Hey everyone! As a philosophy grad transitioning into AI governance/policy research or AI safety advocacy, I'd love advice: which for-profit roles best build relevant skills while providing financial stability?
Specifically, what kinds of roles (especially outside of obvious research positions) are valuable stepping stones toward AI governance/policy research? I don’t yet have direct research experience, so I’m particularly interested in roles that are more accessible early on but still help me develop transferable skills, especially those that might not be intuitive at first glance.
My secondary interest is in AI safety advocacy. Are there particular entry-level or for-profit roles that could serve as strong preparation for future advocacy or field-building work?
A bit about me:
– I have a strong analytical and critical thinking background from my philosophy BA, including structured and clear writing experience
– I’m deeply engaged with the AI safety space: I’ve completed BlueDot’s AI Governance course, volunteered with AI Safety Türkiye, and regularly read and discuss developments in the field
– I’m curious, organized, and enjoy operations work, in addition to research and strategy
If you've navigated a similar path, have ideas about stepping-stone roles, or just want to chat, I'd be happy to chat over a call as well! Feel free to schedule a 20-min conversation here.
Thanks in advance for any pointers!
Act utilitarians choose actions estimated to increase total happiness. Rule utilitarians follow rules estimated to increase total happiness (e.g. not lying). But you can have the best of both: act utilitarianism where rules are instead treated as moral priors. For example, having a strong prior that killing someone is bad, but which can be overridden in extreme circumstances (e.g. if killing the person ends WWII).
These priors make act utilitarianism more safeguarded against bad assessments. They are grounded in Bayesianism (moral priors are updated the same way as non-moral priors). They also decrease cognitive effort: most of the time, just follow your priors, unless the stakes and uncertainty warrant more complex consequence estimates. You can have a small prior toward inaction, so that not every random action is worth considering. You can also blend in some virtue ethics, by having a prior that virtuous acts often lead to greater total happiness in the long run.
What I described is a more Bayesian version of R. M. Hare's "Two-level utilitarianism", which involves an "intuitive" and a "critical" level of moral thinking.