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Summary 

EA and rationalists got enamoured with forecasting and prediction markets and made them part of the culture, but this hasn’t proven very useful, yet it continues to receive substantial EA funding. We should cut it off.

My Experience with Forecasting

For a while, I was the number one forecaster on Manifold. This lasted for about a year until I stopped just over 2 years ago. To this day, despite quitting, I’m still #8 on the platform. Additionally, I have done well on real-money prediction markets (Polymarket), earning mid-5 figures and winning a few AI bets. I say this to suggest that I would gain status from forecasting being seen as useful, but I think, to the contrary, that the EA community should stop funding it.

I’ve written a few comments throughout the years that I didn’t think forecasting was worth funding. You can see some of these here and here. Finally, I have gotten around to making this full post.

Solution Seeking a Problem

When talking about forecasting, people often ask questions like “How can we leverage forecasting into better decisions?” This is the wrong way to go about solving problems. You solve problems by starting with the problem, and then you see which tools are useful for solving it.

The way people talk about forecasting is very similar to how people talk about cryptocurrency/blockchain. People have a tool they want to use, whether that be cryptocurrency or forecasting, and then try to solve problems with it because they really believe in the solution, but I think this is misguided. You have to start with the problem you are trying to solve, not the solution you want to apply. A lot of work has been put into building up forecasting, making platforms, hosting tournaments, etc., on the assumption that it was instrumentally useful, but this is pretty dangerous to continue without concrete gains.

We’ve Funded Enough Forecasting that We Should See Tangible Gains

It’s not the case that forecasting/prediction markets are merely in their infancy. A lot of money has gone into forecasting. On the EA side of things, it’s near $100M. If I convince you later on in this post that forecasting hasn’t given any fruitful results, it should be noted that this isn’t for lack of trying/spending.

The Forecasting Research Institute received grants in the 10s of millions of dollars. Metaculus continues to receive millions of dollars per year to maintain a forecasting platform and conduct some forecasting tournaments. The Good Judgment Project and the Swift Centre have received millions of dollars for doing research and studies on forecasting and teaching others about forecasting. Sage has received millions of dollars to develop forecasting tools. Many others, like Manifold, have also been given millions by the EA community in grants/investments at high valuations, diverting money away from other EA causes. We have grants for organizations that develop tooling, even entire programming languages like Squiggle, for forecasting.

On the for-profit side of things, the money gets even bigger. Kalshi and Polymarket have each raised billions of dollars, and other forecasting platforms have also raised 10s of millions of dollars.

Prediction markets have also taken off. Kalshi and Polymarket are both showing ATH/growth in month-over-month volume. Both of them have monthly volumes in the 10s of billions of dollars. Total prediction market volume is something like $500B/year, but it just isn’t very useful. We get to know the odds on every basketball game player prop, and if BTC is going to go up or down in the next 5 minutes. While some people suggest that these trivial markets help sharpen skills or identify good forecasters, I don’t think there is any evidence of this, and it is more wishful thinking.

If forecasting were really working well and was very useful, you would see the bulk of the money spent not on forecasting platforms but directly on forecasting teams or subsidizing markets on important questions. We have seen very little of this, and instead, we have seen the money go to platforms, tooling, and the like. We already had a few forecasting platforms, the market was going to fund them itself, and yet we continue to create them.

There has also been an incredible amount of (wasted) time by the EA/rationality community that has been spent on forecasting. Lots of people have been employed full-time doing forecasting or adjacent work, but perhaps even larger is the amount of part-time hours that have gone into forecasting on Manifold, among other things. I would estimate that thousands of person-years have gone into this activity.

Hits-based Giving Means Stopping the Bets that Don’t Pay Off

You may be tempted to justify forecasting on the grounds of hits-based giving. That is to say, it made sense to try a few grants into forecasting because the payoff could have been massive. But if it was based on hits-based giving, then that implies we should be looking for big payoffs, and that we have to stop funding it if it doesn’t.

I want to propose my leading theory for why forecasting continues to receive 10s of millions per year in funding. That is, it has become a feature of EA/rationalist culture. Similar to how EAs seem to live in group houses or be polyamorous, forecasting on prediction markets has become a part of the culture that doesn’t have much to do with impact. This is separate from parts of EA culture that we do for impact/value alignment reasons, like being vegan, donating 10%+ of income, writing on forums, or going to conferences. I submit that forecasting is in the former category.

At this point, if forecasting were useful, you would expect to see tangible results. I can point to you hundreds of millions of chickens that lay eggs that are out of cages, and I can point to you observable families that are no longer living in poverty. I can show you pieces of legislation that have passed or almost passed on AI. I can show you AMF successes with about 200k lives saved and far lower levels of malaria, not to mention higher incomes and longer life expectancies, and people living longer lives that otherwise wouldn’t be because of our actions. I can go at the individual level, and I can, more importantly, go at the broad statistical level. I don’t think there is very much in the way of “this forecasting happened, and now we have made demonstrably better decisions regarding this terminal goal that we care about”. Despite no tangible results, people continue to have the dream that forecasting will inform better decision-making or lead to better policies. I just don’t see any proof of this happening.

Feels Useful When It Isn’t

Forecasting is a very insidious trap because it makes you think you are being productive when you aren’t. I like to play bughouse and a bunch of different board games. But when I play these games, I don’t claim to do so for impact reasons, on effective altruist grounds. If I spend time learning strategy for these board games, I don’t pretend that this is somehow making the world better off. Forecasting is a dangerous activity, particularly because it is a fun, game-like activity that is nearly perfectly designed to be very attractive to EA/rationalist types because you get to be right when others are wrong, bet on your beliefs, and partake in the cultural practice. It is almost engineered to be a time waster for these groups because it provides the illusion that you are improving the world’s epistemics when, in reality, it’s mainly just a game, and it’s fun. You get to feel that you are improving the world’s epistemics and that therefore there must be some flow-through effects and thus you can justify the time spent by correcting a market from 57% to 53% on some AI forecasting question or some question about if the market you are trading on will have an even/odd number of traders or if someone will get a girlfriend by the end of the year.

Conclusion

A lot of people still like the idea of doing forecasting. If it becomes an optional, benign activity of the EA community, then it can continue to exist, but it should not continue to be a major target for philanthropic dollars. We are always in triage, and forecasting just isn’t making the cut. I’m worried that we will continue to pour community resources into forecasting, and it will continue to be thought of in vague terms as improving or informing decisions, when I’m skeptical that this is the case.

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[Relevant context/COI: I'm CEO at the Forecasting Research Institute (FRI), an organization which I co-founded with Phil Tetlock and others. Much of the below is my personal perspective, though it is informed by my work. I don't speak for others on my team. I’m sharing an initial reply now, and our team at FRI will share a larger post in future that offers a more comprehensive reflection on these topics.]

Thanks for the post — I think it's important to critically question the value of funds going to forecasting, and this post offers a good opportunity for reflection and discussion.

In brief, I share many of your concerns about forecasting and related research, but I'm also more positive on both its impact so far and its future expected impact.

A summary of some key points:

  1. Much of the impact of forecasting research on specific decision-makers is not public. For example, FRI has informed decisions on frontier AI companies' capability scaling policies, has advised senior US national security decision-makers, and has informed research at key US and UK government agencies. But, we are not able to share many details of this work publicly. However, there is also public evidence that forecast
... (read more)

Stripped of all AI-centred argumentation, the reply is left mostly empty. This suggests that judgmental forecasting, at least as exercised by FRI, should perhaps be thought of as a sub-domain of AI safety. In such a case, its impact would need to be evaluated in the portfolio context of all AI safety budgets, meaning a much higher hurdle rate would have to be cleared to justify its activities.

What more broadly applies to judgmental forecasting and online betting platforms -- and is also the basis for many arguments in this defence of forecasting -- is the circular reasoning regarding the field's importance, frequently repeated by the field's own and those adjacent to it. But, in contrast to the opinionated voices, the evidence is lacking. Merely stating that forecasting has informed some policy or that career decisions have been influenced is not sufficient. Similarly, whether its impact is positive or negative is taken at face value and never substantiated.

All this isn't to say that judgmental forecasting research or its funding should be dispensed with. In fact, hybrids that combine quantitative predictive models with expert judgment are among the foundational tools of large organisations' decision-making processes. However, I believe the field's association with online betting (high time we called things for what they are) as well as over-reliance on AI for its services is actually hurting it.

3
Ebenezer Dukakis
Whose job is it to identify EA questions which could benefit from better forecasts? Consider two different hypotheses: * Forecasting is only helpful for AI * Forecasting is helpful outside of AI, but AI has captured much more forecasting interest than other cause areas How much time are non-AI org leaders spending trying to think up decision-relevant forecasts related to their cause areas? * If leaders are not spending any time trying to think up such forecasts, maybe there is low-hanging fruit here. Maybe EA has latent forecasting capability which can be tapped to improve organizational decision-making. Or maybe such forecasting capability will free up in a few years if AI turns out to be a nothingburger. * If leaders have spent a lot of time trying to think up useful forecasts, and failed, maybe forecasting really is fairly useless outside of AI. If I was leading a non-AI EA organization, and I had a forecast I really wanted to see the result of, who would I even talk to? Which forecasting organizations are actively soliciting ideas for EA-related forecast questions? It seems to me that a lot of what EA does is implicit forecasting in some sense, e.g. if you give someone a grant, it's an implicit forecast about the probability that they will be able to accomplish something with that grant. EA is often critiqued for neglecting "systemic change". If you want to do systemic change, being able to forecast the effects of various systemic changes is really useful. If you take any action, there's an implicit forecast that it will lead to a good outcome and not backfire somehow. Wouldn't it be better to make this forecast explicit? All else equal, wouldn't it be good to get some perspective from people outside of the organization, who are perhaps forecasting in their free time as a replacement for watching TV or other downtime activities?
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Qbson
My understanding of the original post's intent is that it calls for evidence of the field's impact, given the funding it receives. I don't believe it critiques judgmental forecasting as an analytical method and neither do I think that I signal this in my comment.  I stand by my opinion, however, that the community is correct to ask for tactile proof, burden of which rests on organizations that receive the funding. I regret if this doesn't satisfy the questions in your comment.
1
Jhrosenberg
The bulk of our funding has gone toward AI-focused forecasting projects (e.g. LEAP, AI-biorisk, economic effects of AI) or ‘automating forecasting research’-type work that has the ultimate goal of assisting decisionmakers (e.g. ForecastBench), so I think this is most of what FRI should be evaluated on.  I’m not sure what comparison class people had in mind previously, but I agree it seems broadly correct to consider this work alongside other AI-related funding opportunities. As noted above, I’d argue that it is appropriate and valuable to have “AI measurement” as an important funding domain alongside areas like “AI governance,” “Technical AI safety research,” “AI field-building,” etc. It seems valuable for one part of the AI grantmaking portfolio to be generating evidence that can be used to sharpen views on AI timelines, to assess risk in various domains (bio, cyber, catastrophic risk), to assess magnitudes of benefits (for calibrating cost-benefit analyses on policies), and to predict the likelihood and impact of various policies (e.g. the effectiveness of DNA synthesis screening for biorisk), etc. This type of fundamental research can inform and support more effective action in the other domains.  I also think forecasting research can have direct impacts on AI governance via direct decision-making partnerships like I described above: i.e., directly partnering with and advising important government agencies and frontier AI companies, among others, on high-stakes decisions related to AI regulation, implementing effective safeguards to reduce AI-cyber risk, and more. We have already seen some early impacts along these lines, as previously mentioned. I agree. Due to confidentiality, we have primarily shared details of our impact case studies with our funders and had them assess the value of the impact we are making. Establishing evidence of impact publicly is more challenging due to confidentiality considerations. But elsewhere in the thread people have mentioned

Hi Josh, thanks for the response.

I hate to do this, especially at the start, but I want to point out for you and others who have jobs related to forecasting that it's difficult to convince someone of something when their job relies on them not believing it. I think you should assume that you will think forecasting is more useful than it is.

As for your points, I'll respond to some of them.

  1. If you want to DM me, I can sign an NDA, and I may update my opinion depending on what these non-public uses of forecasting are.
  2. I don't think this is all that relevant. I'm not sure what forecasting research has really elicited on AI timelines. I agree that talk about timelines creates a lot of "buzz" around AI but depending on your views, this is good or bad.
  3. I agree that the impact of measurement-oriented research is difficult to measure, but importantly, not impossible. OWID for example should count how much their work is being cited and looked up. Conversely, I think it would be good to estimate, for FRI, how much $$ the change of the decision was worth and by what amount/percentage did FRI make that change more likely. I don't think you really gave a good reason that FRI should be funded over anything else that simply has very diffuse benefits.
  4. When do you think it's reasonable, if ever, for the EA community to "give up" on funding more forecasting work?
  5. If I'm being cynical, almost every field can say "AI will transform the field" though I'm not sure how much this is worth debating.
1
Eva
Not Josh, and also conflicted through the Social Science Prediction Platform (though we had pretty minimal funding from EA sources), but I wonder if it would be worth pooling non-public projects we know of and making BOTE estimates of hypothetical impact. It’s tricky because I don’t know of any RCTs (though I’m working on one now). But I’m extremely confident that across us we would think of some combination of orgs/governments that collectively spend over $100 billion per year (… I can think of that alone) that are interested in forecasts in different ways. Now, imo the vast majority of places interested in forecasting are not going to do anything substantive with it, and it’s hard to know what it means for one of these places to integrate forecasts - for example, for an org spending $X, do forecasts inform 1% of their funding or what? Of the share they inform, how much do they move the needle? If estimates from people who work on forecasts may be optimistic (I'm not paid at all for it, but I choose to work on it because I think it’s useful), happy to describe the situation to an outside observer privately.
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Marcus Abramovitch 🔸
Hi Eva, I think the Social Science Prediction Platform (alongside a friend of mine who is doing something similar for clinical trials) are among the more interesting uses of forecasting/PMs but I'm skeptical they will be uptaken to the degree/impact you might hope for. I'm skeptical of things of the form "small percentage chance * big number". I think humans are really bad at estimating small percentages. Would be happy to talk privately about any situations you are thinking of.
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Eva
Thanks! I agree, I'm also generally skeptical of small chance * big number things - I was not intending 1% as an anchor but as an open question - and not as a probability but as a concrete percent of the funding. For example, a big org uses forecasts, but perhaps they only use them in particular workstreams responsible for X% of funding, and those workstreams could be tracked. Then out of X%, how much do they move the needle? Anyway, happy to chat sometime!
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keller_scholl 🔸
(COI flag: I have an application out with FRI) "Prediction markets are increasingly being cited by government officials, and the public is paying more attention to them than ever before. Much of the impact for prediction markets specifically seems negative (e.g. via incentivizing gambling on low-value topics), but the broader cultural shift suggests there may be an opportunity for better uses of forecasting to enter public consciousness as well." I think that this is a reason for pessimism on impact, not optimism. Kalshi and Polymarket are primarily sports gambling platforms by volume, immune to state regulation for reasons that may, in the perspective of a cynic, be related to them paying Donald Trump Jr. undisclosed sums of money for undisclosed quantities of work. This does not, I think, inspire particular trust in their efficacy or accuracy. The new legislative push could shift this (I haven't dug into it deeply), but by default I expect the shift from "odd thing some experts claim is good" to "the tool for corruption, leaking military secrets, insider trading, and sports gambling" to worsen perceptions of accuracy (broadly defined halo effect).

I don’t disagree with some of the fundamentals of this post. Before diving into that, I want to correct a factual error:

“the Swift Centre have received millions of dollars for doing research and studies on forecasting and teaching others about forecasting”

The Swift Centre for Applied Forecasting has not received millions in funding. The majority of our earnings have been through direct projects with organisations who want to use forecasting to inform their decisions.


On your wider argument. I think forecasting has probably received too much funding and the vast majority of that has misallocated on platforms and research. I believe some funding (hundreds of thousands) to maintain core platforms like Metaculus as a public good of information. Though, services like Polymarket can probably fill most of this need in the future (but many useful, informative markets would never reach the necessary volume to be reliable).

Where I think we disagree most is in the application of forecasting and some of the achievements. We’ve worked with frontier AI labs to inform their decisions, are currently advising a U.K. Minister’s team on a central piece of their policy, and are about to start a secondm... (read more)

"We’ve worked with frontier AI labs to inform their decisions"

This feels likely net negative to me? But don't have enough information to know.

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JamesN
We could “forecast” the likelihood of that haha. I can’t get into specifics. But if you believe activities like evaluations of models to test for dangerous behaviour etc. is net negative, then that may give credence to your assumption. As an extra data point of whether we’d do work we thought was net negative, I was Head of Policy at ControlAI and co-authored narrowpath.co, and our forecasters have done numerous AI safety focused projects (with and outside of the Swift Centre, including AI 2027).
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NickLaing
Personally I weakly think any working with AI labs (except perhaps anthropic) supports dangerous acceleration, but I think the opposing view to this is almost as strong.  That other stuff sounds way better than working with the labs too ;)
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Jeff Kaufman 🔸
That seems much too strong to me: it's very important that AI companies have accurate views on how dangerous their models are. When AISI evaluated Mythos and confirmed its high level of cybersecurity ability, this (from the outside) looks critical to Anthropic deciding not to release it publicly yet. This likely reduced near term risk, set some precedent, and also slowed the race slightly. (Disclosure: the other side of SecureBio does AI evals; speaking for myself)
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NickLaing
On "It's very important that AI companies have accurate views on how dangerous their models are". I would agree its important to the companies so they can prevent near-term harm and increase long-term acelleration.  I would argue that if mythos had slipped through a month ago, and lets say a bank and a government were hacked then we would have our biggest warning shot yet. If Claude had released mythos prematurely, I think it would have reduced AI risk long term because it probably would have freaked out governments and the public, which might then have legislated and put brakes on. In this case, if Anthropic had prematurely released it, that would have slowed the race more than the real world scenario where they didn't. The slowing due to not releasing is IMO almost negligable. I would argue similar for biorisk evals. A warning shot now might trigger the kind of public/government reaction we need before risks get existential.  Hiccups now while models aren't takeover/existential risk ready might slow the race down in a meaningful way. Preventing lower-level biorisk events now could increase existential risk later. But it's obviously really difficult to tell if this kind of short term pain might be worth the longer term gain. But if the labs want the safety now, its for the purpose of continued scaling more than the safety itself. That should give us pause. Also we've already seen Anthropic and Open AI back down on their safety docs red-lines,  "knowing" doesn't mean "slowing". Its entirely possible all of the evals come in, the knowledge is there and everyone just plows on. I would be like 51% sure on this (so barely at all), but at the very least its daft to automatically think that safety work now is necessarily a good thing for the world long term. There's a lot of complexity there. I think there are strong arguments for and against near-term safety.  
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calebp
Whilst I strongly disagree with the claim at the object level, many other non-forecasting AI safety interventions work with labs in some way, so even if this were true, the relative penalty applied to AIS forecasting work would be fairly low.
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Marcus Abramovitch 🔸
Appreciate the correction. I simply did totals I saw from Open Phil/CG spreadsheets. Ill correct the post. 
1
Transient Altruist
Hi; as of now it still says they've received millions of dollars.

I think this post significantly overstates its conclusion and is plausibly poorly calibrated on the relative value of forecasting.

My main "directional" issues with the post as it's currently written:

  • I think it overstates the amount of funding devoted to forecasting on a "worldview" basis.
    • Most forecasting funding is (iiuc) not going to neartermist causes or particularly fungible with neartermist causes, so pointing to a bunch of neartermist causes to justify better funding options seems irrelevant.
    • From my perspective, it seems like:
      • Within Animal welfare fungible money, very little goes into forecasting e.g. less than $2M per year
        • Tbh - I would probably prefer that more money went into some kinds of forecasting on the margin. For example, I think that people are generally too bullish on clean meat, and Linch/Open Phil's work investigating the difficulty of clean meat has plausibly resulted in better allocation of millions of dollars because there are, in fact, good alternatives (like cage-free campaigns).
      • Within Longtermist/AI fungible money, maybe $10M/year goes into forecasting, which seems pretty reasonable to me but i think to get to 10M you need to be including projects that seems
... (read more)
6
david_reinstein
(Caveat: Slightly self-promoting, sorry, but I hope it's germane/helpful.) By the way, on the animal welfare forecasting front, see  Support Metaculus' First Animal-Focused Forecasting Tournament and Rethinking the Future of Cultured Meat: An Unjournal Evaluation. I'd leave room for some doubt as to whether the "clean meat forecasting" work led to updates in the right direction.  We're trying to take the next steps on this with a workshop involving some belief elicitation and forecasting (workshop page, belief elicitation page).
2
Marcus Abramovitch 🔸
I think far more than $10M/year is going into forecasting. Many grants for forecasting are awarded outside the forecasting fund, such as the Navigating Transformative AI Fund. It depends on what you count, but I think it is closer to $25M/year. I really question if people are really getting much, if anything, from all these forecasts that they didn't already have before.

I work at Founders Pledge, which has made many forecasting-related grants, some of them quite recently. Like Marcus, I’ve been fairly successful at forecasting — I am a so-called superforecaster a — but have a fair amount of skepticism. My views here are personal ones, not FP’s.

I have some agreements and disagreements with this post. The main point of agreement I have is with Marcus’ “vibe” here: I think forecasting’s apparent status and prominence among EAs outstrip either its prima facie promisingness or the to-date empirical support for its use.

I’m not sure that I agree that too much has been spent on forecasting, and I definitely don’t agree that enough time has passed that we’d know by now whether this work has been useful. We’re talking about a very short period of time here.

I think we’re at risk of conflating a bunch of different kinds of forecasting work:

  • Investments in calibration: Funding new techniques or experiments in more effective forecasting
  • Investments in diffusion: Broadly, attempts to “make forecasting a thing” by supporting e.g. new platforms
  • Investments in capacity: Attempts to propagate or institutionalize formal forecasting at influential institutions
  • Investments
... (read more)
4
Marcus Abramovitch 🔸
I agree that there is a lot of stuff being conflated in "forecasting". I suppose, I want to single out Prediction Markets and Judgemental Forecasting.

For context: I founded Inkling Markets in 2006 out of Y Combinator running internal prediction markets for companies and governments, and then Cultivate Labs in 2014, which has participated in some of the projects this community has funded. So I've watched this play out for 20 years. Before IARPA ACE and Tetlock's Superforecasters, before FRI, before most of what's mentioned in this thread existed.

Two things I think this debate is missing:

1) On whether the OP/CG money was wasted. Several commenters imply specific grants were boondoggles and this was recently mentioned in Nuño’s forecasting newsletter as well. The stated goal of much of that funding was to influence decision-making inside governments, particularly the US Government.

Anyone who has actually tried this knows it's an extremely expensive and difficult endeavor. For example, just getting in the door to talk to the people who have budgets to spend requires former senior officials on your team to make introductions. These are some of the highest demand people in Washington because of their networks. Then if you get through the door and eventually get to yes, the procurement and contracting takes months or doesn't end up eve... (read more)

5
pete
A small story: I worked for several years at one of the top professional services firms, and encountered tremendous political opposition to forecasting, as had some of my more senior and accomplished peers. I was surprised by this. I shouldn't have been, given that I was de facto asking a hierarchical power structure to at least partially reallocate decision-making authority. Most leaders barely tolerate manipulable data — the threat of additional accountability is a tough sell. Possible, but tough!

[COI: I work at the Swift Centre as a forecaster, I have worked for a prediction market, I am very involved in forecasting. It is not my current work however, which is on community notes]

A few things points attempting to say things other commenters haven't, though I largely agree with the critical comments and the things they agree with Marcus on:

I agree that the $100M doesn't seem super well allocated. Not because forecasting is useless, but because the money flowed to big institutions and platforms rather than smaller, weirder, mechanism-design bets. I like Metaculus, but it has absorbed a lot of money in the last 5 years and not clearly changed much. I don't know if I think FRI has been worth it, I am glad someone has done the research but, again, how much are we talking? I would have preferred smaller projects were funded on the margin. Coefficient's strategy in forecasting has felt poor to me, often ignoring the community who in my view come up with the most interesting projects and going for marginal spending on incumbents. 

Nobody funds mechanism design or institutional epistemics. I recently spoke to someone at a household name enormous tech company who described their ... (read more)

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Marcus Abramovitch 🔸
As promised, my reply (a couple days late). 1. I think it's a bit of a cop out to suggest that the money was spent poorly and therefore it's not fair to judge forecasting on the merits. Not sure if this is what you are saying though. 2. I'm not sure I agree. Blockchains were funded. Lots of academic research is funded by governments, etc. 3. By this logic, why aren't we paying people in the top, say 100 on Polymarket on non-sports questions and saying "hey guys, we want to pay you to make some forecasts for us". 4. I'm not sure how I feel about these. I will say, I am not nearly as big a fan of AI 2027 as others seem to be, and I think it is going to severely discredit AI risks because we have been crying wolf when frankly, most of the scary stuff they say doesn't happen. I am very happy to make some bets with Daniel or Eli on some of these (and give them extra time). 5. Useless is a stretch and I didn't intend to claim it originally. Sorry if I implied it. I merely think they are overrated, hence the title.
1
Miquel Banchs-Piqué (prev. mikbp)
If it is not indiscreet, can you explain what you mean by "intimate partner violence"? Couples fighting due to different views on bets? or more something like bets on couples' separations triggering the separation? I'm pretty curious what you mean.
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Nathan Young
There is pretty solid evidence that sports gambling legalisation leads to increased intimate partner violence.  https://cheps.sdsu.edu/_resources/docs/working-papers/cheps-wp-20251001.pdf?utm_source=perplexity
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Mo Putera
Likely the standard definition, e.g. by WHO  It's a subset of gender-based violence. See cause area overview, TLYCS's help women and girls fund, CE charity NOVAH, etc.
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Miquel Banchs-Piqué (prev. mikbp)
ok, but I mean ask about what the relation is of intimate partner violence with prediction markets.
2
Mo Putera
Ah, sorry for misunderstanding. I don't know.
1
Miquel Banchs-Piqué (prev. mikbp)
well, you actually answered what i asked. It was me who didn't ask what I meant to ask... :-S

I tend to agree with the OP, but think there are a couple of other points about subsidising prediction markets which could have had more emphasis

  • Forecasts are a market in which people trade money, which makes it easy for them to function on a for profit model if there is significant interest in participation. Even if prediction markets are objectively highly valuable, it is not clear there is sufficient altruism-relevant benefit in forecasting quality coming from subsidised rather than non-subsidised platforms to justify the subsidy [1]
  • Forecasting for profit is zero sum,[2] which means every superforecaster is balanced out by an equal and opposite amount of money collectively lost by others who are less "well calibrated". Many people are perhaps happy to net lose money gambled for entertainment or signalling purposes (though perhaps they could part with their cash in other ways which deliver more positive outcomes...), but others may be developing gambling habits which can be extremely self destructive[3]. I guess this links to Marcus' "feels like doing something useful where it isn't" point, but it can be much worse than simply a distraction. Negative externalities can b
... (read more)

For Kalshi specifically, it seems to have essentially become a backdoor to deregulate sports gambling in every US state. The mass deregulation of gambling in the US this decade feels harmful and like something we’ll probably really regret (legalisation seems fine but not like this).

It doesn’t seem popular to criticise the gambling aspects of prediction markets here, but it does seem strange to me that EAs seem to care a lot about reducing harms from tobacco and alcohol, but seem indifferent to gambling.

5
calebp
Interesting, is sports betting plausibly as bad as tobacco/alcohol in low-income countries? Like, I think sports betting is plausibly one of the "worst businesses" for the US, comparable to alcohol/tobacco - but my impression is that the EAs that care about tobacco/alcohol don't care very much about interventions in high-income countries relative to low-income countries.
7
Mihkel Viires 🔹
BOTEC: 4.2 percent of suicides in the state of Victoria in Australia were gambling-related. 19.4 percent of suicides in Hong Kong were gambling-related. 720,000 suicides happen every year. Let's say 10 percent of all suicides globally are related to gambling. That would be 72,000 gambling-related suicides. Tobacco causes over 7 million deaths per year, while alcohol kills 2.6 million people per year. Gambling interventions could be cost-effective, in some situations. Especially for larger countries yet to liberalize gambling/betting (like Brazil, India)? Also, now might be a window to lobby for stricter regulations on prediction markets. Random fun fact: Indonesia has banned gambling, but is the only country where tobacco advertising is still legal.
3
Clara Torres Latorre 🔸
Random tangent: tobacco advertising also legal in Andorra
3
Lucio
I don't have any data to back this up but I wouldn't be surprised if in Sub-Saharan Africa sports betting was worse than tobacco and on par with alcohol, it being incredibly widespread and normalized.
2
NickLaing
It's bad but I don't think that bad. Tobacco and alcohol are far worse than most other realize.
2
David T
Interesting point, and I suspect that there are lower hanging fruit in gambling too: some of the most addictive forms (e.g. fixed odds betting terminals in the UK) are not some intrinsic part of the culture but relatively new innovations promoted by a mere handful of companies and so regulators are much happier grappling with them (in the case of fixed odds betting terminals, I suspect restrictions on how much could be bet per spin were even more popular with the people who actually use them on a regular basis than the wider public!). In that respect it's perhaps a lot  like animal rights activism requires campaigns focused on winnable battles to be effective (and it might appeal to some people that already have that lobbying skillset)
2
david_reinstein
My belief/experience suggests that the sorts of prediction markets that are profitable and entertaining are not likely to be the ones that are going to be particularly informative to globally impactful/EA funding and policy choices. (But at the same time, I guess it's the case that some of the EA/rationalist support for prediction platforms has ended up leading to these entertaining but not socially valuable things.)

As someone who has dedicated their PhD to researching forecasting, I think this article raises an important point—but states it too bluntly, which ultimately muddles its central argument.

First, some context. Broadly speaking, all decisions are made on the basis of expectations about the future. It follows that anything which shifts those expectations can affect decisions in meaningful ways. This is easy to overlook, but it matters for how we evaluate forecasting interventions.

Furthermore, it is not easy to observe the effects of research. Consider the work of the Forecasting Research Institute. Much of what FRI does is research, and most of the benefits of research accrue in the future and are not easily traced back to any single input. The same difficulty applies more generally: since we cannot observe the counterfactual world in which a forecasting intervention was never made, measuring its effect is genuinely hard. How many decisions were improved? We may never know with precision.

That said, I do think the author raises a valid concern. We should be highly skeptical of the large investments of time and money by philanthropic actors and others in this space. Since many people fin... (read more)

Hi Marcus. Thanks for the post. I broadly agree.

Coefficient Giving's (CG's) Forecasting Fund has recently been closed.

As of March 30, the Forecasting Fund is no longer active, though we continue to make key forecasting grants through other funds, such as Navigating Transformative AI. This page will be maintained until the end of 2026 as a record of the fund’s work.

I think this is more likely to make forecasting grants useful. They will presumably be assessed with the criteria used to evaluate the non-forecasting grants of the respective fund.

@NunoSempere wrote about the end of CG's Forecasting Fund in the last edition of the Forecasting Newsletter. Only paid subscribers can check the relevant section.

We are always in triage

Right.

7
Marcus Abramovitch 🔸
I'm not a paid sub to Nuno so I can't see. I had this post in my drafts for 3 years. I was happy to see the Forecasting Fund close down, I don't expect we will see less than $5M of forecasting grants done by CG in 2026 or 2027 though. I don't have an opinion on if I would rather the forecasting grants be made within or separate from the forecasting fund so long as the grants are still being made. I see pros and cons. I think Holly's post you linked is awesome and is in my Mount Rushmore of posts (top 4 all time).

What are the other 3 on your Mount Rushmore?

3
Vasco Grilo🔸
Me neither. CG's Forecasting Fund granted 15.9 M$ in 2025.

I have at least three reasons to be hopeful:

  1. I see forecasting catching on with researchers for experimental design, which could easily save a lot of money and help make more progress. Earlier this month we updated a working paper on forecasts using data from the Social Science Prediction Platform to explicitly include results demonstrating use in power calculations. If a year from now forecasts are used a similar amount to now in economics research then that would be evidence for your hypothesis but from my perspective the concept that forecasts could be used in this way has only just started to be socialized, at least in my field. I also personally know of at least a couple of large institutions seeking forecasts and am planning a RCT on how they affect decision-making in the field.
  2. I think LLMs are making forecasting much cheaper and easier.
  3. If humans don't take up the use of forecasts in decision-making as much as they "should", well, LLMs may be more likely to in their own pipelines.

That's not to say that every project previously funded around forecasting was a good use of money. I would probably agree with you regarding most of the projects you have in mind, while disagreeing with the title and framing which is way too broad.

1
hmijail
Since you're the only one mentioning LLMs I thought I'd ask a couple of things I'd love to understand. Maybe you can point me somewhere to learn more. * Forecasting is supposed to help us prepare for the future. I just learnt that LLMs seem to be increasingly be used for forecasting - turns out that they're surprisingly good at it. And LLMs-for-forecasting are used for AI safety work. * This sounds to me very close to assigning a suspected criminal to guide the team of investigators that are investigating the suspected crime. * Furthermore, I hear that this is admitted to be risky some years in the future. While also admitting that we don't know how the current AI is already so surprisingly good at it. Why isn't it considered to be risky right now? * Even further, I hear that the reason LLMs are used is because there's not enough humans to work on this. But given the circularity of these things, I'll bet that the use of LLMs is also making it difficult for new humans to grow into the job. So this would paint a future of better LLMs forecasting for less humans. Is this so? In all, this sounds to me like a doom machine that will only fail if forecasting turns out by sheer luck to be useless and/or LLMs turn out by sheer luck to go nowhere.  Or in other words, AI safety work with a good chance of making the problem worse by spawning a double agent. What am I getting wrong? Where can I learn more?

When talking about forecasting, people often ask questions like “How can we leverage forecasting into better decisions?” This is the wrong way to go about solving problems. You solve problems by starting with the problem, and then you see which tools are useful for solving it.

I definitely have my own gripes about EA/rationalist attitudes towards forecasting (see here), but maybe your objection is a level confusion:

  1. I think when people talk about "leveraging forecasting into better decisions", they're saying: "'Better' decisions just are decisions guided by the normatively correct beliefs. Namely, they're decisions that make reasonable-seeming tradeoffs between possible outcomes given the normatively correct beliefs about the plausibility of those outcomes. So our decisions will be more aligned with this standard of 'better' if our beliefs are formed by deferring to well-calibrated forecasts."
    1. E.g. they're saying, "When navigating AI risk, we'll make decisions that we endorse more if those decisions are guided by the credences of folks who've been unusually successful at forecasting AI developments."
    2. (At least, that's the steelman. Maybe I'm being too charitable!)
  2. Whereas you seem to be
... (read more)
2
Anthony DiGiovanni 🔸
(My gripes discussed in the linked post above, FWIW: Re: (1), the typical EA operationalization of "well-calibrated", and judgments about how to defer to people based on their calibration on some reference class of past questions, are based on very questionable epistemological assumptions. See also this great post.)

I strongly agree with the author's viewpoint, and I also strongly agree that long-term predictions in chaotic systems (such as predictions about events three years in advance) are, in most cases, a form of self-comfort, a resistance to the uncertainty of the future. Essentially, it's a psychological comfort of seeking certainty, rather than a rigorous, systematic argument. 

Specifically, in complex dynamics, there's the concept of the Lyapunov exponent, a classic application in meteorology. Any weather forecast exceeding 14 days is almost indistinguish... (read more)

I think one should distinguish between several things here:

  • Prediction markets that make a lot of $ and don't really need more because they do just fine with the profit motive
  • People spending a lot of time on prediction markets to prove they are a good forecaster
  • Infrastructure integrated into specific use cases, such as: when a funder is interested in a question so much that they will pay for forecasts, to inform and improve their other funding, or when for structural reasons the institution that has reason to benefit from the forecasts cannot fund them itself (such as some other decision-makers who do not have the mandate to support forecasting and are restricted from spending money to support it but would use forecasts in their work flow), or basic research with positive externalities.

This post really belabours the first and second bullet point, perhaps because that is where a lot of money has gone to, but there can be a lot of value in the third.

Yea, this is fair. I am much more sympathetic to non-PM forecasting than I am PM/judgemental forecasting. The ideas in this post were really developed in 2023/2024 when I saw EAs spending a ton of time on Manifold/Metaculus, investing at high valuations, generally revering prediction markets for decision making, etc. whereas what I was seeing was completely different.

This post really belabours the first and second bullet point, perhaps because that is where a lot of money has gone to, but there can be a lot of value in the third.

I really believe in following the money. I think if we spend $100M on forecasting and $90M of it went to prediction market-style forecasting, I think it's fair to basically lump it all together. It'd be one thing if PMs were a small experiment within broad forecasting, but its been the main thing.

1
Eva
That's fair! It's just also reasonable for me or other non-PM forecasting folks to be concerned about people making the wrong inference. I'm currently set to pay for the SSPP and other forecasting work out of my own personal research budget next year, having not found other funding yet. I had a full proposal out to cG when they shuttered the stream, though there are some other possibilities I'm exploring.

I suspect that the main use of forecasting is if you need a probability for something and you don't really have time to look into it yourself or you wouldn't trust your judgement even if you did.

8
NickLaing
I think this is great and makes sense, but this isn't where 90 percent of the money is going.
4
JamesN
Sort of, but that also doesn’t capture the significant accuracy and efficiency benefits the process of structured reasoning and communication that forecasting enables. There’s substantial risks and issues of “just looking into an issue yourself” - especially when you are more confident in your judgement (because that’s a clear risk of confirmation bias/overconfidence). The main use of forecasting is in utilising the core scientific benefits it can bring as above into, to help real world decision makers. But fundamentally, that hasn’t been funded - instead we’ve funded tournaments and research.

Curious what readers here think! 

Ideally read/skim both @Marcus Abramovitch's post and @Jhrosenberg's response (currently top comment) before voting.  

Note this will obviously not be representative, it's just a quick opinion poll. 

G
GR
YL
DM
T
BM
F
A
AS
B
C
FW
A
JW
ED
A
Z
A
less
more
3
Nathan Young
2
Marcus Abramovitch 🔸
I already made my case in my post. The other thing I would add is that there is evenmore spent on forecasting, its just under the AI safety type funds.
2
Lorenzo Buonanno🔸
I don't think "EA Funding" is that useful of a term here. My sense is that forecasting is not funded by a large number of small retail donors thinking about forecasting as a category, but by few large institutions funding specific projects for specific reasons (which are sometimes not just effectiveness-related, and usually not public so hard to evaluate)
1
Tandena Wagner
Mildly surprised how much is going into it. Mildly surprised how little is coming out of it. Still have high expectations for the return on improving decision-making. I'm a low information voter. Voting without factoring in a large increase in funds in the near future which would slam everything to the right.
1
AgentMa🔸
Marcus' points are good
1
Danila Medvedev
I think it's clear from Marcus experience and his argument that forecasting per se failed to produce results. There are many adjacent areas that are related to better epistemology and decision making and the money should be rationally diverted there. As an applied futurologist specializing in human augmentation and management of innovation I can "push my favorite solutions" here, but my position is more general - find better target for this funding.
1
JamesN
This obviously assumes Marcus has a sufficient level of experience to justify the claims. Which I think, given other comments, can be adequately challenged. It would be good to know what metric/threshold/examples would be taken as forecasting delivering adequate impact to justify funding. From examples in this thread alone, we can see senior government decision makers in both the U.K. (including Ministerial teams and critical committees) and US, frontier labs safety teams, and philanthropic funds moving tens of millions of dollars a year) have utilised forecasting (either the process or the outputs) to inform their decisions. The argument of it only shifting a decision 1-2% is totally fair. But to keep consistent I’d expect the same people who make that argument to also be highly sceptical of the vast majority of research funding.
1
Danila Medvedev
Marcus's experience can be questioned and his position challenged, but in other comments other knowledgeable and experienced people supported some of his arguments, even though they were objecting to others. So I would say that in general Marcus's position is strong. It's clear it's provocative, but I don't see a problem with that personally. The metrics could be chosen based on your overall decision making system. The end points are measured by NPV, QLY, etc. It's clear that you need some intermediate metrics, of course, which I would say, is the number and scale of decisions where forecasting not only "informed" the decisions, but "determined". Examples from determining the impact of scientific research: lead is bad => leaded gasoline banned. CO2 is bad => fight global warming. I would ideally like to see something similar (obviously the scale/impact can be smaller). It's clear that forecasting is distinct from finding a causal link, but the general process of incorporating something in decision making process and having that something affect decisions is similar. Also, I am very skeptical about the value of research. As a (sorta) constructive proposal. Consider how foresight (as a formerly great practice from the 1960s) is used. Consider that foresight (essentially a more advanced form of working with the future than extrapolation and than forecasting) is not promoted or supported by EA-related organizations (or supported to a very limited degree). This is an example of how funding can and should be shifted.
1
Lorenzo Fong Ponce 🔸
It's not a good use of marginal funding when even one of the best forecasters can't build a strong view around its impact.  You can say "confidential AI use cases make it valuable". I don't disagree. I disagree that $100M went into this. Why shouldn't it be $10M?

This isn't something I've thought a ton about but I think forecasting should plausibly still receive funding in a specific way:

Funders should either pay forecasters to make predictions on important questions, or subsidize prediction markets on those questions.

I don't think forecasting is a "solution seeking a problem." There are tons of important but hard-to-predict questions that I'd like better forecasts on! The problem is that the ecosystem hasn't done a great job of turning dollars into good forecasts.

For example, most of my Metaculus questions are thi... (read more)

3
Marcus Abramovitch 🔸
The problem is that prediction markets on useful questions, many years out, suffer from problems due to capital lockup/interest rates, among other things.  Also, I just don't think the wisdom of the crowds emerges as much as you'd want. I think you can just ask 3 smart people what they think, and this will elicit more useful info.
8
Eva
The wisdom of crowds effect kicks in with very few forecasts. In the working paper I cite elsewhere in the comments, even 5 forecasts gets you pretty far along into the WoC effect, and 10 even more so. This is for asking people what they think, not prediction markets - the latter should, theoretically, require more forecasts, since seeing the implicit beliefs of others through the market price could lead to herding etc. But the wisdom of crowds effect kicking in for very small N is well established in the literature. I have a different takeaway as you, though, that we only know about this effect - or about the biases people have and how to adjust their forecasts - because of work on forecasting. I don't know how we'd know this stylized fact without work on it. For the wisdom of the crowds effect specifically, perhaps you could stop funding early since that one is well known, but it's sufficiently surprising to most people that there could be value in showing it for more domains, and it is really just one example of what we learn more generally from research on forecasting - and these other results on how to optimally weigh forecasts can shrink error much more even after taking the wisdom of the crowds effect into consideration. (In our work, WoC gets you a ~60% reduction in the MSE, but other small adjustments lead to an improvement of an additional ~60% reduction in error compared to the WoC estimate, and those aren't even all the improvements we can make.) Today I would never run an experiment without using forecasts to help with power calculations. And there is very recent work I'd use to adjust those forecasts, and we're collectively not near the optimum in terms of learning what we can learn to make more accurate forecasts or integrating them into workflows. As I said elsewhere in the comments, the claims in the OP are far too strong. Even your asking a few experts - that's something that could be improved on and integrated into workflows and is part of the t
3
david_reinstein
I think "your mileage may vary" quite a lot in this. In the context of the social science prediction market, you tend to be asking people who have expertise and familiarity with the methods and context, and sometimes more experienced than the people posting the questions. On the other hand, if you post detailed technical questions on a mainstream prediction market or even on Metaculus, I expect / have the sense that you don't get much of this' wisdom of the crowds dividend'.

"I don’t think there is very much in the way of “this forecasting happened, and now we have made demonstrably better decisions regarding this terminal goal that we care about”."

I assume some people disagree with this strong claim. One example I've heard was AGI timelines and their influence on AI safety field priorities - though I guess one could answer that certain reports or expert opinions where disproportionately more useful than prediction markets.

On a different point, I appreciated Eli Lifland's past comment on many intellectual activities (such as g... (read more)

I agree with some of this. But let me attempt a conciliatory take: less of forecasting money and effort should go to platforms and tournaments, but more should go to identifying existing, nascent forecasts (people using the word "probably" or "unlikely" about empirical matters) and creating markets (even unsubsidized Manifold markets would be helpful on the margin). I think it would be very helpful for someone to go through popular EA forum posts and org research documents and do this systematically.

3
david_reinstein
I started something in this direction here.  But I am also a bit skeptical that creating lots of unsubsidized markets would generate much positive information. My evidence/experience suggests that most people who are involved in these matters, don't want to do a substantial amount of research into this sort of very nuanced, detailed questions that are the highest value, so the small amount of predictions you get might just be noise.  

Prediction markets seem to be a great business (mostly gambling with all the problems associated with it) so “funding” in the sense of investing in them could be sensible while “funding” in the donation sense not. (And then later donation to AMF or similar). 

In general, I’m hesitant to donate to stuff that’s plausibly just a really good business in its own right. 

4
david_reinstein
Fair, but cultivating tools used for prediction markets is only a part of this forecasting research funding. And the sorts of questions that EAs want to get predictions over (e.g., number of chickens and cages per year with versus without the production of cell cultured meat) are unlikely to be part of a popular mainstream prediction market.
2
simon
Yes, funding eg “research that also produces forecasts” seems in a completely different category to me than eg prediction markets or platform building.  I feel the original article perhaps conflates different types of “forecast” funding a bit too much, although I tend to agree with its overall sentiment. 

Solution Seeking a Problem
When talking about forecasting, people often ask questions like “How can we leverage forecasting into better decisions?” This is the wrong way to go about solving problems.

I'm reconsidering this point. It seems intuitive, but what is the strongest argument that this is "wrong"?

2
Marcus Abramovitch 🔸
This just came to mind: the reason that it's the wrong way to go about solving problems is that you want to solve the largest problems (well, per resource) and not just solve any random problem. Like, there is a problem that my shoes are currently untied, and I don't want to bend down or spend 10 seconds to tie them, but it's not very important. So if you want to solve the most important problems, you should start with the problem and then work backwards for what solutions you might wish existed. I think the mere fact that people often talk about forecasting as the solution they are seeking to apply, whether that be Sentinel or whoever, is evidence that things are going wrong.
1
Niklas Lehmann
There is one, and I think is the main flaw of the presented argument: A lot of problems are only considered pressing because of our expectations regarding the future. Improving the latter is not "solving anything", but simply clearing up priorities.


I share the expressed concern but respectfully disagree with the major suggestion.
First, «overrating» is a perception problem, not purely an industry problem. People are free to believe in things, and sometimes they overrate them. The forecasting community did not force anyone to fund platforms over applied work. That was a series of decisions made by funders who could have chosen differently. Blaming the field for how it was funded seems like misplaced accountability.
Second, I am genuinely troubled by the premise of «tangible result delivery» as the prima... (read more)

Forecasting is a dangerous activity, particularly because it is a fun, game-like activity that is nearly perfectly designed to be very attractive to EA/rationalist types because you get to be right when others are wrong, bet on your beliefs, and partake in the cultural practice.

I like bets involving donations, and investments as alternatives to forecasting without money on the line.

4
Guy Raveh
That's still a sort of game/cultural thing rather than a means for more positive impact, though. I've seen that around EA basically forever, but I don't think people who bet on their beliefs have been "more right" than those who don't.
2
Vasco Grilo🔸
Hi Guy. The bets would be directly beneficial if people who are more accurate donate to more cost-effective interventions? In addition, I wonder whether the discussions of bets involving donations, and investments could have higher quality than ones of forecasting questions without money on the line. The prospects of winning or losing money usually leads to people investigating their views more.
4
Guy Raveh
That seems to be a general cultural view in EA, but what I'm saying is that I've yet to see any evidence these bets actually help. I think the notion is unfounded.
6
Ian Turner
My understanding is that there is an extensive body of evidence that people become more rational and put in more cognitive effort when there are real-money stakes involved; but I would welcome commentary from someone more familiar with the literature.
2
Vasco Grilo🔸
Hi Guy and Ian. To clarify, I have in mind bets which involve winning or losing amounts of money of at least 1 % of the net annual income, and ideally at least 10 %. For example, for some earning 30 k$ of net income per year, at least 300 $ (= 0.01*30*10^3), and ideally at least 3 k$ (= 0.1*30*10^3). For a sufficiently large amount of money at stake, people would either not accept the bet, or accept it after significant investigation.
2
Vasco Grilo🔸
This is widely believed to be true outside effective altruism too.

Off topic, but one additional thing I noticed about this list:

I can point to you hundreds of millions of chickens that lay eggs that are out of cages, and I can point to you observable families that are no longer living in poverty. I can show you pieces of legislation that have passed or almost passed on AI. I can show you AMF successes with about 200k lives saved and far lower levels of malaria, not to mention higher incomes and longer life expectancies, and people living longer lives that otherwise wouldn’t be because of our actions.

Is the glaring la... (read more)

It’s not the case that forecasting/prediction markets are merely in their infancy.

 

Counterargument: the internet had its theoretical underpinnings start approximately 1959-1960, with first grants for ARPANET in 1966-1969.

The whole thing was then not very useful until the 1990's.

You could pick earlier dates for theroetical underpinnings of the internet if you wanted, too.

I think prediction markets are more similar to the internet than to cryptocurrency: they require a mix of technology and infrastructure but also a change in human habits. Theoretically... (read more)

2
Lorenzo Buonanno🔸
  I don't think this is true. Emails and FTP were established in 1971 and used a lot by academics, scientists, and the military[1] 1. ^ From Gemini: The utility of email, FTP, and remote login (Telnet) during the 1970s and 1980s repaid the original government grants in three primary ways: 1. Elimination of Duplicate Hardware Costs In the 1960s and 1970s, computers were multi-million-dollar mainframes. Prior to ARPANET, ARPA frequently had to purchase separate, identical computers for different research institutions. The network allowed a researcher at UCLA to log into and utilize a specialized mainframe at MIT. The cost of developing and laying the network infrastructure was significantly lower than the cost of buying duplicate hardware for every university the Department of Defense funded. 2. Accelerated Scientific and Defense R&D Email and FTP collapsed the time required for complex collaboration. Instead of mailing magnetic tapes or waiting months for academic papers to be published and circulated, researchers shared datasets, software code, and peer reviews instantly. This rapid iteration sped up advancements in computer science, aerospace engineering, and defense logistics, delivering immense strategic value to the military and government.

A bit tangential to the main thrust of this post, but I have been wondering lately about some the regulatory aspects around prediction markets. Recently there was the scandal of a soldier who allegedly made $400,000 from insider information about the Maduro raid. There is particular interest in the US on banning sports betting, which is seen (accurately) as another form of gambling. Minnesota might ban prediction markets entirely.

Stepping back from the merits of this specific proposal, I see it as a part of a troubling broader anti-innovation trend. We hav... (read more)

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