is a really interesting and helpful addition to the discussion.
I think I agree with you that it will probably help, if doing impactful things also accrues money/status/power, in that it will you make highly motivated to do more impactful things and make you feel good for doing them.
I think, though, that there are key moments where the impactful thing diverges from the money/status/power thing, and in those cases, I would want people to be clear that their primary goal would be impact. So I don't endorse the idea that we should say "well we are biologically programmed to pursue money and status, so let's not worry about it", if that's what you are saying.
Hi again Jack! I agree with you, and sure we have to be concerned about the pursue of money, power and status. Especially within the EA community, where they could be easily disguised as other intentions.
What I meant is that even if we should keep them on check, they are natural motivations that should not be denied or fought against (but rather balanced and integrated). In case of divergences, moral values and honesty are needed for oneself, and mechanisms as you described in the post will be useful for those not sharing this morality.
I really hope the EA movement flourish. Even if I have been short time in this community I have seen a lot of open minded and well intended humans in this space. =)
On status, I feel funny about that yellow GWWC diamond. I feel a bit uncomfortable about it sometimes since it's like purchasing moral status. It's like purchasing a blue verified tick on X, I guess - (as I understand) before you had to be of actually a certain status to have people try to impersonate you, and you would earn that blue tick. But now I'm pretty sure you can just pay for it. FWIW I am on a trial pledge but feel like my motivations aren't right if I were to put the blue diamond everywhere, so I am totally susceptible to this thinking. Also this leads to some people's first impression of EA being very money and donation-centric, which for me as a layperson I would associate with cult behaviour.
I'm sure these feelings are valid but EA being so rational will counter these with "oh well but money was donated to a good cause at the end of the day"
I think this is a valid concern and it obviously the diamond is in some ways a form a virtue signalling. That effect is likely to increase as EA becomes cool again, which it seems to be. (It's worth saying that when GWWC launched this, EA was very uncool, and adding the diamond felt like quite a big risk, at least to me. That isn't the case now, though.)
I think the main idea behind the diamond is that telling people that you donate can inspire others to do the same, or to talk to you about giving. I am not sure how effective this is, or how to trade it off against the concerns you raise.
I guess I also think that EA is quite money and donation-centric, albeit that this isn't the sum total of what we do, but it is something we have done very well historically.
“Spoiled dogs, sleeping belly-up. No natural predators.”
So says Oliver Quick in Saltburn, describing the wealthy family he has infiltrated. I re-watched it recently and this line made me think of Effective Altruism.
I don’t mean that people in EA are spoiled. I do think, though, that EA’s community norms can lull us into a false sense of comfort, and that this makes it easy for us to lose our way, both through bad decisions and by being manipulated.
I believe incredibly strongly that EA has no particular resistance to the dangers associated with money, status and power. In fact, I think it is unusually vulnerable to them.
These risks will be much more acute during the AI windfall. I think we should take steps now to mitigate them.
What happened last time there was a lot of money?
Not going to lie, it wasn’t perfect.
Despite several sincereattempts to get out ahead of it, the EA community took enormous damage, a lot of it self-inflicted.
There was also other bad behaviour happening at the same time, including serious sexual misconduct issues, which was not obviously linked to the money, but came partly from the same gaps in governance.
Doesn’t Effective Altruism have antibodies against this stuff?
I don’t think so. This view is partly formed from our track record (above) and partly from reasoning (below).
We tend to assume people in EA are impact-oriented, high integrity and both truthful and truth-seeking. Many people in EA have made real sacrifices in service of impact, like giving away a large share of their income.
Assuming this about people we don’t know makes us vulnerable to manipulation. An Oliver Quick or Elizabeth Holmes would find EAs to be easy prey. This time, the amount at stake is two entire orders of magnitude greater than before, so we should expect more and more serious attempts at infiltration.
Even if you aren’t concerned at all about malignant external actors, though, there are many other ways that smart EAs have failed at governance historically. These are easier to mitigate, because we can choose to change our own behaviours more easily than we can gatekeep the community.
The community has also historically given very smart young people a lot of trust and responsibility. This has produced a lot of notable successes, but it should make us more concerned about things like governance, risk management, personal conduct around power, and leadership generally, which inexperienced people are typically worse at.
Finally, because EA is relatively small and has some quirky values, we encounter more conflicts of interest than many movements. If you prefer to appoint people you trust personally and who share EA values to positions of responsibility, they will be conflicted or appear to be conflicted more often than in bigger communities.
Last time, we didnotdowell on conflicts of interest.
Before the increase in funding, it didn’t pay to be EA. In fact, it was rather costly: financially costly because it usually involved a commitment to give away a lot of one’s resources, and socially costly because most people have an intuitive aversion to EA principles.
Although I don’t think we are immune to the dangers of money, I agree that the community is probably less motivated by personal financial gain than most.
Instead, EAs usually translate money into its potential impact - and, while EAs are not often money-hungry, they are extremely impact-hungry. Increased impact also improves your status in the community, which makes it even more attractive to control more cash. It’s obvious, for example, that the head of a $1bn foundation is higher status than the head of a $100m foundation.
Money also increases your power. Once you have money to distribute, whether that is as a donor, a grantmaker or someone who can hire folks, people will treat you differently. It can be very easy to enjoy your success, without realising that some part of your nicer life comes from people no longer challenging you the way they once might have.
I have felt these things acutely as Ultra Philanthropy has moved more money.
I’m not trying to imply that I have been engaged in sketchy behaviour up to now (for the record, I would deny this!). I am simply saying that it would be extreme hubris for anyone to think that they will be totally unaffected by the chance to gain money, status or power.
@ElliotTep has a good list of vanilla, everyday opportunities to be a bit low integrity. I would add to these things I have experienced as an advisor, like:
Recommending your own work or that of your friends to donors, without truly steelmanning whether it is the best donation option;
Not disagreeing with something false, because the person saying it is a donor;
Not writing or saying things that might annoy people with more power and status than you, especially if you might later benefit from their good opinion.
None of these is without nuance. I am simply trying to demonstrate that we should all be on our guard.
I’m not the first person to comment on this, but previous contributions mostly concern external perception, or fundraising behaviour around Anthropic staff. I am concerned with the personal conduct of those already in EA, starting with myself. I am also focusing on governance, rather than just etiquette.
Whose responsibility is this?
Well everyone’s, obviously. However, more for some of us than others.
At EA Global: NYC, I looked around the room and realised with a jolt that my cohort are now the elders in EA. This is quite funny but also scary, because of course we just feel like we always have.
However, I’ve been in the community since about 2011 (GWWC pledge 342. Flex.) If you are my age or older (38), or have been in the community for more than a decade, you are now one of the most important people in EA, even if you don’t feel like one.
Most likely, nobody more senior is coming in above us, because we haven’t historically hired a lot of senior people from outside, and they don’t necessarily want to work here.
Given that we were all here last time it went wrong, and that a significant proportion of the community wasn’t, it’s our job to try to make it go better this time.
It’s our job even if it feels deeply uncomfortable and unreasonably arrogant to think of ourselves as leaders, and even if we don’t want to do it.
I particularly recommend taking this seriously if you expect to accrue significant power or status in the upcoming windfall. You will need to work incredibly hard to continue receiving feedback, and that work needs to start now.
So what am I doing about it?
Ultra Philanthropy runs a fund and advises donors on where to give, which is exactly the kind of conflict I have been describing, and means our work will probably be directly affected by the AI windfall.
I am acutely concerned about the issues I discuss above, because I cautiously expect Ultra Philanthropy to influence a lot of money in the next couple of years, and I don’t want to convince myself that I am somehow too saintly for this to be dangerous.
I am therefore taking some proactive steps, which I list here because others might want to do the same.
First, I am trying to register Ultra Philanthropy as a 501(c)(3) (it is currently fiscally sponsored). This will mean that I answer directly to a Board, have my pay set by that Board, and do public filings specific to Ultra Philanthropy each year. None of these is foolproof, but they make it harder to do sketchy things without scrutiny.
Of course, a founder-selected Board is only a partial defence. I have a cordial relationship with everyone I am approaching, and some are close friends.
Accordingly, I am deliberately selecting Board members with a specific brief to be ethical watchdogs within the organisation. I have approached people I believe to be unusually high integrity, and unusually willing to challenge or confront me if necessary.
Second, I am asking some people to become personal ethics advisors to me, completely separate from the Board. This is because I think the bar for someone to approach a Board member with feedback is quite high. I think that external ethics advisors might be able to receive more feedback, including “epistemically rigorous gossip”, than charity directors. They might also be perceived as more impartial.
I am delighted that Sjir Hoeijmakers, CEO of Giving What We Can, has already agreed to play this role. Sjir is one of the highest-integrity people I know, already regularly gives me candid feedback and is well placed to play this role within the effective giving space. If you have concerns about Ultra or me, you can reach out to him.
Someone at Coefficient Giving once told me that your five best friends are the five people who will tell you straight if they think you are doing something wrong. I am trying to institutionalise that advice.
Third, I am going to ask the Board to write and publish a conflict of interest policy, a whistleblowing policy and a compensation policy as a first order of business. Again, these are not foolproof defences, but they are important nudges in the right direction.
This will without doubt impose costs on Ultra, and would cost the EA community if implemented at scale.
It will be harder to get things done at maximum speed and more time will be spent securing sign-offs.
That being said, we tried doing grantmaking at breakneck speed once before and it ultimately went badly. For example, it was harder for charities to protect money that they had been granted from clawbacks because payments were sometimes made via non-charitable subsidiaries in the interests of speed.
Either way, we can mitigate the friction of more rigorous processes by hiring more staff. If we spend some of the extraordinary sums coming our way on compliance, finance, operations and legal staff, not to mention Managing Directors and Chiefs of Staff, we can have better governance and compliance without slowing to a crawl.
What am I calling on others to do?
I understand that people are very short on time, particularly right now. However, I hope that this piece can kick off a public discussion of these issues.
I am particularly keen to see responses and public commitments from other senior folks in the community. You might not think of yourself as an elder, but you might be one anyway, and making public commitments before the money lands gives everyone something to hold you to.
If you read this and thought “what does he mean, ‘last time’?”, start here and here.
If you run an EA organisation, please publish a conflict of interest, compensation and whistleblowing policy. This goes for the small orgs as much as the big ones - you never know when one of these policies might be needed.
If you are about to make a life-changing amount of money, I gave some advice here. I would particularly recommend asking some close friends to keep you on track, and committing to some giving targets.
Jack Lewars is the founder of Ultra Philanthropy, an independent advisory that helps major donors give for maximum impact, and is the fund manager of its Mid-Stage Global Health Fund. He advises donors giving up to nine figures a year, and is Chair of Trustees at High Impact Athletes.
Crossposted to Less Wrong
‘Like most of life’s dangers, the dangers of artificial intelligence are not easily identified from the armchair.’
J Dmitri Gallow
Epistemic status
I’m not an expert in this field, and herein I make some sweeping generalisations educated guesses about the overall...
Let’s imagine it’s November 2031. We’re both still here, AI is much more capable than it is today, but governments are governing, civilisation is still (mostly) civilised, and there has been no catastrophic loss of control. It just kind of didn’t happen.
What happens to the AI safety field then?
I expect people who currently believe catastrophe could happen within two or three years will start saying five or ten years. Then 15. Then ‘who cares if we’re a few decades of...
Thanks to Bruce Friedrich, Seth Ariel Green, Tobias Leenaert, Jan Willem Bolderdijk, Martine van Haperen, Herman Rohrbach, Chris Popa and Elizabeth Alvarez for comments. Claude helped structure the text. Ideas and mistakes are my own. I currently work with ProVeg International. The prize I propose would be defined and judged by an independent committee, and its money would fund scaling the winning solution(s), not ProVeg or the winner.
TL/DR
* EA could d...
There are many ways in which EA could have handled it better and I agree with your headline: "EA isn't immune to money, status and power".
At the same time, I really want to push back against the simplistic narrative that Wytham Abbey was obviously a silly and ineffective thing to buy[1]. Lots of people were skeptical that £14.9 million pounds could possibly be well spent buying a historic building when it could have saved like 4000 lives based on GiveWell figures. I think it should be quite clear today that this was way too dismissive.
EA correctly called AI as one of the largest issues of our time early and, by taking this gamble, has managed to achieve dramatic influence over the way this is playing out. This grant was a bet on purchasing a nice venue for retreats could allow EA ideas to become more influential. Given how influential EA ideas have become subsequently, it feels plausible that this kind of bet could have worked out. There's definitely a part of me that views this way of influencing the world as shallow, but, at the end of the day, the world is how it is, and you can have a lot of impact if you can bring the right people together.
Now, it may turn out that the influence of EA on AI is actually net-negative. I put a decent amount of weight on this possibility. At the same time, I mostly don't think the folks criticising the castle should get to claim this as a victory[2]. On the contrary, I consider the whole castle brouhaha to have been a distraction from more substantial issues in terms of integrity.
Many people didn't necessarily object to the castle in and of itself, but more as a PR risk. I think Will MacAskill does a great job of explaining why the "PR mindset" was likely a mistake: "Post-FTX, I think core EA adopted a “PR mentality” that (i) has been a failure on its own terms and (ii) is corrosive to EA’s soul".
It wasn't obvious at the time, but it seems pretty clear to me now that a lot of EA's post-FTX reputational issues were actually the result of EA-on-EA fire and then various folks or groups being unwilling to sufficiently back themselves (if you're not willing to back yourself, why would anyone else back you?) rather than anything that happened. Honestly, I think that a lot of the infighting that occurred after FTX was low integrity behaviour, in particular, people taking advantage of the moment to litigate their grievances. Now if this is true, and I think it is, it creates a bit of a bind. On one hand, criticising the motives of critics most typically ends up sliding into a group becoming more insular and closed-minded. On the other hand, giving bad faith critics free reign without ever calling out their bullshit can be disasterous too, as the near-collapse of EA demonstrated. After all, who wants to be part of a community if there's an active effort to tar the community's reputation, the community itself is full of drama and almost no-one is sticking up for people who are fighting their hardest to make the world a better place?
Just to be clear, there are extremely strong reasons be wary of pushing back against criticism. It's very common for this to start off reasonably and then escalate. At the same time, reversed stupidity is not intelligence. Just because the default is for communities to mess up their epistemics by being overly reactive against critics, doesn't mean that you can swing all the way to the opposite end and everything will be fine and gandy. For a long time, it worked rather well, but then the community obtained money and power and the wrong people flooded in and then when things blew up, they took the opportunity to litigate their petty grievances and the EA community that had previously been able to operate on an assumption of good faith was mostly caught flatfooted and let things play out by default, when we needed to be defending ourselves. (Lucky for us most of the people with the wrong motivations left shortly after).
You linked to your comment here as an example of EA doing poorly on conflicts of interest. Honestly, I think a) you're wrong and that Claire had an extremely reasonable explanation b) your criticism focused on prioritised non-mandatory process over the deeper principles at stake c) I honestly think you should apologise to her and admit you were wrong d) maybe there's enough uncertainty that an apology wouldn't be justified, but I still think it's at least somewhat arrogant for you to be acting as though you were clearly in the right here.
Just to be clear, I'm not trying to put you in the crowd of "wrong people" or "bad faith critics", you seem pretty good faith in this post and I can't remember if I've read any of your other comments or posts so I'm going off this post.
But from what I've read, I suspect that you want the community to focus a bit too much on process over real virtue or integrity. Just to be clear, I'm not trying to dismiss the importance of rules, you can follow almost all the rules, but then let one slide and create major legal trouble for yourself and your organisation. Additionally, there are certain norms that are important, not so much because of legal reasons, but because not following them would be a serious breach of trust[3].
My position is simply that I don't think we should take this so far that we let processes colonise our minds as to what true integrity looks like. If money, status and power draw the wrong people to the community then adding just a tiny bit of extra process around the margins isn't going to save you (but it may distract you).
Don't get me wrong, I think what you're doing here is great (honorable even)!
So where do I disagree:
a) "These are easier to mitigate, because we can choose to change our own behaviours more easily than we can gatekeep the community" — maybe we should avoid solutions closer to gatekeeping because they would be infeasible or they would backfire, but I certainly wouldn't make a decision here merely on the basis of one path being "easier".
b) "If you prefer to appoint people you trust personally and who share EA values to positions of responsibility, they will be conflicted or appear to be conflicted more often than in bigger communities" — We should avoid these conflicts when we can; own it when we can't or when the cost would be too high. Again, we need to comply with all relevant laws, mistakes here can be very costly, but it's worth understanding that laws are designed for a low trust environment (ie. all of society). We can't let this completely colonise our mindset. Some people want us to shift much further towards low trust norms, I feel this is defeatist and so I oppose.
It may have been a bad investment if it were underutilised or if it didn't deliver significant value over hiring external venues.
I said "mostly" because this depends on the specifics of what they said.
I haven't thought deeply about this yet, but I wonder whether thinking about whether an action would be a "breach of trust" with the public would be a healthier mindset than PR mindset but I haven't thought deeply about it. Arguably, the recommended PR response to many situations would be at least a minor breach of trust because you're optimising your interaction with the person to obtain an outcome rather than genuinely engaging with them.
Thanks for this, and in particular for writing a strongly argued disagreement, which takes courage.
I didn't particularly want to relitigate the Wytham Abbey debate but I guess I did mention it, so fair enough.
This may be me retrospectively changing my motives, but my objections to Wytham Abbey were (I think) threefold:
1. The building seemed incredibly poorly suited to the proposed use case. Wrong layout/rooms, subject to heavy restrictions as a historic building, substandard catering facilities. I would have been less bothered by them buying a fit-for-purpose conference centre (I think). I think this point of view is one reason why it was used so sporadically, and I vaguely remember people who went there said it was a crap place to hold retreats etc.
2. The conflict of interest in the grant decision.
3. The optics.
I think you argue quite coherently against the optics and this is the one I am least confident in and feel least bothered about today. I agree that EA has commendably defied the optics to do important things.
Your own footnote says it "may have been a bad investment if it were underutilised or if it didn't deliver significant value over hiring external venues". I think it was. It was used sporadically, was hugely controversial, became a meme of EA's excesses and failures, and EV sold it in 2025 for £6m, having bought it for £14.9m in 2022.
On the conflict of interest, I linked to that comment because I followed up with specific (and, in my view, reasonable) questions that went unaddressed. I raised this issue, Claire linked to a comment which did not address my concerns, I clarified my concerns and my follow-up questions weren't answered.
I still emphatically disagree with you on this. There is, in my view, no acceptable reason why that grant was assessed by someone who was so obviously conflicted, when it would have been so easy to mitigate this conflict by having almost literally anyone else at OP assess the grant. (Bear in mind that the widely quoted and accepted standard is an actual or perceived conflict of interest.)
I can also say that I have never heard of, nor seen any evidence of, large grantmakers* taking a Board seat and then having that same person assess the specific grants to that organisation, although that doesn't necessarily mean that this doesn't happen. For the record, even if the practice is widespread, I would still disagree with it on principle, but I would update in your direction.
You and I can obviously have differences of opinion, but you should consider carefully that there is widespread agreement in society, charitable regulation etc. that conflicts of interest are important and should be both acknowledged and mitigated, so the onus is on you to justify your opinion that these processes miss "real virtue or integrity", as there are very strong and widespread norms in the other direction.
I think you're right that managing this conflict wasn't legally required, as far as I can tell. My point is one that I think you gesture at in your footnote 3, about breaches of trust with the public: the norm exists for exactly this situation, because high trust inside a group doesn't substitute for the confidence of people outside it.
(I don't have any opinion on Claire's actual virtue or integrity and, if you do, this may lie behind your reaction. My opinion is that this specific grant was terrible governance, but that can be a mistake as easily as it can be malpractice.)
On your specific criticisms:
a) No, she did not give a reasonable explanation for why she assessed a high value and highly controversial grant to an organisation on whose Board she sat, when easy mitigation was at hand. She also did not provide any account that I have seen regarding whether this conflict was acknowledged, disclosed or managed, as ordinary governance would seem to demand.
b) No, it didn't, because the principles would have been served very well (probably equally as well) by someone else competent assessing the grant, without nearly so many concerns about conflicts of interest.
c) I guess I have answered this with points a) and b).
d) I can see that this might seem arrogant. My intention was to show that serious conflicts of interest existed, were apparently not mitigated and then were waved away without adequate explanation, and I think this comment thread demonstrates that.
Finally, I do agree that FTX imploding gave lots of ammunition to people who were wrong in expectation to say "I told you so". FTX being a fraud doesn't mean that everyone who objected to FTX-related things was right at the time, including me. Equally, the fact that Wytham Abbey failed doesn't prove it was a bad grant in expectation. But my first objection was about the building itself, which was knowable before the purchase, and that is how it played out in reality.
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*I am not sure how to footnote in these comments, but just to note, I said "large grantmakers" because this can be very difficult in small grantmakers, if you want to take Board seats. For example, I hold a Board seat at Lafiya as part of my grantmaking relationship to them. I joined the Board in December 2025, after our Fund's grant to them, and might have decided on a further grant to them after taking the seat (as it happens, I haven't done this, but I could have).
Taking that Board seat was an experiment, which I do not intend to repeat. I am also now asking for two second opinions on any future grants to Lafiya, to mitigate the conflict of interest. I just wouldn't want this to come out and for me to seem hypocritical.
Also, for the record, if Ultra Philanthropy (currently 1.8 FTE on payroll plus some contractors) can take steps to mitigate conflicts of interest over six-figure grants, it makes me even more insistent that a multibillion-dollar foundation with hundreds of staff can do the same, when making controversial eight-figure grant decisions.
I don't know very much about Wytham Abbey (and I've never been there).
But it seems like the complaints about a conflict of interest and "EA is wasting money on castles" actually ended up distracting from what seems to have been the more important lesson here, which is about domain knowledge: something can seem well-suited to a particular use case in the abstract, but may turn out to be poorly suited in the concrete. No-one had any interest in buying a building poorly suited to the use case and, if anything, this is the kind of mistake that a closer relationship between a funder and a grantee might actually be able reduce by involving the grantmaker at an earlier stage of the process. Now there are risks as well, as you point out, but these can be mitigated (I'd probably feel more nervous about the CEO of a large funder sitting on the board of an organisation they were funding, not saying I'd be completely against this, but they wouldn't have a direct boss to evaluate them. There'd still be the board, but an employee would have two potential lines of oversight rather than one).
"So the onus is on you to justify your opinion that these processes miss "real virtue or integrity" — I don't agree. I think we should take a more nuanced stance on how these norms evolved. Effectiveness is obviously a part of it, but it's only one component. Have you heard of the book Seeing as a State? States focus on legible metrics like COI because that is the mechanism that is available to them and because it reduces the chance they can be blamed if things go wrong. I'm not saying that these laws should be repealed nor am I saying that concerns about conflicts of interest are minor and can be waved away. I'm just saying that these shouldn't colonise our minds and I think you're giving them too much deference in terms of how we should handle situations where there isn't a legally mandate[1]. Nor am I saying that we should ignore social norms either—integrity is about right relationship with society and yourself. It's about orienting to both.
"When easy mitigation was at hand" — except if the purpose of her being there was to help ensure that the money was spend well...
Just to be clear, this isn't an endorsement of looking for loopholes in the law. I'm only talking about situations where the law doesn't apply and it isn't due to an obvious loophole.
I agree that domain knowledge was a real problem here.
I don't see, however, how this evidences the idea that earlier grantmaker involvement would mitigate this. The grantmaker was involved on both sides of the transaction, presumably from an early stage, so if anything it should update you in the other direction.
I don't think conflict of interest norms are mainly a product of states needing legibility, in the Seeing Like a State sense (although I haven't read that book). The principle that no one should be a judge in their own cause is centuries old. High-trust communities built on expertise, like academic peer review, adopted conflict rules for themselves rather than having them imposed.
I take your points, which I think are broadly true - people and organisations use weak proxy metrics a lot, sometimes for the wrong reasons, and we shouldn't adopt norms for their own sake.
At the same time, I think conflicts of interest are a norm we should take seriously, and for substantive reasons. Conflicts of interest genuinely get in the way of truth-seeking, by making people less objective and making it harder for them to decide what to do and say. They therefore disadvantage the ecosystem, organisations and individuals, including those individuals in conflicted positions.
Some examples:
I accept your point (and made the same one myself) that conflicts are almost inevitable in small ecosystems, but my response to that is that we mitigate this by acknowledging, declaring and managing the conflict. So, for example, person X can give a reference after saying "as a trustee, I am clearly conflicted and not able to give my fullest reference, but you can have it anyway." Funder B can say "as I am conflicted, I will ask an independent colleague to assess this grant."
This also answers your point that the purpose of Claire being there may have been to help ensure the money was spent well. That's an argument for her sitting on the Board, but not for her being the person at OP who assessed the grant. She could have overseen the spending as a trustee while a colleague assessed the grant, without any noticeable loss to anyone involved.
Even if you weight these norms less than I do, the cost of mitigation in this case was close to zero - namely one colleague assessing the grant instead of her. I can't see that much was gained by skipping it, and I think this applies across almost all conflicts of interest - the cost of mitigation is small and the dangers of no mitigation much larger.